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Abstract 
This research provides a microeconometric study of production efficiency in Iranian 
manufacturing sector within a broader political economy context which helps 
delineate the conditioning factors that are included in the model. The study is also a 
contribution to the literature on economic growth in oil rich economies. The existing 
literature mainly discusses the impact of oil revenues in terms of either sectoral 
misallocation of resources away from traded goods sectors or underinvestment in 
production sectors. We argue that these models fall short of explaining the growth 
experience of oil economies such as Iran. We show that the main obstacle to Iran’s 
economic growth is the inefficiency of investment. This is done by measuring 
production efficiency in the manufacturing sector using firm-level data. 
We assess the context of Iranian political economic structure and the importance of 
factors that can explain efficiency. We look at the productivity of Iranian economy 
and compare it with the performance of South Korea and Turkey. Our findings 
suggest that the productive performance of Iran has deteriorated not only in 
comparison to these countries but also with regards to its own trend prior to the 1979 
revolution. To establish the reason for this dismal performance, we explore the 
production efficiency of the Iranian manufacturing sector. We find production 
efficiency for manufacturing producers in 2007 to be around 66%. Our results also 
confirm that some of the institutional features of the Iranian economy play a 
significant role in explaining production efficiency. These are characteristics of firms 
that benefit most from higher subsidies and support from the oil revenues. We also 
find that firms that export and those that are larger tend to be more efficient. These 
findings have important policy implications, most notable of which is the creation of 
a more competitive environment for successful long-term growth. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Hypotheses 
The economic and development experience of oil-rich countries has been rather 
mixed. The diverse experience of different countries range from success stories such 
as Norway all the way to ‘failed states’ such as today’s Iraq. While the experience of 
each country is influenced by a myriad of other historical, cultural and political 
factors that are unique to each country, harnessing the power of oil (or other natural 
resources) can go a long way in improving the welfare of inhabitants of these 
countries. Form an economic point of view, this type of income is considered a rent 
since it is based on a wedge between the cost of obtaining this factor of production 
and the amount it is valued in the global markets. In other words it constitutes a 
source of ‘unearned income’. Nevertheless, the real-world examples of countries 
which have managed to benefit from these sources of rent confirm that they are not 
intrinsically harmful to the economy. Thus, the actual challenge should lie in the 
processes of their extraction, investment and redistribution. As these incomes almost 
entirely accrue to the government of the oil-rich countries, the role that they play in 
reaping the benefits of oil rents can be vital for these economies. There are numerous 
channels through which the government’s mismanagement and lack of foresight can 
influence the absorption and reallocation of this resource wealth. Furthermore, it can 
be argued that such sources of rent can be so powerful that they can redraw political 
lines and even change the governments themselves. These explanations highlight the 
importance of appropriate management of these revenues. 
Cursed Blessings? 
There has been a wide body of research dealing with the effects of countries’ natural 
resource endowments on their growth and development paths. Numerous hypotheses, 
both economic and political, have been proposed and tested in the literature. The 
most widely discussed theories include economic approaches such as the ‘Dutch 
Disease’, the ‘Resource Curse’ and ‘Rentier State’ theory. The Dutch Disease 
theories hypothesise that the interplay of economic factors and resource income can 
lead to overvaluation of the exchange rates and de-industrialisation. On the other 
hand, the more general Resource Curse discourse consists of growth models with 
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rather ad-hoc choice of variables that aim to explain how resource incomes can 
negatively influence economic growth. The channels discussed include factors such 
as institutional quality, rent-seeking behaviour and volatility of resource revenues. 
Furthermore, the Rentier State literature adopts a more political narrative to explain 
the sources of misfortunes for resource-abundant nations. These studies 
predominantly provide a more state-centric explanation by focusing on the 
possibility that the presence of the resource revenues can affect the very structure of 
the state and hence lead to undesirable social and economic consequences. 
While there seems to be some justification for each of the explanations provided by 
these approaches, the recent surge in empirical interest in this field has presented 
mixed and at times inconsistent results. Some findings have clearly challenged a 
number of these explanations entirely. Other analyses have shown that these 
explanations tend to be insufficient in providing a complete account of the 
developments for a given country due to their restrictive assumptions. This has been 
particularly true in the case of a number of developing countries. For example, as we 
will demonstrate, the experience of the Iranian economy does not conform to the 
predictions of the Dutch Disease framework. In fact in the presence of oil booms 
there seems to be an expansion and growth in profitability rather than the contraction 
of manufacturing. 
Iran has long been one of the main oil and gas producers and currently with 9.4% and 
18% share of the world’s proven oil and gas reserves respectively (BP, 2013), she is 
likely to remain a major producer in the foreseeable future. Thus, exploring the effect 
of oil revenues will have important implications for the long-term growth of Iran. 
The empirical evidence in the case of Iran suggests that the problems of growth are 
not due to the crowding out of the traded goods sectors as suggested by the Dutch 
Disease theories, nor do they appear to be associated with low levels of investment in 
the economy as suggested by some of the Resource Curse theories. In this thesis we 
argue that the low efficiency of investment rather than its level or sectoral allocation 
may be a more important problem associated with oil economies in general and Iran 
in particular. This is demonstrated by undertaking a microeconometic study of 
production efficiency in the manufacturing sector in Iran using firm-level data.  
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We further argue that the impact of oil revenues on production efficiency is mediated 
through the institutional set up in the economy and hence can be highly context 
specific. In order to investigate the determinants of production efficiency in Iranian 
manufacturing, we therefore need to first conduct a political economy analysis of the 
economic institutions that emerged in post-revolution period in Iran. These 
institutions determine the transmission mechanisms through which oil revenues 
affect manufacturing inefficiency. The econometric model of manufacturing 
efficiency which is estimated in the thesis incorporates these specific determining 
factors as well as other more general factors suggested in the literature. 
Why Manufacturing Sector? 
The role of industrialisation has long been highlighted in the growth and 
development literature. Most noticeably, manufacturing sector has received 
considerable attention due to its linkages and other characteristics that can enhance 
growth in the entire economy (e.g. Kuznets, 1957; Kaldor, 1967). Furthermore, a 
number of theories regarding oil and development, such as the Dutch Disease 
literature, also discuss the role of industries in the development experience of 
resource-rich countries. Therefore, this research takes a closer look at this aspect of 
growth and identifies the characteristics of manufacturing firms in the context of an 
oil producing country. Focusing on the behaviour of manufacturing firms also 
bridges the gap in the literature for a more micro-level explanation on the 
consequences of the role of oil on growth potentials of a resource-rich economy. It 
provides a clear framework of assessing the effect of prominent economic policies of 
oil-rich countries on their productive performance. These policies include emphasis 
on large scale and capital intensive production, greater public ownership and 
pursuing import substitution policies; all of which rely on the availability of the oil 
income. In the case of post-revolutionary Iran, we will show that these measures 
have been implemented through the country’s unique political economic structure.  
In light of the above passage, the main hypothesis that is tested in this thesis is 
whether the oil revenues have adversely impacted the production performance of 
manufacturing firms. To examine this, the role of important determinants of 
production efficiency (also referred to as technical efficiency) is explored. A number 
of these determinants are themselves a product of the political economic features of 
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Iran. As mentioned above, these features have been largely moulded by the effect of 
oil income on the economic policies and institutions. We empirically test the effect 
of ownership of manufacturing firms on their efficiency index and see if the public 
sector is truly less efficient as it is generally concluded in most studies on Iran. This 
will help determine if oil revenues have reduced the role of private sector in favour 
of less efficient public ones. Next, we examine the hypothesis that exporter firms 
tend to be more efficient than those who only serve the domestic market. Exporters 
receive a number of benefits from cheaper exchange rates and other government 
benefits. Nevertheless, a positive influence of exports on efficiency could also 
highlight the importance of export promotion strategies which is exemplified by the 
experience of the Asian Tigers. Other direct interventions of the government in 
production such as factor price subsidies to producers especially in their energy bills 
might not only cause allocative problems but it can act as a determent to the 
efficiency of production. Thus, a variable of fuel expenditure can shed light on this 
hypothesis. The effect of other factors such as size, agglomeration and capital 
intensive production which are the salient features of oil-abundant countries could 
also explain the negative productive capacity of industries due to the presence of 
such revenues. Exploring the importance of other factors such as market share, 
Research and Development (R&D) expenditure and composition of the labour force 
will also allow us to control for other sources of efficiency heterogeneity. 
The research deals with the unique anatomy of the Iranian state and will shed light on 
the performance of the Iranian manufacturing firms using a microeconometric 
framework. It will be a contribution to the existing oil and economic growth 
literature by looking at the effects of oil revenues through channels which shape the 
production behaviour of individual firms in the manufacturing sector. The micro-
level efficiency analysis on the Iranian industry provides both a theoretical and an 
empirical contribution to the literature. The theoretical contribution is providing a 
disaggregated account of the dynamics at play and an alternative to the oil and 
development literature by linking it with the efficiency analysis literature. 
Empirically, this thesis provides evidence on the sources of productivity disparity in 
the Iranian economy. Furthermore, to our knowledge accurate estimates of 
manufacturing efficiency are non-existent in the productivity literature of Iran. These 
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estimates can provide a benchmark in a number of other fields such as managerial 
aspects of production. 
1.2 Chapter Summary and Key Objectives 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Here we will provide an overview of the 
remaining eight chapters and their main aims. 
The next chapter ( Chapter 2) explores the main theoretical and empirical literature 
regarding the frameworks of oil and economic growth. The prominent paradigms are 
discussed in this chapter, including the Dutch Disease theory of Corden and Neary 
(1982) who initially suggested a static model of how oil revenues affect the 
economic structure of a resource dependent country. We review the other variations 
of the basic Dutch Disease model, and examine their assumptions and limitations. 
Next, we present an overview of the Resource Curse literature which gained 
prominence by the work of Sachs and Warner (1995). We discuss the main 
explanations that are provided in these studies to explain the impact of resource 
revenues on economic growth of countries. We critically appraise these models’ 
econometric approach and investigate the compatibility of their conclusions with 
findings of empirical studies especially with regard to oil-rich countries. We explain 
why a number of their limiting assumptions make them incapable of explaining the 
experience of many developing countries. We also review the literature on Rentier 
States that was spearheaded by the work of Mahdavy (1970). We emphasise the 
important contribution of this literature suggesting the necessity of context 
specificity in any meaningful research on the role of oil on growth and development 
of a given country. 
After the review of the resource literature we discuss a neglected component of 
economic growth theory literature to the context of our interest. We explain how 
efficiency analysis can assist in clarifying the channels through which oil revenues 
influence the productivity of an oil-rich country. While both allocative and technical 
aspects of efficiency can be influenced by oil expenditure in the economy we 
propose investigating technical efficiency measures since as we will see in  Chapter 3 
and  Chapter 4, this seems to be a more long-term challenge to the Iranian economy 
and has yet to be addressed in depth by the existing literature. 
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In  Chapter 3, we provide an overview of the political structure of the Iranian state 
after the revolution. We explain the principles that this arrangement has been built 
upon and highlight its consequences for economic institutions and their impact on the 
economy. We briefly provide an overview of the political economic history of the 
Islamic Republic where we focus on the issue of factionalism which has been at the 
forefront of political and economic instability with important implications for the 
management of oil revenues. We then discuss the institutional developments with 
important economic consequences by focusing on the economic evidence regarding 
the role of state owned enterprises (SOEs), parastatal organisations (bonyads) and 
traditional merchants (bazaaris). We show that these unique institutional attributes of 
the Iranian economy are paramount factors that have to be considered in any analysis 
regarding the effect of oil revenues on Iran’s economic growth.  
In  Chapter 4, we explore the historical growth trends of the Iranian economy and 
compare the Iranian case with the prediction of theories discussed in  Chapter 2. We 
empirically investigate the relationship between real GDP and oil growth rates in 
order to demonstrate the extent of dependence of growth rates on oil and gas 
revenues. We discuss the findings of studies researching the effects of oil revenue 
volatility on the economy. We argue that political competition has translated into 
volatility in government expenditure despite recent measures such as the oil 
stabilisation fund (OSF) which itself has seen amendments partly as a result of such 
factionalism. Next, we investigate the performance of manufacturing growth vis-à-
vis the oil income in order to assess the empirical relevance of the Dutch Disease 
framework in Iran. To see the underlying dynamics of the manufacturing sector we 
employ a markup model for cost-price relationships. We compare the labour 
productivity and product wage trends and explain the consequences of government 
subsidies for the productive performance and competitiveness of manufacturing 
firms. We compare Iran’s per capita growth trend with other countries and 
demonstrate how the government’s policies have led to inefficient modes of 
production in the economy which is evident in indexes such as energy intensity. 
To have a broad picture of the economy’s performance and the importance of all 
inputs in production, we look at total factor productivity (TFP) of Iran’s economy 
in  Chapter 5. We construct a capital stock trend for Iran and use this to obtain growth 
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accounting estimates of TFP growth for the 1966-2007 period. We analyse the trend 
based on the main periods of the economy and especially assess the difference 
between the pre and post-revolutionary performance of the aggregate economy. We 
estimate the aggregate productivity of South Korea and Turkey for the same period 
and compare their performance with the estimates for Iran. In order to understand the 
reasons for the difference between Iran and these countries’ performance we draw 
our focus back to Iran’s manufacturing sector which we argue can be the engine of 
growth and job creation in Iran. Finally, we look at manufacturing structure and see 
how the shift of manufacturing production towards heavy industry has been obtained 
through government intervention and backed by oil rents. We argue that a more 
sustainable trend is only possible through improvement of productive efficiency. 
This will lead us to establish how productivity of the aggregate sector is determined 
by the efficiency of production at the micro-level in manufacturing production The 
measurement and analysis of production efficiency at the microeconomic level is the 
subject of the following three chapters. 
 Chapter 6 provides both a theoretical and an empirical discussion on the efficiency 
analysis literature. After critically evaluating the different notions of efficiency in 
economics, we focus on technical efficiency and explain why this is an important 
measure to investigate regarding Iranian manufacturing production. We next 
examine various methodologies of estimating technical efficiency. We identify two 
important approaches: the econometric (stochastic frontier analysis) and non-
parametric (data envelopment analysis) methods of estimation. We compare the 
benefits and drawbacks of each method. Eventually, we opt for the stochastic frontier 
analysis method due to better statistical properties and an organic relationship with 
the TFP estimation methodology. This is in line with most studies in economics and 
in contrast to fields such as operations research which use non-parametric methods. 
We also review the theoretical models of identifying sources of technical 
inefficiency. Next, we look at the empirical literature to gather a list of important 
determinants of efficiency and explore key rationales for the incorporation of such 
variables in the models. A number of these determinants are used in  Chapter 8 to test 
our hypotheses regarding the sources of inefficiency in the manufacturing sector. 
Finally, we compare and contrast different empirical models with regards to the 
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choice of functional form, definition of variables and other implicit assumptions of 
such models. 
In  Chapter 7, we introduce our frontier model and variables. Next, we provide a brief 
overview of the dataset used in our efficiency estimation which consists of a census 
of firms with more than 50 employees and sample survey of smaller manufacturing 
firms in 2007. After discussing key indicators and some stylised facts of the data, we 
estimate both Cobb-Douglas and Translog production frontiers and obtain estimates 
of technical efficiency for each. We test if the Cobb-Douglas function is nested in the 
Translog function and use the more appropriate estimates as our preliminary results. 
We assess the relative success of the manufacturing sector by looking at our initial 
estimates. Finally, we summarise the efficiency scores based on important categories 
such as type of industry and ownership and investigate the presence of heterogeneity 
among different firms. This will assist us in identifying the potential determinants of 
technical efficiency in our sample. 
The objective of  Chapter 8 is to arrive at our final model and identify the sources of 
technical inefficiency in a more robust manner. We start this chapter by discussing a 
list of key determinants from the literature and those particularly relevant to the 
institutional set up of the Iranian economy. We then list the key variables affecting 
the production performance of firms in Iranian industries and incorporate nine key 
determinants based on the theoretical and empirical literature and allowed by the 
limitations of the dataset. These factors include ownership, fuel intensity, industry 
share, labour composition, agglomeration effect (main industrial provinces of Tehran 
and Esfahan), export and research intensities, size and capital-labour ratio. We then 
use two main methods of incorporating the determinants within our estimating 
model. We identify the statistically significant determinants in the two-stage method 
but reserve the final judgement for the second method which is more econometrically 
robust. The second method or the single stage estimation follows Battese and Coelli 
(1995) in which the efficiency scores are estimated alongside the effects of 
exogenous factors on these efficiencies. Thus, first we compare the new adjusted 
efficiency estimates with our initial findings in the previous chapter. After this, we 
explore the results and comment on the significant determinants. We explain the 
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channels through which oil has affected these variables and subsequently the 
efficiency performance of manufacturing firms.  
In the final chapter ( Chapter 9), we provide a summary of the important conclusions 
of this research. We then reflect on the significance of these findings with the current 
body of empirical and theoretical literature and important policy implications. 
Finally, we identify the limitations of our analysis and based on this propose the 
important directions for prospective research.  
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Chapter 2 Frameworks of Oil Revenues and Development 
2.1 Introduction 
The main challenge of oil-rich economies is managing the proceeds of their natural 
fortunes both in terms of investment and controlling for the income fluctuations that 
are associated with revenues based on such commodities. With the current increase 
of oil prices the importance of oil in the growth literature has rather intensified.  
Different explanations have attempted to shed light on the nature of challenges of 
resource-based economies using arguments drawn from both economics and politics 
disciplines. Until the early 1950s development economists largely held that natural 
resource exporting countries had the luxury of overcoming their capital shortages and 
consequently maintain high investment rates. This would ideally materialise in high 
levels of investment and ultimately translate into higher growth rates in resource-rich 
countries compared to those that are not resource-abundant. Other infrastructural 
shortfalls and investment bottlenecks could also gradually be alleviated. On the other 
hand, in 1950s a minority of others (mainly Structuralists) argued that this might not 
be the case. Their main reasons were deteriorating terms of trade (Prebisch, 1950), 
unreliable government and foreign exchange reserves due to high price fluctuations 
(Nurske, 1958) and lack of investment by the multinational extractors in other sectors 
of the economy (Hirschman, 1958). Since then the true consequence of natural 
resource wealth has been a hotly contested issue in the field. Consequently, in hope 
of finding evidence ascertaining the true relationship, research in this field has 
gradually become less theoretical and more empirical which is applied to various 
different contexts while employing a range of diverse models and approaches. 
The current literature can be divided into three main groups including Dutch Disease, 
Resource Curse and Rentier State theory. In this chapter we will review these 
prominent frameworks that are used to explain the possible negative effects of 
resource abundance/dependence for the resource-rich countries. We will start by 
surveying each literature’s main results and critically assess their strengths and 
weaknesses. After this we discuss the relevance of efficiency analysis in providing a 
new approach to the question at hand. Finally, we will conclude this chapter with our 
proposed synthesis of the discussed literatures. 
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2.2 Dutch Disease 
The so called ‘Dutch Disease’ concept is one of the popular theoretical frameworks 
trying to explain why revenues from non-renewable resources such as oil, gas and 
minerals may ironically induce lower growth rates in the economy. This framework 
can be considered as a relatively separate literature from the more general Resource 
Curse literature since the channels of the resource effect and its empirical 
investigation are explained in a distinctively different manner. 
The earliest written document using the term was The Economist magazine, in 
November 26th 1977, in an article about the overvaluation of the then Dutch currency 
(Guilder) in the 1960s. A sudden boom of revenues from the natural gas reserves at 
that time was followed by a shift in the structure of the Dutch economy (crowding 
out of the manufacturing sector and drop in export share in GDP) and thus this 
process was termed as the Dutch Disease. The literature consists of a limited number 
of different models but is riddled with a wide number of empirical applications 
explaining the curse of resource abundance. What makes the Dutch Disease 
argument to be widely discussed, in comparison to the more general Resource Curse 
discourse, is its clear analytical structure. It allows for a logical foundation based on 
which not only cross-country studies become comparable but it methodically 
discusses the dynamics and structural rearrangements within the economy. 
There have been different frameworks presenting the problem, each having relatively 
different essential assumptions which can be a make-or-break element in their 
discussions. All models try to explain the coexistence of a booming and lagging 
sector and the consequences that shifts in one might entail for the other. 
2.2.1 The Core Model 
The core model suggested by Corden (1982), Corden and Neary (1982) and 
elaborated by Corden (1984), is explained through assuming three sectors in a small 
open economy. These are the booming sector (B), normally oil/mineral sector, which 
is the source of a sudden increase in export revenues, the lagging sector (L) such as 
manufacturing or agriculture and the non-tradable sector (N) such as utilities or 
transportation. Production in each sector is undertaken by a factor specific to that 
sector and labour. The core model suggests three reasons for a sudden boom: 
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increase in the price of the exported good, important technological advances in B and 
an increase in capital flows from outside the country (Corden, 1984). 
The core model relies on a number of critical assumptions. It assumes full and 
efficient employment of factors of production. This can be obtained by assuming that 
labour is truly mobile thus it can move freely between sectors and be employed 
relatively easily. Consequently, wages in different sectors will be equal. Factor prices 
are assumed to be flexible in the country but the factors themselves are immobile 
between countries. This implies full employment in the economy. Furthermore, the 
analysis talks about a one off initial revenue or technical change. In other words, 
post-boom it relies on the assumption of fixed technology. Additionally, it is implied 
in this framework that the tradables produced by L and their foreign counterparts are 
homogenous or perfect substitutes. The other assumption is the small country 
assumption so that a contraction or expansion of L does not change world prices. 
The two main consequence of the sudden boom are termed as the ‘spending effect’ 
and the ‘resource movement effect’. The spending effect happens when the 
additional revenues are spent either by the B or the government which obtains 
additional revenue via taxes. If the income elasticity of demand for the goods is 
positive, it will induce a greater demand in the economy both for tradables such as 
manufacturing and non-tradable goods such as construction. This will entail a pull on 
the price of non-tradables whereas the price of tradables stays constant since it is 
determined by world prices since the economy is assumed to be small. Therefore, the 
relative price of non-tradables to tradables or the real exchange rate increases. The 
appreciation happens in the form of nominal exchange rate appreciation if the 
country has a floating exchange rate and as inflation if the exchange rate is fixed. 
What follows this is the resource movement effect. The windfall will lead mobile 
factors of production such as labour to leave L for B due to their higher marginal 
product in that sector which now has a higher factor demand. This movement is 
referred to as the direct deindustrialisation. Moreover, at constant real exchange 
rates, labour is expected to also leave N for B, which results in additional movement 
of labour away from the L towards N to cover the excess demand for non-tradables. 
This is called indirect deindustrialisation. Ultimately, this results in a contraction in 
the less competitive tradable production hence the term lagging sector which is 
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normally referred to manufacturing or agriculture. It is worth mentioning that there 
might be an additional increase in labour wages if the non-tradable sector expands 
compared to pre-boom levels. However, not all the above effects necessarily 
materialise, for example, in oil booms since the oil sector is not labour intensive, the 
more important effect tends to be the spending effect (e.g. Bruno and Sachs, 1982). 
2.2.2 Relaxing the Core Model Assumptions 
Corden (1984) consolidates the literature that followed and attempts to relax some 
restrictions and explain theoretical gaps such as immigration and endogenous terms 
of trade. It then goes on to provide solutions for protecting the lagging sector. 
He argues that if it is assumed that apart from labour, other factors of production are 
now mobile the resource movement effect could have paradoxical results. To further 
clarify, if it is assumed that B still has its own specific factor of production but the 
two other sectors use labour and capital in different proportions under a mini-
Heckscher-Ohlin model, in this setting and at constant real exchange rate, resource 
movement will result to the capital-intensive sector’s expansion due to labour 
movement out of L and N into B. Now if L is capital intensive it will mean that based 
on the resource movement alone it will expand. Even though the real appreciation of 
the spending effect might counter this due to labour and capital leaving L for N, the 
final result might be unclear yet it might mean L expanding. It is clear under similar 
rationale that if N is capital-intensive then N could experience a contraction and a 
real depreciation might follow. 
Going back to the core model, this time if we relax other factor mobility for the two 
main subsectors of L, similar to the above, it might be that the subsector which is 
capital-intensive will expand and the labour-intensive one will contract, even though 
the sector as a whole might contract (Corden, 1984). Clearly, this might mean that 
the results and policy implications of Dutch Disease under this form will be 
considerably different and might not be as bad in certain scenarios. 
2.2.3 Other Dutch Disease Models 
A slightly different model is that of van Wijnbergen (1984) in which he introduces 
the productivity enhancing importance of ‘Learning by Doing’ (LBD) in the tradable 
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sector as an additional caveat for the Dutch Disease model. He argues that if the oil 
(mineral resource) revenues are not spent on buying foreign assets (he initially 
assumes that there are no international capital flows) then the government should 
intervene and subsidise the tradables sector. This is because LBD is not internalised 
by the firm that initially train and obtain the experience and its social spillover 
accrues to the whole industry. 
Alternatively, Krugman (1987) presents a slightly different framework to explain the 
Dutch Disease. Instead of a Heckscher-Ohlin type of model, he presents a framework 
based on the comparative advantage model of Dornbusch et al. (1977). Relying on 
increasing returns to scale trade theory (due to LBD being assumed to be external to 
manufacturing firms), he argues that the temporary export boosts can have a lasting 
impact and even some industries disappear or contract in an irreversible manner. 
Matsuyama (1992) employs an endogenous growth model (also referred to as the 
‘linkages approach’) in which manufacturing is assumed to experience LBD. 
However, the benefit of this learning process does not spillover the rest of the 
economy. He demonstrates that when labour (the only mobile factor in his model) 
moves away from agriculture and manufacturing it will have a detrimental effect on 
the growth rate. 
2.2.4 Dutch Disease Limitations 
The models proposed by the Dutch Disease literature are heavily dependent on their 
assumptions making them rather abstract models and in reality often being the 
exception. Clearly, if we relax any of these conditions the situation would be 
different. This has meant that even though it provides a framework to show the 
mechanism the effects of oil windfalls on the whole economy it remains abstract. 
It is relatively easy to observe why Dutch Disease might not be robust in developing 
countries. The assumption of full employment of production factors is an 
inappropriate assumption for these economies (and most other economies). The 
resource revenue allows these countries to import the necessary capital and 
machinery and overcome such shortcomings. Furthermore, in light of these 
productivity-enhancing investments and the consequent higher levels of technology 
(in contradiction to fixed capital assumption), it can well be the case that the output 
30 
of the tradable sector also increases along with the non-tradables. Similar arguments 
can be made with regards to the full-employment assumption since these countries 
are often plagued with large amounts of surplus labour. For example, in a panel of 
eight developing oil-exporting countries Fardmanesh (1991) contests that the 
spending effect and the world price effect (changes in relative world price of 
agricultural commodities to manufactures) in the 1966-1986 period only contracted 
agriculture and not manufacturing. Furthermore, Gelb (1988) confirms resource 
movement from agriculture and manufacturing to the resource sector for only four 
out of the seven oil exporters during the oil boom period of 1971-1983. 
Furthermore, in oil-rich but capital-poor economies the increased productivity can be 
so overwhelming that leads to real exchange rate depreciation and hence the so called 
curse would not seem apparent (Sachs, 2007). Bearing in mind that aid inflows 
technically have the same effect as oil windfalls, the experience of poor African aid-
receiving countries show real exchange rate depreciations. 
Another issue is the time horizon that the Dutch Disease deals with. The model is 
only equipped to explain a short-term account. The paradigm is mainly based on a 
single shock to the economy and how thing take hold from then onwards. However, 
this is clearly inadequate (if not misleading) for a large number commodity exporters 
especially oil economies, which possess large amounts of resources lasting a long 
period of time and therefore experience numerous booms and busts in their revenues 
in the medium and even short term due to the fluctuations in export prices. For 
example, Michaels (2011) assesses the long run consequences of oil revenues in the 
United States’ southern states in the period between 1940 and 1990 and finds a 
positive effect for the resource-abundant counties. He argues that the higher wages 
lead to greater population directed to these regions leading to greater infrastructure 
investments. This will entail higher productivity not only for sectors directly related 
to the oil sector but also other sectors which offset the high factor prices and resource 
price volatility. 
Additionally, the literature often implies that if the government takes appropriate 
measures to minimise the effects of Dutch Disease the consequences will be 
temporary and the economy will soon follow its previous trajectory. However, if the 
lagging sector such as manufacturing operates under economies of scale or LBD, 
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then the return to pre-boom state after a long period of contraction would be very 
costly and the effects of such a scenario might not be so temporary. 
In a recent study Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) provide empirical evidence 
regarding the sectoral productivity changes due to resource windfalls. The authors 
show that regions with higher resource wealth (resource revenue to GDP ratio) tend 
to have productive but small manufacturing sectors and large unproductive non-
manufacturing sectors. They claim that resource movement effect leads to this 
dynamic. They argue that as a result of a self-selection process, the less-skilled 
workers in the manufacturing sector leave for the non-manufacturing sector. This 
means that a more skilled workforce increases the productivity of the manufacturing 
sector and a less specialised labour reduces the productivity of the non-tradables, 
ultimately leading to a change in sectoral productivity.  
While this shows the productivity changes of resource movement it fails to clarify 
how the production process itself is affected. In other words similar to previous 
literature it focuses on resource reallocation as a detriment to aggregate productivity 
and not the production process itself. Apart from the indirect reference of Dutch 
Disease models that rely on LBD assumptions the literature ignores the question of 
economic inefficiency in other sectors and how this affects the growth trajectories of 
these countries. This issue will be the crux of our argument and is addressed in the 
last part of this chapter. 
Finally, a note of caution seems warranted regarding models which assume a 
separate traded and non-traded sector. While any abstraction is done for the sake of 
arriving at a simplified model, in the case of Dutch Disease such restrictive sectoral 
classification has increasingly become meaningless and incompatible with reality. It 
is increasingly hard to find examples of a fully non-traded goods sector. For instance, 
offshoring of services to other countries or employment of foreign labour in large 
construction projects is only two examples that come to mind for non-traded goods. 
Similarly, traded-goods sectors such as manufacturing can be protected to the extent 
that they can be considered as non-traded goods due to import restrictions. For 
example, as Davies et al. (1994) point out, this is commonly observed in sub-Saharan 
countries due to heavy import restrictions. In this light, we argue that a more micro 
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perspective that can provide an alternative framework on the effect of oil revenues 
can help address this issue. 
2.3 Oil and Economic Growth - Resource Curse 
The other strand of literature dealing with the effect of resources consists of a 
relatively large number of studies which try to examine the validity, cause and 
severity of the so called ‘Resource Curse’ hypothesis. The more general ‘Resource 
Curse’ (also referred to as the ‘Paradox of the Plenty’) literature normally relies on 
empirical econometric growth regression; the majority of which are mainly cross-
sectional cross-country regressions trying to measure the extent and direction of a 
resource abundance (or dependence) variable on the overall growth variable. These 
studies attempt to first evaluate the growth experience of the group of countries they 
study and then relate this to the growth trend in their corresponding resource sector. 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997 and 2001) are amongst many in the literature 
suggesting a negative relationship between the resource dependence and economic 
growth. A number of reasons have been put forward in explaining this paradox 
including governance, excessive debt, currency overvaluation and inequality, only to 
name a few.  
As mentioned above, the research on the impact of natural resources has been a hotly 
contested topic, especially since the 1950s. Case studies including Gelb (1988) and 
Auty (1993) which indicated a negative relationship paved the way for more work. 
This was in light of the fact that some of these studies where cautious on the 
implications of their results and suggested they could not be treated as general 
binding rules but rather as a plausible possibility (Auty, 1993).  
Probably the most influential study attempting to verify these claims was that of 
Sachs and Warner (1995), in which the growth determinants of ninety-seven 
countries in a nineteen year period was studied and a negative relationship between 
resource intensity (ratio of natural resource exports to each country’s GDP in 1971) 
and growth was concluded. In this cross-sectional model it is suggested that even 
after controlling for other variables affecting growth such as trade policy, investment 
rate, initial per-capita income, income distribution and terms-of-trade volatility, the 
results hold. They further find a robust relationship after excluding six slow-growing 
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but oil-rich countries (Iraq, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia) in their study period of 1971-1989. These results are confirmed once again in 
Sachs and Warner (1997) after changing the base year to 1970 and extending the 
period to 1990 in which they conclude nearly a 1 percent growth reduction for every 
one standard deviation increase in the resource variable. In the first paper they 
propose four different hypotheses or ‘pathways’ for abundance of resources possibly 
hindering growth. One hypothesis is that more resources lead to more rent-seeking 
behaviour which would show itself in a lower value for the ‘bureaucratic efficiency’ 
variable (an index of judicial independence, corruption and red tape in each country). 
They model this index to influence economic growth directly and indirectly by 
affecting the investment variable. Their second hypothesis is that more resources 
lead to states pushing for protectionist policies which is claimed to reduce 
investments and growth indirectly but also independently after controlling for 
investment. The third explanation is that the higher demand caused by the resource 
rents leads to higher relative price of non-traded goods which might change the 
relative price of investment goods and ultimately affect investment and thus growth. 
Finally, they suggest higher aggregate demand can draw labour away from sectors 
with high levels of LBD reducing labour productivity and growth (similar to Dutch 
Disease). These explanations are vaguely presented and the exact possible channels 
of such effects are not elaborated and thus they seem to be more a tentative guess 
rather than concrete theoretical rationale. The authors explicitly state this by claiming 
that they directly include the resource variable in the growth model to measure the 
mentioned affects ‘as well as further unspecified effects’ (Sachs and Warner 1995, 
p.18). This drawback is the most evident unifying characteristic of almost the entire 
general Resource Curse literature. 
Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) argue that the resource-growth relationship might be 
affected by the fact that resource-rich countries tend to overspend. They postulate 
that due to the exhaustible nature of the resources these industries cannot grow at the 
same rate as the non-resource industries. Therefore, especially in the initial stages of 
production the habit of increasing revenues might lead these countries to make large 
expenditures and carry on to do so as they are arriving at a more steady state. 
Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) assume the Venezuelan oil sector between 1972 to1993 
as a sector with a fixed output while other sectors can expand by employing more 
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capital and labour. They find negative overall growth due to the presence of oil 
incomes causing the country to arrive at its expected steady state from above. They 
state that their model will apply if the resource revenues are not invested in foreign 
capital assets with fixed interest rates and using the annuities as the source of 
expenditure. On the other hand, it is argued by Manzano and Rigobon (2001) that the 
over spending of these governments can have further negative implications. For 
example, over leveraging against the oil asset ultimately leads to large debt burdens 
and unfinished projects which are obstacles to economic growth  
Bulte et al. (2005) investigate the relationship between a number of welfare indices 
(including HDI and life expectancy) and the natural resource variable for which they 
find a weak relationship. However, they demonstrate that the indirect effect of the 
resource income on welfare via affecting institutions is more robustly negative. 
A number of studies (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Torvik 2002, 
Halvor et al., 2006) suggest a rent-seeking rationale for the overall detrimental effect 
of resources on the economy. They suggest that a country’s resource abundance 
might lead to increasing rent-seeking activities in the economy instead of productive 
ones. This problem seems to be more acute especially when there are multiple main 
powerful groups. Lane and Tornell (1996) explain that under this setting and 
especially in the absence of strong institutions the fiscal demands of these interest 
groups have to be sourced by some type of taxation of the rest of the economy which 
will cause savings, rate of return and investment to fall and thus reduce production 
growth. Furthermore, the negative effect of competition for fund appropriation 
between these powers can surpass the overall increase of income for the resources 
causing actual growth reduction (the voracity effect). Tornell and Lane (1999) divide 
the economy into a formal and shadow sector (e.g. offshore bank accounts). They 
hypothesize that the formal sector employs productive technology, has efficient 
investment and is taxed whereas the shadow sector uses less productive technology 
and thus lower rates of returns but is not taxable by the domestic authorities. Based 
on this model they contest that even though an increase in the raw rate of return such 
as a resource windfall or even a positive productivity shock in the formal sector 
means better profitability for that sector, it ironically reduces overall growth due to 
factionalism and competition for fiscal rents which can be taxed and redistributed to 
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the informal sector. The negative effect is shown to offset the windfall 
disproportionally. Thus, the lower rate of return of the informal sector means that 
under a discrete mechanism of rent redistribution, overall growth of the economy 
suffers. Torvik (2002) also concludes that the drop in income due to the rent-seeking 
activities offsets the increase of income from the natural resource and thus ultimately 
reduces overall growth. Furthermore, in an extension to his main model, the author 
proposes that when only the non-traded sector is subject to increasing returns to scale 
and the natural resource is the only export good, in an open economy setting the 
additional rents leads to additional rent-seeking and reduced actual production. Thus, 
this retards productivity in the non-traded sector. This is in contrast to the Dutch 
Disease models which instead suggest traded-sector to be the main culprit of 
decreased productivity. 
Other studies directly focus on institutions as the main focal point of their arguments. 
Mehlum et al. (2006) focus on the role of institutional quality as a predetermined or 
fixed factor affecting growth. They argue that the outcome of the competition 
between entrepreneurs who compete for rents to use in production purposes and 
those who engage in rent-seeking depends on the type of institutions. After dividing 
the countries of their study into two groups of those with bad or grabber friendly 
institutions and those with good or production friendly institutions, they find a 
stronger negative relationship for the former group and an insignificant one for the 
latter. In a different approach a number of studies including Leite and Weidmann 
(2002) postulate that the institutions themselves are affected by resource abundance. 
Therefore, they suggest that rather than a direct channel it is the indirect channels 
that resource rents hinder growth by shaping bad institutions. Two main rent-seeking 
explanations are provided by Isham et al. (2004) for why point resources (i.e. 
resources concentrated in small geographical area such as oil) can retard growth. 
First, it is suggested that the elites in charge of such resources would resist 
industrialisation to avoid their power base being undermined with the emergence of 
urban labour, urban middle class and industrialists who will try to get hold of the 
rents. Thus, a lag in progress and growth is created by this conflict of interests. 
Secondly, they suggest that the social inequality effect of point resources can create a 
hierarchical relationship which leads to clientelism and reduces the possibility of 
collective demands by horizontally equal classes (who might have distrust for each 
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other) for better governance. This ultimately contributes to worse economic growth. 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) assert that it is exactly the lack of controlling 
for the institution variable that leads to the conclusion of a negative relationship 
between resources and growth. 
Despite the vast number of explanations and empirical analyses, the literature has 
displayed mixed results. A string of studies argue that while this might be the case 
for other resources, the oil-rich countries have definitely experienced a positive 
relation between oil booms and economic growth (Spatafora and Warner, 1995; 
Yang and Lam, 2007). Other studies question the robustness of Sachs and Warner 
findings and find a positive relation once resource abundance is used instead of 
resource dependence (e.g. Ding and Field, 2005; Alexeev and Conrad, 2007). Stijns 
(2005) suggests that the results are not as robust as they are claimed to be and are 
often ambiguous due to the presence of both positive and negative channels through 
which resources (except land) can affect economic growth. 
From an econometric point of view, the majority of earlier studies have mainly relied 
on cross-sectional analysis thus time effects have been left unexplored. Furthermore, 
cross-sectional growth regressions might be problematic due to problems of omitted 
variable bias and endogeneity of the resource variable. More recently, the 
employment of better estimation methods and employment of better panel-data 
techniques have to some extent improved results but heterogeneous panel estimators 
are yet to be widely applied (Mohaddes and Pesaran, 2014). 
Technical estimation deficiencies aside, it still remains that the main drawback of the 
models in the Resource Curse literature apparently stems from the fact that relatively 
ad-hoc growth regressions with vague theoretical rationale which seem inadequate in 
illuminating the complex relationship between resource abundance and growth and 
the various channels that it might influence the economy. 
2.4 Rentier States and the Political Economy 
Within the literature attempting to show an explanation for a negative relationship 
between resources and prosperity there are also those which provide a more political 
narrative. These studies focus on the nature of the oil revenues as rent and emphasise 
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the consequent effect that resource rents pose on the institutional anatomy of 
resource-rich states. Initially, Mahdavy (1970) coined the term ‘Rentier States’ in 
order to elucidate the oil-rich countries poor development records. He argues that due 
to the external windfall in revenues, governments gradually become less efficient in 
terms of investments and taxation. 
A Rentier State is normally defined as one that a considerable share of its revenues 
consists of oil (resource) income. A necessary condition for classifying a resource 
based government to be a Rentier State is that it has to have access to these revenues 
directly. Within the literature attempts have been made to propose a quantitative 
definition of a full Rentier State. Luciani (1987) defines a Rentier State as a country 
which its state budget consists of more than 40 percent from oil rents. Nevertheless, 
it is argued that prior to the 1970s when the oil companies started to share the oil 
rents more fairly with the oil-rich countries, the sudden boost of revenues reshaped 
governments even before this threshold (Claes, 2001). The main explanation of the 
Rentier State theory is that by relying on the non-tax based revenue the state 
becomes almost financially independent of the domestic production taxes. 
Describing it as state-centred explanations, Ross (1999) indicates two major themes 
among the Rentier State literature that try to explain the negative effects of the 
external revenues. One reason is that the emergence of these rents fosters an elite 
group. Since the realisation of future rents are also not based on domestic economic 
production, this will cause the economy to move away from efficient maximising 
behaviour into inefficient, wasteful and corrupt economic behaviour. Consequently, 
the state will lose its extractive (taxing) capability when it needs it most (slowdown 
in oil rents) and only plays the distributive role (Mahdavy, 1970). The extractive 
power of the state is also a method of obtaining accurate information on the economy 
and since it no longer functions as such; it would mean the implementation of 
appropriate economic policy will be less likely (Chaudhry, 1989). 
The second theme argues that these rents will bring about authoritarianism. The 
government will try any means of coercion, bribery or outright repression. For 
example, countries might pacify dissent by paying patronage and buying off votes 
and critics. This is the direct result of this inefficiency and emergence of the elite rent 
controlling group who see democratic political status as a direct threat to their 
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interest (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Ross, 1999). In many instances, this non-tax 
revenue has ultimately resulted in repression of different social groups (Shambayati, 
1994). Clearly, it is more likely that the reasons behind the growth of Rentier States 
is increasing rent rather than sound economic planning which is confirmed by the 
non-spectacular performance of these countries compared to non-Rentier States 
(Shambayati, 1994). 
What is obvious from the conclusion of the Rentier State discourse is that the 
development process of an oil-rich country is more than anything a contextual 
question. Therefore, the recent Rentier State literature overwhelmingly focuses on 
context specificity and path dependence (e.g. Karshenas and Moshaver, 2012) rather 
than generalisations or multi-country comparisons. Nevertheless, observations 
against the Rentier State paradigm such as the positive effect of oil rents in Norway 
do exist. While being heavily dependent on oil exports the market and democratic 
structure has seemed to stop Norway from transforming into a Rentier economy. The 
crucial matter in this view seems to be the power structure of each country. 
In  Chapter 3 it will be attempted to investigate the true power and decision making 
arrangements in the contemporary history of Iran. We will look at the pre and post 
revolution periods and how such problems have led to mismanagement in utilisation 
of oil revenues. 
An emerging literature attempts to explain the impact of the uncertainty attributed to 
the oil revenues. These studies argue that it is the subsequent response of 
governments in the percolation of such revenues to different elements of the 
economy which can influence growth patterns. Obviously, this characteristic of oil 
economies further complicates all aspects of planning and management at the macro 
economy level all the way to firm-level decision making. The volatile nature of oil 
prices has always been a predicament that all countries with higher share of primary 
exports have to address. 
The majority of these studies are inspired by the general literature concerned with the 
impact of revenues or terms of trade volatility and growth. Strong historical evidence 
suggests countries which specialise in a commodity with considerable price 
fluctuation have more volatility in their terms of trade and obtain lower foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and consequently lower growth rates (Blattman et al., 2007). 
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Aghion et al. (2006) find a robust negative relationship between real exchange rate 
volatility and growth performance highlighting the crucial role of sound financial 
development for sustainable growth. They explain that macroeconomic volatility can 
create financial constraints which could hamper firm innovation and therefore overall 
growth if there is inadequate financial development in the country. Furthermore, in 
their study of lower income countries, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) argue that poor 
countries suffer more from volatility due to a number of reasons. First, these 
economies tend to be less diversified, second they tend to specialise in more volatile 
sectors. Third, they have more macroeconomic policy-induced shocks. While a lot of 
oil exporting countries are not poor, nevertheless, they do suffer from a number of 
these problems which is normally because of the presence of a lopsided economy 
with a large resource enclave and weak institutional foundations. 
On the other hand, Ramey and Ramey (1995), instead of terms of trade volatility, use 
the volatility of unanticipated output growth and document its negative effect on 
growth in a cross-country study while controlling for initial income, human capital, 
physical capital and population growth. In their cross-sectional analysis, Fatas and 
Mihov (2005) find a strong negative effect of fluctuations in government spending 
on growth. Moreover, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) suggest a negative 
relationship between growth and volatility while controlling for various factors 
including resource dependence. They argue that the direct positive effects of 
resources are often offset by the indirect volatility effects caused by that resource, 
providing an alternative explanation on the role of oil revenues on growth. Similarly, 
Cavalcanti et al. (2012) study the impact of commodity price volatility and growth 
for a number of countries with large reserves of different commodities and find a 
negative association. They also conclude that the true plausible argument for the 
Resource Curse hypothesis lies in the volatility rationale. 
The most important tool at the disposal of these countries has been the resource-
based wealth funds which are based on a number of fiscal policy rules in order to 
encourage economic stabilisation, maintain savings and manage absorptive 
constraints of these economies. These funds are intended to provide governments 
with means of enforcing countercyclical fiscal policies and buffer the economy 
against issues such as Dutch Disease by allowing the resource rents to be gradually 
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converted to domestic currency over time (Davis et al., 2003). The experience of 
these funds in different countries have been mixed since often there is no guarantee 
that withdrawal rules or investment purposes of these funds are actually respected by 
the governments or are not changed throughout time. Furthermore, the transparency 
purpose of such initiatives can be rendered obsolete if, for example, governments use 
these funds as an alternative discretionary budget mechanism for fiscal spending 
(Petrie, 2009). Thus, the true onus is on the governments to adopt prudent fiscal 
policy by avoiding self-defeating actions such as running deficits in the boom 
periods. The Iranian experience with the oil stabilisation fund is explored in more 
detail in  Chapter 4. 
Among all the stylised rationales above what seems to be obvious is that the source 
of the volatility attribute of resources is not entirely an economic issue and more 
often it is overshadowed by political developments especially inside the country. 
This is suggestive of the fact that the real obstacle to growth might indeed be the 
volatility in government expenditures and lack of sound planning rather than other 
versions of volatility such as price volatility discussed in the literature. In this light, 
the unpredictable and unsustainable spending habits of states acts merely as a 
political economic indicator of that country which can be the main obstacle to 
growth. 
2.5 Efficiency Analysis 
It should not come as a surprise that looking at how efficiency can affect growth in 
resource-rich countries can be instrumental. As we have seen parts of the literature 
discussed so far such as learning by doing Dutch Disease models or some rent-
seeking explanations either implicitly or explicitly employ productivity as a 
mechanism for explaining the effect of resource revenues on an economy. Thus, it 
seems interesting to see how the measures of productivity and more importantly 
efficiency of production can be influenced by the availability of resource rents. 
This topic will be of great interest in the remainder of this research. In  Chapter 4 
and  Chapter 5 we will discuss the key question in the context of the Iranian industrial 
sector and the underlying cause of its uncertain growth. The main feature of this 
sector which is the presence of seemingly profitable firms during oil booms which 
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suddenly transform into bankrupt businesses in subsequent oil busts can be examined 
more warrants an adequate investigation and framework. This highlights a more 
long-term consequence of oil revenues that has not been appropriately explained in 
any of the aforementioned literature. To address these issues it seems imperative to 
look in more detail at the structure of these firms and their respective efficiency 
performance. 
The literature on efficiency analysis can broadly be divided into two due to interest 
in two different components of economic efficiency, namely ‘allocative’ efficiency 
and ‘technical’ or ‘productive’ efficiency. The first group of studies focuses on the 
neo-classical based allocative efficiency measures. This literature elaborates the 
impact of the relative price ‘distortions’ on the efficiency of resource employment at 
different levels of aggregation. These studies have a longer history of analysis and 
consist of two main subsections. The first cohort emphasises the monopoly social 
welfare costs. The other group of allocative studies examine the benefits of trade and 
openness in outputs and growth. This is clearly one important avenue to assess if 
government spending sourced by natural resources might have a significantly 
different macroeconomic impact on indicators such as inflation which can ultimately 
determine the choice of production factors by firms and their respective allocative 
efficiency. 
The second body of literature concentrates on explaining the sectors or firms 
performance by differences in their relative non-allocative efficiencies. Initially 
Farrell (1957) introduced the notion of ‘technical inefficiency’ by highlighting the 
importance of management and work incentives. Having a more empirical approach, 
he maintains that firms do not necessarily minimise their cost and there are 
considerable inefficiencies in management which results in efficiency disparities 
among firms. Based on similar considerations, in his pioneering paper, Leibenstein 
(1966) questions the relative importance of allocative efficiency. He argues that 
factors such as the intrinsic negative attributes of human organisation and their effect 
both within and outside the firm shapes the principles of the true measure of 
inefficiency. He goes on to call this type of inefficiency as X-inefficiency. One of the 
subtle differences between X-efficiency and technical efficiency is that the latter 
questions the conventional assumption of rational behaviour by the economic agents 
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whereas Farrell focuses on the measurement issue and highlights the technical aspect 
of production and management staying within the neo-classical modelling 
frameworks. 
On the empirical side, the technical efficiency literature has an overwhelming 
presence compared to the X-efficiency studies. Clearly, the biggest problem of X-
efficiency measurement lies in construction of indexes of human attributes in a 
meaningful and consistent manner. The two main applied modes of analysis in 
empirically estimating technical inefficiencies are the Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) and the Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) techniques. The most successful 
empirical studies for confirming non-allocative efficiency theory which have applied 
these techniques have been at the industry or firm level. Here the differences 
between firms or industries have predominantly been attributed to factors such as 
market structure, ownership and firm size. A more in depth discussion of the 
theoretical and empirical literature of production efficiency analysis is presented 
in  Chapter 6. 
The link between oil revenues and production efficiency can be both direct and 
indirect. The government can take prudent measures to support manufacturing firms 
to select better modes of production. For instance, it can facilitate the import of key 
capital goods and better international cooperation with foreign firms. Furthermore, 
the states can indirectly influence the production environment through both 
economic and political channels to help firms improve their technical production 
performance. For example, the introduction of better property laws and tighter 
regulatory supervision can induce production to be more economically competitive, 
or enforcing measures to reduce the privileges of elites and certain factions could 
lead to better business confidence and thus the employment of more productive 
processes. 
2.6 Theoretical Framework Conclusion 
Based on the above review of relevant works on resource abundance and growth it is 
clear that there is an ambiguous answer to the presence of the so called curse. It is 
most likely that a more comprehensive analysis of the causal relationship in question 
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would depend not on a single rationale but rather a hybrid or a mixture of the above 
factors which would differ from one case study to another. 
Furthermore, what seems to be lacking in the literature is a micro-level case-study 
analysis to assess the production performance of these resource-rich countries 
especially in the industry sector. More recently, the availability of detailed firm level 
censuses carried out by governments and statistical bodies paves the way to take a 
closer look on how the introduction of oil revenues into the economic system affects 
firms. Adjusted carefully, this can also be a useful re-examination technique to 
reassess the hypotheses and claims put forward by the above literature from a 
different vantage point. 
In order to disaggregate oil from a macro-level variable to a micro-level phenomenon 
we would need a micro index that would capture the resultant direct or indirect 
influences of oil revenues for each specific firm’s production performance. Clearly, 
this is an abstract notion and the closest equivalents to this are measures such as 
carbon footprint or value of fuel subsidies of the product are the closest equivalents. 
However, these measures only capture part of the oil effect. Therefore, the lack of a 
comprehensive disaggregated measure seems the main obstacle of a simple 
mechanical method of analysis. 
Instead, we argue that the overall effect of the oil influence in a micro-level analysis 
can to a large extent be captured by its influence on technical efficiency of 
production. Assessing what factors are detrimental or beneficial to firm technical 
efficiency and how those factors are relevant to the oil revenues can shed light on the 
question at hand from a new perspective. Thus, the challenge here would be to 
identify the channels through which oil revenues shape the firm production 
decisions. For this purpose we can draw inspiration from the resource literature 
however, the result would be a highly context specific matter. 
Thus, it is our attempt in the remainder of this research to incorporate different 
aspects of the literature discussed in this chapter to arrive at a more comprehensive 
model. In the case of Iran, the micro-level channel of efficiency performance and oil 
revenues can be built upon the political economic factors which can be considered as 
the skeleton of our theoretical contribution to acknowledge the contextual issues in 
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the study of Iranian economy. Identifying, these key characteristics we can assess the 
role of oil in the economy’s productivity and focus on manufacturing firms’ 
performance due to their importance in Iran’s development trajectory. 
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Chapter 3 Political Economic Structure of Iran 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we attempt to paint a clearer picture of the Iranian political structure 
and explore the contextual political economic challenges it has faced. Following the 
discussion on the political factors in explaining the role of oil in development of 
countries we try to investigate the validity of these explanations in the case of Iran. 
In order to better comprehend the nature of oil revenues’ role in the Iranian economy 
it is crucial to take a closer look at the power structure in the Iranian context. This 
consideration seems even more necessary in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution and 
further complexities brought about to the political spectrum. We explore the role of 
oil in the arrangement of power and its importance from a political economic 
perspective. We explore the key characteristics of the Iranian political economy and 
the resulting key institutions which shaped investment and efficiency in production 
sectors. We address the important components of post-revolutionary paradigm of 
power and its economic consequences. This will help explain the main challenges 
facing the development and growth trajectory of the Iranian economy. This 
background will also provide context on our case study of manufacturing production 
in proceeding chapter and to address specific questions within the institutional 
context of Iranian political economy. 
The layout of this chapter is as follows. First, we discuss the broad outlines of the 
Iranian political structure. A comparison between the Pahlavi monarchy and the 
Islamic Republic state structures and their key characteristics helps provide context 
to the evolution of the present system and emergence of various new institutions. We 
move on to study the role of three key economic institutions and their specific 
characteristics within the Iranian economy. First, we examine the importance of 
public sector production and key features of state owned enterprises (SOEs) vis-à-vis 
the private sector and evaluate how growth of the overall economy is affected by this 
presence. Second, the background to the unique semi-public organisations that 
became prominent in the post-revolutionary economy and the extent of their 
economic influence are discussed. Third, the importance of the old mercantile group 
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in the contemporary history of Iran is briefly investigated. Finally, our findings are 
summarised in the final section. 
3.2 The Iranian Political Economic Structure 
During the pre-revolutionary period the Iranian power structure mainly revolved 
around the Shah. Centralised administration and planning was the main feature of 
this period. One of the biggest obsessions of the Shah after the 1953 coup and 
overthrow of Mosaddegh was the military. Abrahamian (2008) argues that one of the 
three pillars of Shah’s power as the military. He argues that this is evident by the vast 
expenditures and investments in arms trade, military infrastructure and personnel 
upkeep receiving $7.7 billion equivalent to 35% share of the GDP by 1977. Only 
twenty years prior to that in 1954 the expenditure was around $60 million or 24% of 
GDP in 1954. Nevertheless, being wary of a potential coup, he instated people in 
charge of military on the basis of loyalty instead of measures of military abilities. In 
1957 the Shah with the help of CIA and Israel’s Mossad founded the intelligence 
service SAVAK. This agency alongside the intelligence units of different military 
forces were mandated to only be directly in contact with the Shah’s office and 
provide updates on a regular basis.  
The second pillar according to Abrahamian is the expansion of the bureaucracy and 
the state both in terms of number of ministries and also the far reaching influence of 
the state all the way to the smaller villages for the first time. He claims this was 
reflected in the fact that by the end of 1977 the state was directly employing one in 
every two full-time employees.  
The third pillar, he argues, was the court patronage through the charity foundations 
such as Pahlavi Foundation (bonyad-e pahlavi in Persian) which were responsible for 
managing the royal funds, exerting economic control and rewarding the supporters of 
the regime. Regardless, all three components were maintained through the abundance 
of the oil revenues which accrued to the government and had become even more 
important with the fifty-fifty oil contracts introduced after the events of oil 
nationalisation upheaval prior to 1953. The oil revenues jumped from only $34 
million in 1954 to $20 billion in 1975, respectively accounting for 15% and 72% of 
the country’s foreign exchange receipts (Fesharaki, 1976). 
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The authoritarian structure of power during this period meant that rent-seeking 
activities in the general economy and more specifically with regards to oil proceeds 
was conducted only through a single channel of direct connections with the Shah and 
his close associates. A series of reforms carried out by the Shah in the 1960s coupled 
with the oil boom in the early 1970s resulted in high growth rates. However, during 
the 1970s it also brought inflationary pressures to the average consumer as a result of 
over-ambitious policies pursued by the state. Furthermore, the Shah’s economic, 
political and cultural reform programs caused the alienation of the clergy, the 
working class and ‘bazaaris’ (traditional merchants) while its three pillars of power, 
discussed above, all gradually crumbled in the wake of the revolution. These issues 
alongside the overheated economy paved the way for the Islamic revolution in 1979. 
After the revolution, the political arena became more complex. Various institutions 
and supervisory councils were incorporated into the Constitution. Broadly speaking, 
the power structure in the post-revolutionary Iran can be divided into two parts. 
These are the elected body and an appointed core headed by clerical figures (see 
Figure  3–1). This categorisation does not mean that these two components of power 
are entirely independent but it does show that the rationale behind the introduction of 
the clerical core is supervision of the decisions and actions of the elected apparatus. 
In other words, these clerical institutions have the final authority and jurisdiction 
over the actions of the elected component of power.  
The people directly elect the president, parliament representatives, provincial council 
members and members of ‘Assembly of Experts’. However, the candidates of these 
elections are filtered through the vetting process carried out by the ‘Guardian 
Council’. This council consists of six jurists, chosen by the head of the judiciary and 
approved by the parliament (Majles in Persian) and six theologians, chosen by the 
‘Supreme Leader’. This Council has veto powers over the laws passed in the 
parliament in order to guarantee that they conform to Islam and the Constitution 
(Article 96). However, if Majles disagrees with a veto on the legislation, the 
‘Expediency Council’ is responsible for resolving the dispute and arriving at a final 
verdict. The Expediency Council is also a board of advisors to the Supreme Leader 
and consists of 42 members with political, military and religious backgrounds.  
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The Supreme Leader appoints the heads of the judiciary and armed forces. The only 
institution that theoretically has oversight on the Leader is the Assembly of Experts 
(Article 107). Based on the Constitution, the Assembly of Experts is responsible for 
choosing the Leader which possesses qualities such as scholarship, piety and political 
prudence (Article 109). Furthermore, the Assembly is responsible for overseeing the 
Leader’s performance in order to make sure he maintains capability of fulfilling his 
responsibilities (Article 111). This power formation has meant that every institution 
is either directly or indirectly affected by the Supreme Leader which by explicit 
terminology of the Constitution is the highest authority in the country. 
Figure  3–1 Diagram of Iran’s Political Structure (Post-Revolution). 
 
Source: BBC (2009). 
The revamping of political arrangements and the introduction of new actors was 
necessary for embedding the religious elite in the main arteries of the state. It can be 
argued that this new power structure has been a strategy for maintaining a balance of 
power amongst different factions. Some have argued that the resulting duality of 
centres of power might not necessarily entail inefficiencies, due to the freedom and 
flexibility that the semi-official components enjoy which theoretically could be 
helpful in providing solutions that are not at the disposal of the official institutions 
(e.g. Esfahani, 2005). However, in practice the oversight of institutions on each other 
and the parallel structure of power have brought various clashes of ideas and 
ideological oppositions regarding various political, social and economic issues. As 
we will discuss below in a number of serious instances the confrontations amongst 
the existing factions were only resolved by the Leader’s direct intervention. This is 
why other studies have emphasised the negative aspects of Iranian factionalism and 
labelled this process as ‘destructive competition’ (see Bjorvatn and Selvik, 2008). 
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More crucially, the clash and competition amongst different groups has presented 
itself in ideological issues as well. An important historical example is the debate at 
the onset of the revolution regarding the role of government and the economic 
strategy that was to be pursued after the revolution. Two main camps of thought were 
prominent at the time, a pro-state versus a liberal ideological group (Pesaran, 2011). 
The wider support of the revolution was gained on the basis of populist 
socioeconomic slogans of equality, wealth redistribution and defending the 
‘oppressed’.  
On the face of it, statist measures taken by the regime such as nationalisation of 
industries, expropriation of properties of numerous major capitalists and establishing 
revolutionary parastatal organisations was meant to show their commitment to these 
promises. However, this was really a decision made out of exigency due to lack of 
entrepreneurs, revolutionary turmoil and the Iraq war (Harris, 2013). Amidst state 
interventions and marginalisation of the private sector, based on Article 44 of the 
Constitution, sanctity of private property was upheld from the very first days of the 
revolution and was echoed by Ayatollah Khomeini himself (Saeidi, 2004; 
Abrahamian, 2008). This was explicitly stated in support of the bazaaris who had 
played a major role throughout the revolutionary movement and had long enjoyed a 
special relationship with the clergy. This helped establishing this influential group’s 
position firmly into Iran’s post-revolutionary economic dynamic from the early days 
of the revolution which materialised especially after the war period.  
Consequently, throughout the life of the Islamic Republic the statist arguments 
gradually lost ground to the liberal ideology not as a result of sound economic 
reasoning but rather as a product of political economic forces at play. In order to 
better appreciate the evolution and the extent of the political economic context in 
Iran here we will provide a brief chronology of political developments in the Islamic 
Republic period. 
3.3 Historical Overview of Post-Revolutionary Power Formation 
In the initial revolutionary phase (1979-80) Ayatollah Khomeini allowed more 
moderate figures to take control of the government. Straight after returning to Iran 
and following the fall of Bakhtiar’s government in February 1979, Khomeini instated 
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Bazargan, a moderate technocrat figure as the prime minister of the interim 
government. The provisional government of Bazargan was dogged down by the 
gradual strengthening of conservative figures who were gaining influence through 
revolutionary bodies that were in the hand of members of the Islamic Republic Party 
(IRP). The members of the IRP entirely consisted of close associates of Khomeini. 
On numerous occasions, the prime minister voiced his discontent to the judicial 
proceedings of the revolutionary courts and local committees regarding the lack of 
democratic measures in the Constitution which was being drafted. The decisive event 
however, was the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran by a group of university 
students which received the full support of the Leader. The support of Ayatollah 
Khomeini for the occupation exposed the decreasing level of support that Bazargan 
was receiving from the Ayatollah. This led Bazargan to reluctantly resign from office 
in November 1980 in objection to his political alienation and the limited scope of 
power that was left at his disposal. 
In February 1980 another liberal-minded figure, Banisadr, came into power as the 
first president of the Islamic Republic with 69% of votes (Axworthy, 2013). He was 
one of the figures that had criticised the seizure of the US embassy. The power 
struggle between him and the now strengthened IRP resulted in his eventual 
acceptance of the party’s candidate Rajaie as the prime minister1. Nevertheless, the 
two continued a long disagreement on the choice of ministers which meant even by 
the end of Banisadr’s presidency in 1981, a number of ministries did not have the 
posts filled. 
Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1980 after announcing that it was no longer 
bounded by the Algiers Accord agreement regarding border disputes which had been 
negotiated in the Shah period. This was an additional burden on the already unstable 
political situation after the revolution. The war proved an important ingredient in the 
forging of the religious conservative factions’ power by eliminating the non-aligned 
parties to that of IRP. After a series of street demonstrations and increasing pressure, 
the Mojahedin-e Khalgh Organisation’s (MKO) took up armed resistance and carried 
out a number of assassinations and bombings of key IRP figures (including Rajaie) 
after the removal of Banisadr. Historically, the MKO was an important part of the 
                                                 
1 Ultimately, Rajiae would go on to replace Banisadr as the president after he was removed from 
power. 
51 
revolutionary forces fighting against the Shah. They consisted of both Muslim and 
left wing fighters who had taken up arms against the Pahlavi monarch. After 
experiencing rifts and splinter groups during the revolutionary struggle, they sided 
with Ayatollah Khomeini in the beginning of the Islamic Republic. The MKO proved 
to be a determined (if not merciless) opponent to the Islamic hardliners but chiefly 
lacked the organisational infrastructure to succeed (Axworthy, 2013)2. 
Following the success of the conservatives’ power grasp and the assassination of 
Rajaie, Khamenei the IRP’s secretary at the time, ran and won the presidential 
elections. However, after the parliament rejected his initial proposed candidate for 
the prime minister post, even he had to settle with his second candidate, Mir-Hossein 
Mousavi. In this stage the next group targeted was the leftist Tudeh Party which 
again was a group that had collaborated with the religious groups in the struggle 
against the Shah. They were officially outlawed in 1983. This meant that the biggest 
organised groups which could be a threat to the conservatives’ dominance were now 
officially forced out of the political sphere by their erstwhile Islamic counterparts.  
Nevertheless, these events did not lead to a unified and homogenous residual group 
in power. On the contrary, it instigated the emergence of a left-right spectrum of 
political and economic ideology amongst the remaining supporters of Khomeini. The 
factional competition became so strong that it soon unsettled the IRP itself and in 
1987 Ayatollah Khomeini dissolved the party altogether (Axworthy, 2013). The 
power struggle continued until after the ceasefire with Iraq in July 1988.  
One of the crucial aspects of factionalism was the positions of different groups on the 
role of the state in the economy. On the left there were calls for maximum amount of 
nationalisation of trade and industries alongside land and labour reforms in favour of 
the working class. This seemed to be the inclination of Mousavi. On the other hand, 
the conservatives on the right had the support of the majority of the clergy and 
especially Khamenei. They supported the calls of the bazaaris for non-interventionist 
policies of the state. Ayatollah Khomeini who had tried to act as the moderator 
reiterated the sanctity of private property in Islam but assured that the state can 
impose rules and conditions on the activity of private sector. These events 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed discussion on the history and complexities of MKO in the revolution process, 
see Abrahamian (1989). 
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highlighted the difference of opinion at the very top levels of power i.e. between the 
president and the prime minister. It is reasonable to conclude that it was only due to 
the mediation of the Leader that the Khamenei-Mousavi duo lasted for eight years 
until 1989. 
However, with the end of the war other points of disagreement arose. The 
mistreatment and mass killings of MKO and other leftist prisoners brought the outcry 
of Ayatollah Montazeri, a close follower and the successor-in-waiting of Ayatollah 
Khomeini until that point. Montazeri had expressed sharp criticisms against him due 
to the purge of political freedom and the executions and mass killings in the jails 
which were carried out in the earlier periods. However, this time his stronger 
criticisms received an even stronger response from Ayatollah Khomeini himself. He 
dismissed him as politically incapable and dismissed him as his successor. Montazeri 
accepted and announced his resignation. In a matter of days Montazeri was 
completely alienated to the extent that even his name and speeches were almost 
entirely barred from all media outlets. Later on however, he continued to criticise the 
new leader after Khomeini. This led to him being dismissed as a simpleton, barred 
from carrying out his religious teachings and finally put under house arrest from 
1997 to 2003.  
It is worth mentioning that this was not the first fallout of a key religious figure with 
the state. The other important instance is the fate of Ayatollah Sharia’tmadari who 
prior to the revolution was largely an apolitical cleric. Nevertheless, he had openly 
voiced his opposition to the role of the ‘Supreme Leader’ or the concept of ‘Velayat-
e Faghih’ (jurist prudence) in the Constitution in the early days of the revolution. 
However, after the trial of Ghotbzadeh, the former foreign minister, following plans 
to overthrow the government, in his confessions he mentioned that the Ayatollah had 
given his blessings to his plans. Subsequently, Sharia’tmadari was put under house 
arrest in 1982 where he remained until his death in 1986. These events highlight the 
non-uniform composition of various groups, in this case even within the clergy. With 
special reference to the clergy this phenomenon is partly related to the embedded 
idea of pluralism exercised in Shi’ism. The concept of ‘ejtehad’ or interpretation of 
religious laws allows each ‘marja’ or qualified religious jurist to provide his personal 
understanding of religious texts and laws to his followers. Nevertheless, Ayatollah 
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Khomeini’s doctrine of ‘absolute jurist prudence’, which gave unique status to the 
country’s Leader, even allowing him to waive or suspend fundamental religious laws 
if necessary, helped him curtail broader amount of the clerics’ role. 
After Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in June 1989 and the dismissal of Montazeri, 
Khamenei (not an Ayatollah at the time) was chosen by the Assembly of Experts, 
with the strong support of Rafsanjani, as the new Supreme Leader. Rafsanjani, a 
cleric member of the IRP and another close associate of Ayatollah Khomeini had 
been the speaker of Majles since 1980. He quickly nominated himself for the 
presidential position and replaced Khamenei as the new president.  
Soon after entering office, Rafsanjani proposed a broad reconstruction plan for the 
economy. This plan called for investments and restructuring of the economy which 
was in dire conditions due to the problems in the initial phase of the revolution and 
the crippling war with Iraq. Apart from repair and expansion of the infrastructure, the 
plan set out goals in liberalisation of the economy and promotion of the private 
sector. The initial progress such as reduction of unemployment and other 
reconstruction efforts was made possible due to the both the oil revenues directly and 
the foreign loans provided on the basis of these revenues. However, the over reliance 
of the government on high oil prices to finance these investments, which was 
crucially needed in the oil sector itself, caused a balance of payments crisis with the 
fall of oil prices in 1993. This placed great downward pressure on the value of Rial 
and subsequently the economy witnessed an inflation rate of 50%. His attempts of 
attracting foreign investment suffered a blow after the intensification of US’s 
economic sanctions specifically aiming at companies not to invest in Iran. 
Furthermore, the privatisation efforts were also left incomplete as the parliament 
passed a law to give priority to war veterans and the dependants of the martyrs. After 
the growing dissatisfaction of the conservatives with the government policies, 
Khamenei wrote a letter to the president asking for greater efforts in alleviating the 
problems and improving the situation of the oppressed. This was the first sign of a 
possible rift between the two former close allies. Overall, during the reconstruction 
period due to the pragmatic stance of Rafsanjani the left-right power struggle had 
been relatively subdued and only publicised in a limited number of occasions 
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involving the parliament and the guardian council. This would soon change in the 
proceeding periods. 
In the 1997 presidential election, the strong favourite was the right-leaning speaker 
of Majles, Nategh-Nouri. The other serious contender was Khatami, who similar to 
the other candidate, was a cleric but with quite a different political, cultural and 
economic ideology. Khatami had been the minister of culture and Islamic guidance 
from 1982 (during Mousavi’s term) until 1992 when he had to resign after the right 
wing dominated parliament and Nategh-Nouri as the speaker, strongly criticised his 
liberal tendencies. Khatami presented the option of change and liberalisation in 
social, political and economic fields. On the other hand, Nategh-Nouri was largely a 
symbol of the right-wing conservatives and the status-quo.  
An important development prior to the election was the support of Khatami by the 
Kargozaran Front whose members were mainly Rafsanjani’s relatives and associates. 
Ultimately, in a surprising landslide victory, Khatami won over 70% of the votes. 
From the early days into his presidency, Khatami emphasised the importance of 
foreign policy and amending ties with western countries. He restored full diplomatic 
ties with Britain and later on visited a number of European capitals, a first for any 
president since the revolution. Nevertheless, Khatami was gradually put under 
pressure from the conservative Majles with the impeachment of his interior minister 
who was forced to resign. Moreover, a series of murders of key liberal figures, 
including members of Bazargan’s provisional government, carried out by ultra-
hardliners, added pressure both domestically and internationally on him. Another 
scandal was the attack on the liberal students in the dormitory of Tehran University 
by plain-clothed elements (extremist pressure group members). Later on Khatami’s 
minister of culture was forced to resign. This period was filled with controversies 
and other signs of unease from the conservative camp. Despite this, the reformists 
managed to take the majority of the seats in the 2000 parliament elections. This was 
another blow to the right wing factions but also to Rafsanjani who only managed to 
secure the last place out of the thirty seats appointed to Tehran province and 
subsequently withdrew his nomination. This further radicalised the political sphere 
and soon numerous reformist newspapers were closed. This was followed by an 
assassination attempt of a key reformist figure, Hajjarian, who was considered their 
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main strategist. Throughout these events Khatami struggled to maintain the middle 
ground and manage these crises. 
The reluctance of Khatami to directly confront the hardliners translated into some 
discouragement of the more liberal supporters but despite this he managed to secure 
an impressive 80% of the votes in 2001. This, however, was the beginning of the end 
for Khatami as a number of outside developments considerably undermined his 
ability to fulfil his political and economic goals. These events included the West’s 
suspicion of Iran’s nuclear programme, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the 
attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Again 
despite attempts by Khatami to reach out and even provide support against Taliban 
and assist in Iraq, Iran was labelled as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’. These events further 
strengthened the hardliners in criticising Khatami’s conciliatory stance toward the 
West and severely undermined the already limited power that was practically at his 
disposal. 
The lack of progress and the backlash of the hardliners disrupted the social and 
economic reform plans of Khatami and caused the apathy of greater part of the 
public who had hoped for greater change and renewal in the direction of the country. 
This was reflected in the low turnout in the Majles elections of 2004.The 
dispiritedness of the general public and dismissal of a numerous reformist candidates 
paved the way for the right wing factions to win the majority of the seats in the 
seventh parliamentary elections. This was the prologue to the resurgence of the 
conservatives and their comprehensive power grab. These events and the 
unorganised campaign of reformists helped secure the hardliners victory in the 2005 
presidential elections. Rafsanjani who had retreated to his role as the head of the 
expediency council (he had held the post since the inception of the council in 1989) 
was the favourite in the runoff. However, he suffered another defeat this time at the 
hands of the lesser-known Ahmadinejad, the former mayor of Tehran. Rafsanjani 
openly contested the results but eventually did not pursue this through official 
investigatory procedures.  
In his campaign Ahmadinejad had strongly criticised Rafsanjani and his associates 
regarding allegations of corruption and decadence. He also managed to win support 
of part of the population due to his unknown credentials and populist slogans. After 
56 
assuming power Ahmadinejad embarked on replacing key government positions such 
as provincial governors. He also drastically changed foreign policy and took a harder 
stance in the nuclear issue with the UN’s atomic agency. This resulted in the 
implementation of economic sanctions by the UN Security Council for the first time. 
As Alizadeh (2014) notes, during Ahmadinejad term in office a return to populist 
policies were pursued which resulted in typical petro-populist stages of initial growth 
followed by inflationary pressure and stagnation which forced him to implement 
subsidy removals due to dire government financial situation and intensification of 
economic sanctions. On the domestic side the marginalisation of the reformists and 
the full support of the leadership meant that his term in office was largely 
unchallenged from political groups inside the country despite some of his populist-
liberal comments on the role of women and praising Cyrus the Great the Shah of Iran 
in pre-Islamic times. 
In the 2009 presidential election a coalition of the reformists and pragmatic figures 
(such as Rafsanjani and Mousavi), was determined to prevent Ahmadinejad hold 
onto power for the second term. Nevertheless, in another surprising outcome, 
Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of the race but the results were contested by 
the opponents and mass protest took place in Tehran. The turmoil after the elections 
finished after an ultimatum by the Leader in Friday prayers stating that his view were 
closer to that of Ahmadinejad and the leaders of the opposition had to stop the 
protests. After defying the leader Mousavi and Karroubi (two of the candidates who 
were key figures in the revolution) were put on house arrest and continue to be so to 
this day. These events which can be considered the biggest threat to the regime after 
the war initially were portrayed to further unite conservatives. The nuclear talks had 
stalled and US-EU sanctions reached an unprecedented level. This gave the part of 
the armed forces which were already participating in economic activities greater 
opportunity for more overt economic engagement. Later on Ahmadinejad, who had 
gained greater confidence, gradually fell out with the main body of the conservatives. 
Khamenei publicly intervened and prevented one appointment and one dismissal in 
Ahmadinejad’s cabinet. In 2009 he appointed his close aide, a controversial figure, as 
vice president but was ordered by the leader to resign. The other intervention of 
Khamenei was the reversal of the removal of the intelligence minister. This was the 
beginning of a downward spiral for Ahmadinejad, who was strongly criticised by the 
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majority of the members of Majles and conservative clerics. Prior to the 2013 
presidential elections Ahmadinejad accused the brother of Larijani the speaker of 
Majles and the head of the judiciary of abusing his brothers’ influence and illicitly 
benefiting from them. These and other incidents in the second term of Ahmadinejad 
sealed his fate and the candidacy of his close aide in the presidential elections. 
Ultimately, in 2013 Rohani, a more moderate figure that had the support of the 
reformists and Rafsanjani came to power. Rohani’s main slogan was that of 
moderation and unity of different political groups. It is yet to be seen exactly how his 
term plays out but already signs of struggle between the president and the 
conservative camp can already be seen in speeches made by them. 
This condensed narrative of the turbulent history of the Islamic Republic is a 
testament to the fact that the political economy of Iran is, if not entirely built around 
factionalism, at least riddled with ample examples of it. As pointed out earlier, this 
polycentric paradigm resonates with the Shi’a religious hierarchy of ‘maraje taghlid’ 
(see Walbridge, 2001). Consequently, groups and factions with similar interests have 
emerged in the political scene, not only within the elected and clerical structure, but 
also groups with members across the two components (Bjorvatn and Selvik, 2008). 
Nevertheless, this palette of different variants of political and economic ideology has 
allowed the regime to use this quasi-flexibility to weather the storms of different 
crises using different groups in different epochs. 
The key issue here is that this complex and dynamic process of competition has had 
tangible implications for the choice of economic policy. As discussed above, after 
the war period, President Rafsanjani followed a series of policies, such as relaxing 
labour law and liberalising trade, in order to move towards a more rational mode of 
economic strategy. After that, Khatami took steps forward and implemented more 
measures of openness and accountability such as establishing the Oil Stabilisation 
Fund and foreign investment law. Acknowledging this multifaceted background of 
the political economic structure in Iran we argue that it has created new economic 
actors and influenced the performance of existing ones. Thus, the result of this 
dynamic will be informative in our analysis of economic production in the following 
chapters. We will briefly discuss the role and significance of three of the unique 
defining economic components of the Islamic Republic’s economy below. 
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3.4 Public Sector Production 
The overwhelming presence of the public sector is by all means not specific to Iran 
and is predominant in most oil producing countries. This is not to say that the 
intervention of the government can always be negative. In fact the presence of the 
government in early development stages of countries is mandatory to alleviate 
problems of information asymmetries, incomplete markets and other externalities 
that a developing country might experience in its growth paths. However, certain 
characteristics of large endowment of the government has had various repercussions 
for the structure of the economy and business environment. The public firms tend to 
be referred to as inefficient, overstaffed and unprofitable producers (e.g. Alizadeh, 
2002) 
After the revolution and in light of the ideological debates between proponents of 
pro-state and liberal economic strategies, the government expanded its control over 
the economy. In 1982 it increased the number of ministries from 20 (in 1979), 
employing 304,000 civil servants, to 26 which employed 850,000 people and further 
grew to above a million civil servants in 2004 (Abrahamian, 2008). This was in line 
with nationalisation of banks and businesses in the early periods of the revolution. 
For instance, the industries ministry took possession of factories belonging to 64 
industrial notables under the accusation of being corrupt supporters of the Shah or 
the West. As a result, the government was left with more than 2000 loss-making 
factories (Abrahamian, 2008). In total, the government nationalised roughly 80 to 85 
percent of the country’s major production units (Ehteshami, 1995). The 
nationalisations were unconventional by modern standards as a major part of these 
industries were previously privately owned but were target of confiscation as many 
had fled the country due to the political turmoil. On the other hand, these 
appropriations were theoretically based on Islamic principles practiced even in the 
days of the prophet (see Behdad, 2006). Regardless, the ultimate result of this 
process was the growing presence of the government directly in production and the 
dependence of the country on its policies. In this process and throughout the 
turbulent economic history of Iran, especially after the revolution, due to economic 
mismanagement, oil revenues have not only failed to help the revival of the private 
sector but instead it has embedded public sector production as the main component 
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of the economy. This is evident in the fact that the public firms alongside other 
quasi-public ones account for two thirds of the overall budget (Hertog, 2010). 
Despite the high annual investment rate of the government in the first decade of the 
new millennium, around 33 percent of GDP (Crane et al., 2008), the dismal 
performance of these producers suggests that the efficiency of investment has been 
unsatisfactory. Rather than being productive, these expenditures have been mainly to 
subsidise costs of production and bailout poorly performing companies. This has 
meant that often these producers seek to keep these government transfers in place 
and prolong them as much as possible (Alizadeh, 2002). 
The government’s failure in implementing strict discipline and supervision on the 
SOEs has led to the majority of these firms remaining dependent on government 
transfers. In other words the soft budget constraint of these entities has not only 
entailed inefficiency of production and allocation of resources but also other negative 
macroeconomic implications for the economy such as inflating government budget 
and inflation (Alizadeh, 2002). 
The increasing dependence of the economy on public sector production, even after 
the revolution, cannot be justified based on rationales of infant-industry protection. A 
number of industrial producers, such as automakers, that are protected by the 
government have been active for more than three decades and had even been 
profitable under private ownership prior to the revolution (Alizadeh, 2002). This is in 
contrast to the experience of countries such as South Korea (henceforth, Korea) that 
transformed firms to global competitors thanks to initial government supports and 
facilitations which were targeted and constrained by a time frame. Thus, what seems 
to be at the heart of the problem is the very ownership of the government in these 
firms which has barred openness and competition to increase the quality and 
sustainability of domestic production. 
An explanation for the government failures or inability to remedy the problems of 
these firms is often political. For example, some firms are not directly overseen by 
the government such as the television and radio broadcasting organisation while 
other that are, might be given leeway since the CEO or the company itself is 
somehow linked to the interests of a certain political faction. Furthermore, the 
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opacity of the accounts of these enterprises itself brings about less appropriate 
scrutiny (Alizadeh, 2002). Moreover, these units might have political or other 
alternative goals to fulfil alongside the economic ones, which might reduce their 
optimal performance. For instance, SOEs have to perform redistributive roles for the 
state rather than trying to solely increase production (Hertog, 2010). 
While in general the hypothesis of inefficient production in the state owned 
companies seems plausible it does not mean that this is always the case as the issue 
could be a topical matter. Put differently, it might be other significant features of 
public sector (which might be shared by private companies) that could be the actual 
problem. For example, it might be the case that since on average these producers 
tend to be large compared to their private counterparts and the additional managerial 
know-how for large scale operations is the underlying source of weak performance. 
In other words, in the evaluation of their performance other factors need to be 
controlled for in a more systematic manner. Consequently, in the context of Iranian 
economy the hypothesis of negative impact of the public ownership on the 
performance of producers needs to be more rigorously investigated. 
3.5 Bonyads and Parastatals 
The Iranian political economic structure is further complicated with the creation of 
unregulated semi-governmental organisations such as ‘bonyads’ (Persian for 
foundations) after the revolution. The activities of these institutions are mainly 
beyond government supervision. The idea of foundations in the Islamic context 
stems from Islamic charitable funds (‘vaqf’ or ‘owqaaf’) which have been around in 
Iran at least since the Safavid Dynasty. The ‘vaqf’ funds were charity funds or 
endowments at the disposal of religious establishments. They acted as a source of 
untaxed endowment for the clergy, providing them economic independence from the 
state which was crucial to the operation of religious leaders (Maloney, 2000). For 
instance, when this independence was threatened by Reza Shah, taking control of 
their assets, it resulted in riots and stiff resistance from the clergy (Saeidi, 2004). 
Beside such religious foundations in the mid-twentieth century, economic 
foundations such as the Pahlavi Foundation gained additional importance, especially 
due to the objective of gaining support and patronage through various investment and 
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job creation channels (Thaler, et al., 2010). The Pahlavi Foundation was initially set 
up in the 1950s based on the assets of the Shah’s father who was exiled. Later on, 
this foundation received possession of assets from the Shah and his family which was 
invested in shares of 207 domestic and a number of international companies 
operating in various businesses (Abrahamian, 2008). 
In post-revolutionary Iran foundations with any connection to the previous regime 
were dismantled. Instead, provisions for a number of new foundations with greater 
autonomy and financial leverage were implemented. Their main objectives were 
defined as helping the deprived and assist the redistribution of wealth throughout 
Iran in order to improve the welfare of the ‘Muslim community’. These organisations 
were assigned the responsibility of managing the factories or funds expropriated by 
the revolutionary government from the former royal family and the elite who had 
fled Iran after the overthrow of the Shah.  
Similar to the details of their operations, their legal status is rather vague. They have 
been defined as public, non-governmental organisations with financial and 
administrative independence (Maloney, 2000). Interestingly, in different research on 
the Iranian economy, even by IMF, this confusion persists. For example, in an IMF 
report in 1995 they are treated as private entities (Maloney, 2000) whereas in IMF 
(2007) they are defined as nonfinancial public sector companies. This confusing 
terminology rather than being an obstacle potentially is a valuable asset for the 
foundations. It means that they can present themselves as private or public as it suits 
their interest which would allow them to take full advantage of a given policy or law. 
As mentioned above, at the point of inception the stated objectives of these 
foundations were entirely humanitarian and charitable. While they are meant to 
spend their profits on the martyrs’ families, war veterans and other activities to 
promote Islam and Islamic movements across the world, they only spend part of 
these profits as patronage tributes in order to secure votes and allegiance of a limited 
group (Roy, 1994). This function has managed to foster enough support for the state 
in times of political turmoil. It has also been a means of institutionalisation of the 
ideology of the new ruling class through increasing social mobility of the loyal 
revolutionaries (Saeidi, 2004).  
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However, over time some bonyads have evolved into capital accumulating 
conglomerates with rapid expansion paths. They have evolved into full-fledged 
profit-maximising conglomerates. They strengthened their foothold in the economy 
through direct transfers, preferential exchange rates and provision of interest-free 
credit. Moreover, being tax-exempt producers, detailed information on their 
operations is intentionally kept less transparent (Maloney, 2000). 
The Iranian state relies heavily on these parastatals for job creation and maintaining 
domestic production levels and therefore these entities have significant influence on 
the economy as a whole. They have an influential place in the non-oil economy of 
Iran and are active in various sectors such as tourism, finance, agriculture and 
manufacturing. For example, the most prominent bonyad, Islamic Revolution 
Mostazafan Foundation (IRMF)3, which was initially established from expropriation 
of funds belonging to the Pahlavi Foundation, is stated by Saami (2006) to account 
for around 10-20 percent of gross domestic product. At the onset of the revolution, 
its assets were almost twice as much as its predecessor’s due to confiscation of 
possessions of 50 millionaires after the revolution (Abrahamian, 2008). The total 
assets of this organisation in the late 1980s is estimated around $20 billion through 
the ownership of 64 mines, 470 agribusinesses, 140 factories, 100 construction 
businesses, two hotels, two newspapers and 250 commercial corporations 
(Abrahamian, 2008). In the mid-90s, IRMF is said to have been contributing to a vast 
share of the production of textiles (20 percent), dairy products (30 percent), soft 
drinks (40 percent) and glass containers (70 percent) among other products (Behdad, 
2000) while employing up to 700,000 people within at least 800 subsidiaries and 
additionally entering into sectors such as foreign trade and construction (Maloney, 
2000). All this was in light of regular annual payments by the government to IRMF. 
For example, during 1981 to1990 the government provision of resources to it 
increased by 29.3% on an annual basis (Saeidi, 2004). 
Other parastatals such as Alavi Foundation, Martyrs Foundation, Housing 
Foundation, War Refugees Foundation and Imam Khomeini’s Publications 
Foundation jointly employed more than 400,000 people in the early 1990s 
(Amuzegar, 1993). Additionally, the increasing presence of the foundations is 
                                                 
3 IRMF is referred to as ‘Bonyad-e Mostazafan-e Enghelab-e Eslami’ in Persian. 
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directly encouraged by oil resources allocated to these enterprises. It is worth noting 
that a number of bonyads only deal with cultural issues such as Farabi Foundation 
(cinema), Sazman-e Tablighat-e Eslami (Islamic missionary) and Resalat Foundation 
(newspaper) (Maloney, 2000). 
It is important to note that a number of these bonyads such as Martyrs Foundation 
and Komiteh Emdad have an official allocation of resources from the government 
general annual budget. For example, Martyrs Foundation was allocated $120 million 
from the budget in 1997 which was equivalent to 21% of the entire government 
expenditures in health, treatment and nutrition (Messkoub, 2006). 
Nevertheless, due to the limited and often incompatible data sources used in the 
literature to shed light on the relative size of IRMF (and similarly most other 
institutions) a great amount of caution has to be taken when using these data. 
Looking at the annual financial accounts recently published by IRMF (2014a) we can 
reassess these claims at least in the period covered (annual reports of 2010 to 2013). 
The website (see IRMF, 2014b) confirms the dominant market position of some of 
its leading companies. Behran Oil is said to have control of 53% of car lubricant oil’s 
market and one third of total industrial oil market in 2011 and Iran Tire is said to 
have a 14.5% market share of car rubber industry. The Zam Zam Holding Company 
holds 35% of total beverages market and Sina Food Industries Development 
Company controls 63% of non-alcoholic beer and 18% of the fruit juice markets. 
Nevertheless, our calculations based on the 2010 annual review figures suggest that 
its total employees are just around 34 thousand people and IRMF’s manufacturing 
and mining production accounts for 5% of Iran’s total manufacturing and mining 
production in this year (see  Appendix 1 for more details). This decreasing trend in 
the share of IRMF output simply might show the transfer of power of the bonyads 
who were dominant in the 1990s to the IRGC (discussed below) in the 2000s as 
described by Thaler et al. (2010). 
Regardless of the exact current figure on the size of these conglomerates, the real 
problem has been the implications they have had on domestic production and 
competition in the productive sectors. These foundations have faced numerous 
allegations of corruption and calls for their greater transparency have been voiced 
from time to time. For instance, in a parliamentary investigation of IRMF in 1995-96 
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concluded that the foundation had used its influence to gain favourable terms and 
concessions (Maloney, 2000). Furthermore, in 1997 with the new reformist 
government of President Khatami coming into office pressure on the bonyads further 
increased. Only then was that the IRMF announced that it will be publishing details 
of the financial accounts and privatisation of 250 of its companies. In practice these 
statements proved to be hollow promises and were soon forgotten (Saeidi, 2004). 
Apart from the financial power of these institutions they possess political influence 
due to various interpersonal and institutional relations with the government and other 
religious centres of power. They have acted as means of rivalry through the myriads 
of factions within the country and have often managed to redistribute power both 
between and within different social and political groups (Maloney, 2000). 
Interestingly, their relationship with the traditional merchants has been complicated 
and they are as much influenced by the bazaaris (and often cooperate) as they are 
economic rivals (Keshavarzian, 2007). Nevertheless, this power has allowed them to 
keep private sector investments away and secure their interests and has paved the 
way for their further expansion. They take measures to undermine potential threats 
through unfair trade conducts and monopolistic behaviour to their political agenda 
even if their economic interests are not at risk. 
Apart from bonyads, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Sepah-e 
Pasdaran or Sepah in Persian, has increasingly become an influential economic actor 
since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. While the root of IRGC’s economic interests can 
be traced back to the post-war introduction of formal military ranks, it was the profit 
motive of creating independent revenue streams for governmental organisations, 
advocated by Rafsanjani (the president) in the early 1990s, that resulted in its notable 
economic operations (Wehrey et al., 2008). The IRGC has expanded its presence in 
the economic scene both directly and also through semi-private companies managed 
by its current or former members. Moreover, it has often collaborated with some 
bonyads in various projects. For example, the IRGC and IRMF cooperated in a $1.2 
billion project of Tehran’s metro expansion (Bjorvaten and Selvik, 2008). This is not 
surprising due to the ‘Sepahi’ background of key foundation figures which itself 
partly stems from the close logistic support the bonyads provided to the Guards 
during the Iraq war. Furthermore, IRGC has proven its intolerance of foreign 
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competition where they see their interests at risk. For example, in 2004, they 
unilaterally barred the operation of a Turkish company which was legally contracted 
to undertake construction and servicing of the Imam Khomeini Airport (Pesaran, 
2011). Moreover, during Ahmadinejad’s term they gradually obtained increasing 
presence in the oil sector, undertaking various projects such as production of 
pipelines and drilling activities (See Bjorvaten and Selvik, 2008). This trend 
culminated to the appointment of the head of a major economic wing of Sepah as the 
country’s oil minister in 2011. However, he was replaced with the new cabinet of 
Rohani in 2013. 
The Iranian political turmoil has resulted in the implementation of sanctions against 
Iran both through UN resolutions and also trade and financial embargos put in force 
by countries such as the US and the major European Union countries. These have 
placed the Iranian economy under immense pressure but have also meant an increase 
in the protection and aid provided to these parastatal organisations and their 
subsequent importance in the domestic economy. 
In July 2006, after a number of failed attempts of privatisation, new amendments to 
article 44 of the Constitution (with the declaration of the Leader in mid-2005) 
envisaged a gradual privatisation procedure of 80 percent of public sector industries 
and companies, excluding upstream oil sector and other key infrastructure, through 
the stock market (see IMF, 2007; Atashbar, 2011). However, this move was largely 
hampered by the presence of these parastatals as they have been the ultimate winners 
of these policies (Harris, 2013). This is partly due to the financial strength of these 
institutions but more importantly these transfers were made possible through 
preferential price and tender conditions exclusive to these organisations (Saeidi, 
2004). As a result, the foundations have entered the stock offering and ultimately 
ownership has been transferred from one group of public sector to another (Maloney, 
2000). This has been referred to as ‘pseudo-privatisation’ instead of actual 
privatisation (Harris, 2013). Even though this process has resurrected the Tehran 
Stock Exchange back to life it is unlikely to benefit the economy and has emphasised 
the marginalisation of the private sector investment in the Iranian economy. 
The sheer size and interrelatedness with the government, SOEs and other bonyads 
accompanied by the political agenda that they pursue, clearly demonstrate the 
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potential for them to intensify the distortions in the Iranian economy which damage 
the country’s economic dynamics. For example, their interests as monopolists 
coupled with tax exemptions, subsidised loans and preferential exchange rates, 
circumvent any type of competition from the private sector which entails additional 
costs for the economy as a whole. Similarly, they would fiercely oppose entry of any 
foreign competition to their markets leading to minimum transfer of technological 
knowhow from abroad.  
The economic burden of the bonyads on the government itself has been quite 
crippling and in the past has made reaching the structural adjustment targets of IMF 
an arduous objective for the state. In the past when their economic interests clashes 
with those of the government, it has shown the powerlessness of the government to 
the extent that government figures have publicly voiced their frustration (Thaler et 
al., 2010). Crucially, despite the semi-public nature of these institutions their 
performance in comparison to the pubic production might be distinctively different. 
It might be argued that due to their autonomy they might end up being more efficient 
and competitive (Maloney, 2000) contrary to public sector production which as 
discussed earlier could be susceptible to various inefficiencies and mismanagement. 
Consequently, in order to inspect the ultimate effect of the oil rents on the Iranian 
economy examining the presence of these economic giants and their impact on the 
economy is essential. To see how these parastatals have performed compared to 
private and other public firms in terms of efficiency can provide a valuable addition 
to the research on the Iranian economy. By closely examining the performance of 
these conglomerates in terms of efficiency in the manufacturing sector these claims 
can be verified. Furthermore, other potential positive roles in the development path 
of the economy, such as the intermediary between public and private sectors 
(Maloney, 2000), are yet to be fully investigated and tested. Based on these results 
reforms and remedies can be then put forward for the Iranian economy. Obviously, 
the biggest barrier to investigating such entities is the limited and often contradictory 
data available about these institutions. However, certain triangulation of data already 
available could help to shed some light on their activities. For example, in a given 
industry that the presence of the private sector is limited the mere size of a given firm 
could help identify these subsidiaries in datasets that are provided anonymously. 
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3.6 Bazaaris 
The traditional merchants of the Tehran Bazaar, or ‘bazaaris’, have consistently 
played an important role throughout the economic history of Iran as early as 19th 
century (Abrahamian, 2008). Interestingly, they enjoy close affinity with the clergy, 
most visibly; the clerics supported them for being mistreated by the Qajar dynasty. 
This kinship was important to the extent that, alongside the crucial role of the 
intelligentsia, it is considered as a contributor to the success of the Constitutional 
Revolution in 1905 (Keshavarzian, 2007). Another important example of the clergy-
bazaar alliance is the strikes undertaken by the merchants in support of clerics and 
Mosaddegh in the oil nationalisation upheavals in early 1950s (Bayandor, 2010). 
Once more at the onset of the 1979 revolution the bazaar played an important role in 
support of Ayatollah Khomeini (Abrahamian, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the events after the revolution did not imply the increase of influence 
of the Bazaar after the revolution. As Keshavarzian (2007) argues, the ironic result of 
the revolution for the Bazaar as a whole was its marginalisation and loss of internal 
cohesion. He notes that despite the modernisation policies of Shah in the 1960s and 
1970s and his hostility towards the bazaaris, the Bazaar remained autonomous and 
controlled two-thirds of wholesale trade and more than 30% of imports in this period. 
The bazaar prospered due to the growth-oriented policies of the Shah backed by the 
strong oil income. However, Keshavarzian (2007) maintains that after the revolution 
the situation changed as a result of the ideological categorisation of bazaaris by the 
Islamic Republic. This meant that the group that it considered in line with the 
revolution, the ‘committed bazaaris’, were allowed to benefit from access to state-
controlled resources whereas the ‘non-committed bazaaris’ were left to fend for 
themselves. Furthermore, the dominance of the Bazaar was also undermined by the 
redistributive policies of the Islamic Republic (contrary to the Shah) and the state’s 
desire to control production and support low income strata through tentative and 
instable policies. This took place through the mushrooming of various state 
institutions and organisations after the 1980s. 
On the other hand, a number of committed bazaaris went on further and directly 
entered the political sphere by taking part in parliamentary elections and starting the 
Islamic Coalition Society. Furthermore, one of the prominent figures of bazaar, 
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Habibollah Asgaroladi, was straight away put in charge of the ministry of commerce 
in 1980. While the main economic function of bazaaris is mercantile operations, 
ruling them out simply as middleman would be an understatement. The participation 
in the revolution resulted in an even stronger sphere of influence for the ‘committed 
bazaaris’ in different offices which guaranteed their interests in the face of statist 
policies of trade nationalisation advocated by a separate faction at the onset of 
revolution. It guaranteed various profitable trade contracts and licenses for the 
(committed) ones in return for their allegiance and often charity spending for 
building mosques and other community projects (Abrahamian, 2008). 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have provided a perusal of the key political economic factors in 
Iran’s recent history. By exploring the power structure before and after the revolution 
we demonstrated the importance of political distribution of power which has been 
maintained with reliance on oil in both periods. Nevertheless, the nature of power 
structure in the two epochs is considerably different. During the Shah’s reign power 
and decision making solely revolved around him. After the revolution, despite the 
supremacy of the Leader above all institutions there exists a considerable amount of 
heterogeneity among different groups active within the accepted circle of the regime. 
Looking at the Constitution we argued that this polycentric characteristic of post-
revolutionary Iran was encouraged by the provision of duality in the obligations and 
oversight of institutions and councils. We briefly reviewed the turbulent three-decade 
political history of the Islamic Republic and identified the main influential factions 
and showed how throughout time their ideologies and vested interests constantly 
redrew the lines between allies and rivals. 
To see the practical implications of this complex picture and the interests of these 
various groups we looked at the key features in the economy. We saw that the public 
sector production has dominated the economy and due to protective measures it has 
prevented the flourishing of a healthy private sector. We discussed a distinctive 
feature of the Iranian economy, the quasi-public or parastatal organisations that due 
to their financial capabilities act as monopolies and are barriers to competition and 
openness. The monopolistic interests of the elite bazaaris in international trade and 
both wholesale and retail domestic market is protected by this structure and itself 
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cements ties between different components of power. These different entities have 
often been the centre stage of political arena and means of factional competition. 
This unique economic layout of public and semi-public sectors after the revolution 
has had important ramifications for the performance of the productive sector. Having 
been assigned key goals of employment creation, provision of goods and services 
and improving income distribution, these sectors have been receiving preferential 
treatment compared to the private sector for a long time. The existence of these 
unique economic agents highlights the importance of firms’ ownership in our study 
of production performance in the following chapters. Furthermore, other aspects of 
state influence such as relative large size and small incentives of exporting in Iranian 
components of the economy are important hypotheses to be tested in our 
investigation of the manufacturing sector vis-à-vis the oil income. We will explain 
the precedence and prominence of oil income in the next chapter and will formalise 
our framework in the chapters after that.  
70 
Chapter 4 Oil and the Iranian Economy 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we emphasised the key political developments and the 
influence of political economic factors in the Iranian economy. Confirming some of 
the political explanations (discussed in  Chapter 2) of resource dependent economies 
for the case of Iran we argued that this structure has survived with reliance on the 
flow of oil revenues. In this chapter we investigate the extent of this dependence. We 
provide a historical narrative on the growth trend and key features of Iranian 
economy with special reference to the role of oil. By revisiting the historical 
performance of the economy we investigate the role of oil in economic policy and 
more crucially attempt to verify the validity of the economic frameworks discussed 
in  Chapter 2 (Resource Curse and Dutch Disease). We try to provide an explanation 
on the channels through which the oil revenues have alternatively played their roles 
based on the political economic structure discussed in  Chapter 3. To this end, the role 
of oil revenues on the competitiveness and efficiency of the productive sector is 
investigated. 
4.2 Oil and Growth in Iran 
Whether a curse or a blessing, it is certain that the Iranian economy has for more than 
half a century been one that is heavily dependent on oil. It is clear that the oil sector 
has been the driving engine of Iran’s economy. The government budgets and 
economic plans have long been closely intertwined with the oil revenues. Within the 
government budget there is explicit mention of the oil prices for the year and 
government finances are managed on the basis of this price. 
As Karshenas and Hakimian (2005) demonstrate, there is a close relationship 
between oil export revenues and the real GDP figures for the majority of the last few 
decades in Iran especially after the revolution. This oil dependence can be clearly 
observed by looking at the differences between real GDP and oil annual4 growth 
rates. Figure  4–1 highlights the close association between the output growth of the 
                                                 
4 The data obtained from the Iranian sources such as CBI and SCI are reported according to the 
Iranian calendar. The Iranian calendar year starts on 20th March. As a close approximation, we convert 
the Iranian year to the Gregorian calendar year equivalent by adding 621 to the Iranian year. 
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oil sector and the growth rates of the Iranian economy. This graph clearly shows that 
contrary to the Resource Curse growth discourse, the relationship between oil and 
GDP growth rates are positive. 
Figure  4–1 Oil and GDP Annual Growth Rates, 1960-2011. 
 
Source:  Based on CBI (2014a). 
Notes:  * Real growth rates based on 2004 Rial prices. 
We can also see in Figure  4–2 that, apart from the obvious decline in the 
revolution/war period, the share of oil in GDP has hovered around 20% and has not 
returned to its peak in mid-1970s of around 40%. Furthermore, the dependence of the 
economy on oil income as the biggest source of foreign currency is better understood 
by looking at its share in total exports (sum of merchandise and service exports). The 
figures are high in both pre and post revolution with averages of 85% and 74% 
respectively. This can be very problematic for the country and the government 
finances if this income becomes under threat such as in 2012 as a result of the 
sanctions a 37% decline in oil exports drops the oil export share to 48% for the first 
time in more than half a century. As expected the data also suggests that in the last 
four decades the biggest income source of the government has come from oil 
proceeds which on average have contributed to more than 50% of government annual 
income from 1965 to 2010. This constant share has been maintained in the post-
revolutionary phase largely as a result of increase in the price of oil which has 
simultaneously countered the increase in consumption due to higher domestic 
consumption and a flat production trend after the war. This trend is in contrast to the 
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pre-revolutionary one where the dominant engine of oil sector growth had been 
increase in production during the Shah era (see  Appendix 2). 
Figure  4–2 Share of Oil in GDP Exports and Government Income, 1959-2011. 
 
Source: Based on CBI (2014a) and CBI (2014b). 
The above observation is in line with a number of studies on the effect of oil income 
on the growth of oil exporting countries (e.g. Berument et al. 2010). Nevertheless, it 
has been argued that the relationship between oil income and output growth can be 
asymmetrically positive so that the extent of negative oil shocks might be more 
significant on average than positive shocks (Mehrara, 2008). These results are also 
confirmed in studies on the Iranian Economy which suggest a positive relationship 
between oil income and the overall growth of the Iranian economy (Farzanegan and 
Markwardt, 2009; Emami and Adibpour, 2012). In a recent study, Esfahani et al. 
(2013) study the effect of one standard deviation positive shock of oil revenues in the 
Iranian economy employing a General Impulse Response Function. They report that 
a shock equal to one standard deviation of oil revenues, despite putting upward 
pressure on prices and real exchange rate, can also lead to an increase of real GDP by 
3.2%. These findings similar to our observation above provide empirical evidence 
contrary to the interpretation of oil abundance as a Resource Curse. 
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It is worth noting that most studies here focus on the growth aspect and largely avoid 
the development question. Thus, it is important to bear in mind the subtle difference 
between economic growth and economic development when interpreting these 
results for the case of Iran. Identifying the optimal course of action and utilising 
resource revenues (oil revenues in this case) is crucial to the developmental 
trajectory of the country. The strategy that a country undertakes in managing its 
resource revenues can have a great impact on macroeconomic indices such as the 
national savings ratios, unemployment figures and the long-term GDP trend. 
4.3 Oil and Volatility 
Having investigated the extent of the reliance of the economy and the government on 
the oil revenues it would be reasonable to argue that any source of volatility with 
regards to this source of income could pose serious challenges to the economy. This 
negative potential would materialise as a big problem only if the government 
expenditure was to be pegged to this oil income. In other words, while commodity 
prices ‘naturally’ tend to be volatile, it is the manner in which income from oil is 
incorporated in to the fiscal and monetary policies of the government that can either 
transform it to a curse or a blessing. 
In their study, Mohaddes and Pesaran (2014) compare the extent of volatilities in the 
price, production and revenue of oil in the recent history of Iran. They report that in 
the period between 1960 and 2010, the highest volatility is for that of oil revenues 
followed by production and prices respectively. Their findings suggest that all three 
indices of volatility have increased through time. Prices have become more volatile 
due to the big oil multinationals gradually losing their hold on prices from 1950s, the 
collapse of the OPEC pricing mechanism in 1985 and a number of price shocks. 
They also suggest that the upward volatility in oil production is largely witnessed 
after the revolution due to the war with Iraq, the intentional halving of oil production 
as an agricultural production stimulus and more recently the lack of investment in oil 
projects due to sanctions imposed by the West. The compounding effect of these two 
components has led to an even more volatile oil revenue trend. While they 
demonstrate a positive association between oil export revenues and real growth 
(similar to Esfahani et al., 2013), they find a negative relationship between oil 
revenue volatility and real per capita GDP growth. Therefore, the volatility argument 
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seems to be a more plausible proponent of the Resource Curse rather than the growth 
regressions of Sachs and Warner (1995) and others. 
Consequently, as a first step, it seems necessary for countries such as Iran to improve 
the accountability and transparency of the government with regards to oil revenue 
through improvement in institutional quality and macroeconomic prudence. More 
crucially, they should also devise additional mechanisms to immunise the country to 
the negative effects of the tentative nature of oil income. The concept of sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs) has been around for a long time. Examples of such funds 
include, Kuwait Investment Authority (founded in 1953), Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (founded in 1976) and Norway’s State Petroleum Fund (founded in 1990). 
These funds act as a cushion to oil price and income volatility and their resources are 
often used to finance infrastructural and long-term investment projects. Due to the 
procedural and statuary requirements that have to be fulfilled in order to use the 
funds this mechanism acts as a screening tool of withdrawn amounts. 
Despite the relatively long history of oil in Iran, the Iranian state has only recently 
followed suit and implemented SWFs in managing oil and gas revenues and the 
subsequent investment in the economy by inception of the country’s oil fund for the 
first time in 1999. The fund has witnessed a number of amendments in its definition 
and regulations in its relative short life. Initially named the Oil Stabilisation Fund 
(OSF) it was introduced in the reform period of Khatami in 2000. The objective of 
this fund was merely to act as a reserve ‘account’. It mainly served the purpose of 
using half of surplus revenues accruing from oil to cushion the volatility impact of 
these revenues on the government finances. The other half was earmarked for 
provision of loans to the private sector. In practice, the Treasury was allowed to 
withdraw funds if the oil revenues fell short of the projected budget values in order to 
meet its targets. This was due to the fact that the OSF was not integrated into the 
general budget of the country and, as such, has enjoyed relatively less regulatory 
scrutiny. 
Under article 84 of the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan the OSF was almost 
entirely replaced by the National Development Fund (NDF) in 2011. The NDF has 
been established with broader objectives such as boosting private sector role, 
increasing overall productivity of the economy and maintaining the benefits of the oil 
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wealth for future generations. The NDF obtains a minimum of 20% of the oil 
revenues based on budget predictions of the price of oil. Furthermore, each year this 
share is planned to increase by an additional 3%. However, if revenues were to 
exceed these predictions, 85.5% of this income is additionally transferred to the OSF 
from which half of the balance of this account is transferred to NDF (IMF, 2011). 
The other sources of income of the fund include interest from central bank and other 
interest returns from projects that have the fund reserves. The reserves of the fund 
can be used for production loans to private entrepreneurs and non-governmental 
public institutions, loans to customers of Iranian produced goods and investment in 
foreign markets, but it cannot be used to buy capital assets or to payback government 
debts. 
The fund is not a subset of the ministry of Finance directly, but it is governed by a 
board of trustees who are senior members of the government including the president, 
ministers of oil, finance and labour. The board of executives conducts the 
management of the fund projects and its members are chosen by the president. There 
also exists a board of supervisors who are responsible on overseeing the fund 
activities and its progress towards the defined goals. In 2011, the fund revenues was 
valued at $24.4 billion (Heuty, 2012), $35billion in 2012 and estimated to be around 
$50 billion by early 2013 (George, 2012). Recently the head of the fund has 
confirmed the total inflow figure to the fund from its inception to mid-June 2014 to 
be around $64 billion (ISNA, 2014). 
An additional factor regarding the establishment of the NDF is its role in the political 
infighting of various groups and factions within the state. For instance, the change of 
organisational structure of the OSF to NDF was ratified based on the 
recommendation of the Expediency Council (headed by Rafsanjani). This change 
was enforced in order to rein in the spending spree of the government and implement 
tighter controls on the flow of funds. On the political side, this was also testament to 
increasing frictions between the Ahmadinejad’s government and other factions 
especially in the final years of his presidency. Thus, in a number of instances rather 
than acting as a stabilising institution the fund has been changed and amended 
according to the power struggles inside the country. This highlights how the channels 
of oil revenues entering the economy can be heavily influenced by various groups in 
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the political structure of the regime (as discussed in  Chapter 3). It is clear that the 
presence of such political influences can determine, for example, the allocation of 
loans to firms that might not utilise these funds correctly or get them used to cheap 
credit and affect their production habits. These observations are important in 
reference to the framework we will employ for investigating the oil question and will 
be further explored in the following sections. 
4.4 Oil and Trade Policy 
As with all other aspects of economic policy in oil economies, their trade strategies 
are also largely determined, for good or worse, by the presence of proceeds from oil 
exports. The inherent characteristics of oil income, such as their denomination in 
dollars, can have implications for an oil exporter. One negative channel is the 
consequence of the Dutch Disease. It can be argued that the influx of foreign 
currency revenues leads to an appreciation of the national currency, leading to a 
contraction of other exports and can possibly increase the reliance on relatively 
cheaper imports (Amid and Hajikhani, 2005). Alternatively, the oil income could 
lead to the expansion of domestic demand and further pressuring the government to 
forgo policies of investment in manufacturing exports and rely on imports (Kavoussi, 
1986). This contradicts objectives such as export promotion and strengthening of the 
state’s trade balances and extending backward linkages in the economy.  
However, oil could potentially play a positive role in the sense that it can provide 
means of reducing the period of protection needed for domestic companies to 
become more competitive by expanding infrastructures and human capital. Other 
implications of the presence of resource funds for the government can have dubious 
effects. For instance, the availability of oil proceeds can prevent the need for foreign 
loans and the consequent large interest costs but at the same time it may be used as 
collateral for securing larger loans. Both instances can entail serious implications for 
the country’s national currency and consequently for volumes and directions of trade. 
Moreover, while the presence of oil revenues allows the government to subsidise 
production and avoid the negative attributes of trade policies (such as tariffs and 
quotas) could ironically lead to production becoming over reliant on these transfers 
and further prolonging the need for government protection policies. This also means 
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that with the increase in government’s fiscal spending alongside the buoyant 
domestic market the result could well be that even though imports increase and 
industrial export is inhibited, the growth of the manufacturing sector might not be 
negatively affected in light of production subsidies (Kavoussi, 1986). 
The oil income has strongly influenced the import and export behaviour of the 
Iranian economy. The government’s trade policy changes have had a close 
association with variations in oil income receipts. Even though according to World 
Bank data the measure of trade openness in Iran is below that of the MENA average, 
at times instead of relying on oil money to import intermediary goods needed in 
production, it is spent on current expenditures such as imports of food. This is 
confirmed by the measured tariff restrictions index of trade for agricultural goods 
being half of that for non-agricultural goods (World Bank, 2009). This is not to say 
that the agriculture sector does not receive any protection from foreign competition 
since from time to time policies of self-sufficiency in produce such as wheat has 
been pursued due to populist intentions. However, these attempts similar to policies 
for the industrial sector have only had short run effects and significantly negative 
long run impact. For instance, the over-usage of groundwater and inefficient 
irrigation techniques has made water shortage as one of the biggest challenges to the 
country. 
During the pre-revolutionary period there seems to be an overwhelming evidence of 
import-substitution policies with various forms of intervention including various 
tariffs and quotas. Additionally importers were obliged to pay commercial benefit 
tax, municipal tax and port tax (Amid and Hajikhani, 2005). The composition of 
imports was mainly geared towards the imports of intermediary and capital goods for 
the industrial sector. This partly inhibited greater forward and backward linkages due 
to the presence of cheap oil based credits and employment of heavily capital-
intensive technologies that were dependent on such imports. These policies soon 
changed with the hike in oil revenues in the mid-1970s and a larger proportion of 
consumer goods took the place of capital goods in government import expenditures. 
On the other hand despite some tax exemptions for exporters the main non-oil 
exports even until 1978 remained to be agricultural and traditional exports such as 
carpets (Amid and Hajikhani, 2005). 
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After the revolution, the government initially followed strict protectionist policies 
based on political and ideological goals of self-sufficiency and achieving 
independence from foreign powers. These measures were further strengthened due to 
the problems in the first decade of the revolution and the Iraq war. However, in the 
‘reconstruction’ period after the war the government exercised gradual liberalisation 
policies. These movements came to an abrupt end after the balance of payment crisis 
of the 1993–4 due to a slump in oil prices and the devaluated Rial (Esfahani and 
Pesaran, 2009). This pattern was repeated in subsequent years with the fluctuations 
of the oil income such as the sharp rise of oil prices in 2002. 
The oil revenue has not been adequately utilised by the state in order to pursue a 
more export oriented industrialisation policy. Thus, the state has forgone the 
important goal of increasing the domestic production’s competitiveness. Measures 
such as export diversification not only can reduce the dependence of the economy on 
oil but it also can foster other economic goals such as alleviating the problem of 
unemployment. However, the problem of large endowments of public and quasi-
public sectors has been the main drawback of these objectives. In the quasi-public 
sector, the bonyads (especially IRMF) have been actively engaged in foreign trade 
(Maloney, 2000). Moreover, it is reported that in pursuit of obtaining an additional 
source of income, the IRGC engages in smuggling goods through unofficial ports 
(Wehrey et al., 2008). On a number of occasions these operations have even been 
contested by some of the country’s notables, including Ahmadinejad in the latter part 
of his tenure after falling out with the traditional hardline factions. Thus, the vested 
interest of these entities in foreign trade while partially justifiable in the war period 
obviously undermines the planning and implementation of appropriate trade policies 
by the government. 
More recently, the escalation of economic sanctions due to political pressure from 
the United States government over Iran’s nuclear programme has severely disrupted 
imports and exports from various dimensions. In addition to putting pressure on the 
oil revenues, sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran has meant that the country has 
seen its connections to the world banking systems almost entirely severed. These 
restrictions and the resulting collapse of the exchange rate5 have made receipt and 
                                                 
5 See Habibi (2014) on a timeline of recent sanctions and exchange rate trend. 
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payment of revenues and expenses in dollars literally impossible for businesses. This 
has meant that on many occasions the government itself has pursued bartering 
transactions with countries such as China, India and Thailand. 
There is no doubt that the inappropriate and inconsistent trade strategies alongside 
political impediments to trade in the Iranian context have caused short term costs to 
the economy. However, more crucially these factors have contributed to long lasting 
effects on production structure, especially in the industrial sectors, both in terms of 
machinery and production techniques. Subsequently, in this setting the emergence of 
a strong and competitive private sector that can replace the public sector production 
and compete with foreign imports is a remote possibility. 
4.5 Dutch Disease in Iran? 
To analyse the performance of the manufacturing sector in light of the oil revenues 
and the above factors we investigate the historic performance of the oil and 
manufacturing sector and assess whether or not the Dutch Disease framework which 
was discussed in  Chapter 2 is even applicable in the case of Iran. 
We argue that what the Iranian economy experienced has been the opposite of the 
Dutch Disease predicted outcomes. This is not to say that the Dutch Disease 
mechanism is negated but rather it is simply inapplicable in the case of Iran since the 
assumptions of the Dutch Disease model are not satisfied. As discussed in  Chapter 2, 
a crucial assumption of Dutch Disease is assuming a small open economy. This 
assumption does not hold in the pre and post-revolutionary phase due to the various 
state implemented tariff and non-tariff protections of manufacturing sector which has 
transformed it to more of a non-tradable sector than a tradable one. Furthermore, 
government interventions by controlling wages and prices with the help of the oil 
revenues themselves violate other assumptions of the Dutch Disease framework. 
The majority of the historic GDP trends by sector do not indicate a negative 
relationship between oil and gas revenues and manufacturing production. Taking a 
closer look at macro data in different sub-periods, we can shed light on the state of 
affairs of the manufacturing sector vis-à-vis the oil sector (Figure  4–3). A clear 
positive correlation between the growth figures of the two sectors is visible 
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throughout the seven sub-periods covered. In the first sub-period which shows the 
years prior to the main oil boom, there is a steady growth in manufacturing with a 
slightly stronger increase in the oil and gas sector. The subsequent oil boom in the 
1970s is accompanied by an increase in the manufacturing sector presence. However, 
as the boom finishes so does the growth in manufacturing until the revolution in 
1979. The war period (1981-1987) continues with negative growth indicators for 
both sectors. However, again with the next oil boom the manufacturing sector rises 
into the green, thanks to the surge in oil revenues in late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
two periods of ‘construction’ (1994-1997) and ‘post-construction’ (1998-2006) 
similarly show the strong effect of the oil revenues on the manufacturing or ‘tradable 
sector’ in a positive way rather than what is put forward by the Resource Curse 
literature and the Dutch Disease in particular. Overall, the manufacturing sector 
expands with oil booms and production slows as the oil revenues decline. 
Figure  4–3 Oil and Manufacturing Sector Growth Patterns, 1960-2006. 
 
Source: Based on CBI Data (2011). 
Notes: *Deflated by CPI index in 2005. 
Apart from the above discussion, even if we hypothetically assume the conditions for 
Dutch Disease to be valid, the limited nature of this framework due to its short run 
scope deems it inapplicable to the case of Iran. The one-off influx of revenues, which 
is the mechanism that the model relies upon, applies for a country with limited oil 
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reserves and thus does not provide a long run solution for the case of a major oil 
exporter such as Iran (Mohaddes and Pesaran, 2014). 
The interaction between the industry and oil sector warrants a closer examination for 
the context of Iran. Below, we will explore the undercurrents of the manufacturing 
sector performance more closely by looking at the historical trend in labour 
productivity, wage and profitability of Iranian manufacturing. These indices will 
provide us with an alternative explanation since the Dutch Disease cannot be applied. 
4.5.1 Labour Productivity, Wages and Manufacturing Markups 
Under the Dutch Disease paradigm it is suggested that oil revenues cause 
deindustrialization in the manufacturing sector. The reason for this is the lack of 
competitiveness of manufacturing firms compared to their foreign counterparts due 
to wage increases induced by the oil income. In order to provide a framework 
regarding how the violation of the Dutch Disease model assumptions has meant that 
its prediction fails to materialise in the Iranian economy, we look at manufacturing 
production more closely. This way we can appreciate the adjustments of the 
economy’s composition and study how price markups are influenced in the Iranian 
economy. To this end we can rely on the decomposition of manufacturing output 
value. Under a basic markup pricing setting we can formulate the relations between 
labour productivity, wages and outputs as below: 
 𝑃.𝑂 = (1 + 𝜋)(𝑊. 𝐿 + 𝑝𝑚.𝑚) ( 4–1) 
Here 𝑂 is the quantity of output, 𝑃 is the price of manufactured output, which is set 
by global markets, 𝑝𝑚 and m are the price and quantity of raw material and 
intermediary goods, 𝑊 and 𝐿 are aggregate manufacturing money wage and 
employed labour and 𝜋 is the producer’s markup. We divide both sides of Equation 
( 4–1) by the output value we have: 
 1 = (1 + 𝜋) �𝑊. 𝐿
𝑃.𝑂 + 𝑝𝑚.𝑚𝑃.𝑂 � ( 4–2) 
The LHS of the Equation ( 4–2) is a constant and thus we can analyse changes in the 
RHS more conveniently. In order to see labour productivity explicitly, we can divide 
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both the numerator and denominator of (𝑊. 𝐿)/(𝑃.𝑂) by 𝑃. 𝐿. We would then have 
Equation ( 4–3) as below: 
 1 = (1 + 𝜋)�𝑊𝑃𝑂
𝐿
+ 𝑝𝑚.𝑚
𝑃.𝑂 � ( 4–3) 
We can see the results of a simple interpretation of Dutch Disease through this 
relationship. An oil-induced increase in money wages will lead to a drop in the 
profits (𝜋), when all other factors are constant. The important issue here is that this is 
just one scenario out of many. This equation clearly shows other channels through 
which manufacturing profitability can be influenced. When other factors are not 
constant, the outcome of an oil boom for the economy might be different and an 
increase in money wage does not necessarily reflect a drop in profitability of the 
manufacturing sector. One possible scenario could be that if at the same time labour 
productivity increases, it can offset the downward pressure on producers’ margins. 
As discussed in  Chapter 2, labour productivity can increase due to employment of 
productivity enhancing machinery or the exit of less skilled labour from 
manufacturing into other sectors such as services. An alternative scenario could be 
that the share of intermediate goods in total output might be reducing due to 
improvements in technology or worldwide commodity price fluctuations.  
The above relationship shows that not only the profitability of manufacturing 
necessarily needs to decrease but it may well be that it can more than offset the 
downward pressure of wages on profits and increase their margins with various 
protection measures provided by the government. Below, we will take a closer look 
to see what explanation seems to be more plausible by looking at the components of 
Equation ( 4–3) in the case of Iranian manufacturing. 
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Figure  4–4 Wage Bill to Total Output ratio of Iranian Manufacturing, 1963-2008. 
 
Source: Based on UNIDO (2013). 
The empirical evidence in Figure  4–46 shows that despite short-lived upward trends, 
the share of wage bill in total output had a mild upward trend prior to the revolution 
but was predominantly on the decline in the Iranian manufacturing sector after the 
revolution. This graph also highlights the anomalies of price structure and the 
importance of wage bill in the period immediately after the revolution and during the 
war which was possible following the nationalisation of industries and control of 
production. 
As we showed before, the wage bill share is equivalent to the ratio of product wage 
(𝑊/𝑃) to labour productivity (𝑂/𝐿). The above graph confirms that this ratio has 
mainly had a decreasing trend after a sharp jump right after the revolution. To further 
study this dynamic, we can compare the labour productivity trend vis-à-vis the 
product wage behaviour separately in Figure  4–5 and Figure  4–6. Looking at 
Figure  4–5 it can be observed that in the decade before the revolution (1968 to 1977) 
labour productivity had a mild increasing trend of 1.7% annually compared to the 
high growth rate of 6.6% on average in the years between 1995 and 2008. In other 
words, labour productivity growth in the 1970s was almost half the rate of growth in 
the post-war phase. However, according to Figure  4–6, the product wages growth 
trend is exactly the opposite when comparing the situation before and after the 
                                                 
6 See  Appendix 3 for more details on calculations for Figure  4–4, Figure  4–5, Figure  4–6, Figure  4–7 
and Figure  4–8. 
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revolution. The product wage index witnessed average annual growth rate of 6.2% 
prior7 to the revolution and 3.1% post-1995.  
Figure  4–5 Labour Productivity Index in Iranian Manufacturing, 1963-2008 (2005=100). 
 
Source: Based on UNIDO (2013) and CBI (2013). 
Thus, the data on the growth rates of product wage and output growth can explain 
how their ratio moved in these periods. Comparing the two indices of product wage 
and labour productivity we find that after the revolution, post-war product wages 
increased at a much more moderate pace compared to labour productivity. This has 
led to a drop in the ratio of product wage to labour productivity especially after the 
revolution. As a consequence, and as we saw earlier, the trend in Figure  4–4 is 
downward in this period. Based on the same analogy, the mild upward trend in the 
ratio illustrated in Figure  4–4 for the period prior to the revolution can be explained 
by the slower growth of labour productivity (the denominator) compared to product 
wage (the numerator). 
                                                 
7 The underlying reason for the increasing trend in labour productivity especially after 1997 
(Khatami’s first term) can be summarised in three main explanations. First, thanks to increase in oil 
prices the government had managed to weather the balance of payment crisis of the earlier period 
during Rafsanjani’s second presidential term, in the early 1990s. This resulted in easier availability of 
inputs and raw material for production. Second, the easing of the credit constraint problems also 
stimulated demand and allowed the utilisation of excess capacities in the economy. Third, we can see 
that during this period investment in the entire economy (gross capital formation) grew at an average 
rate of 6% annually.   
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Figure  4–6 Iran’s Manufacturing Product Wage and overall Real Wage, 1963-2008 (2005=100). 
 
Source: Based on UNIDO (2013), World Bank (2013) and CBI (2011). 
On the other hand, Figure  4–7 shows the trend in the other component of the markup 
relationship discussed in Equation ( 4–3). Here the share of intermediate goods in 
total output displays a relative flat trend (apart from a drop in the war period falling 
below 55%) and has been hovering around 60% up to 2007. Consequently, based on 
the markup relationship, the profit margin has been on the increase in the period after 
the war with Iraq. This can explain why despite increase in oil prices and the 
consequent high wage share immediately after the revolution, profit margins may 
have not necessarily shrunk. 
Figure  4–7 Share of Intermediate Goods in Output of Iranian Manufacturing, 1963-2008. 
 
Source: Based on UNIDO (2013). 
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To see these developments more explicitly, the markups have been calculated from 
the identity relationship and illustrated in Figure  4–8. The aggregate markup of the 
manufacturing sector in the pre-revolutionary period shows a declining trend (except 
early 1970s) whereas in the post-revolutionary phase the trend up to early 2000s has 
been mainly an upward one. This highlights the effect that the increase in labour 
productivity has had on the profitability of the manufacturing sector. 
Looking at the fall in labour productivity in the 1980s we can conclude that the 
product wage increase in this period was not economically viable for the producers. 
Despite these wage rigidities, the generous subsidies provided to these industries 
allows the profit markup to only fall to an average of 28% from 46% prior to the 
revolution. To see the extent of the help provided using Equation ( 4–3) we can 
calculate that the markup should have fallen to 17%, had the share of intermediate 
goods’ bill not fallen. This was also welcomed by the workers as it translated to a 
real wage increase in their payroll. 
Figure  4–8 Aggregate Markup Trend in Iranian Manufacturing, 1963-2008. 
 
Source: Based on UNIDO (2013), World Bank (2013) and CBI (2011). 
Furthermore, we see a much higher correlation coefficient (-0.73) between wage 
shares and the profit margin compared to intermediate goods bill and profits (0.06). 
This highlights the role that factors affecting productivity have on how oil income 
can determine the survival of manufacturing firms. 
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Our empirical findings show that the oil revenues through state interventions have 
distorted the wage price relationship. More importantly, this begs the question that 
what effect such provisions of cheap inputs may have had on altering the efficiency 
of industrial production itself and artificially preventing the markup from falling 
when oil income is available. Thus, the role of the state and the economic policies 
undertaken by it means that a number of Dutch Disease assumptions such as flexible 
prices and open economy assumption are violated which deems the standard Dutch 
Disease explanation seem irrelevant in this context. 
We have explicitly only looked at one aspect of productivity, namely labour 
productivity. We will then investigate how efficiency and productivity of the 
manufacturing sector has been influenced by the oil income. This will provide the 
foundation for an alternative hypothesis with regards to the relationship between oil 
revenues and economic success of an oil economy such as Iran. Obviously, assessing 
the overall productivity of production and its determinants such as capital stock and 
human capital would provide a more comprehensive picture on the performance of 
industrial production. In order to investigate this issue further and evaluate other 
contributing factors to manufacturing productivity, in  Chapter 5 we will look at a 
broader measure of productivity, namely total factor productivity. 
4.6 Oil and Efficiency in Iran 
As mentioned in  Chapter 2, oil money can have both direct and indirect 
consequences for the productive performance of a country. In order to see the 
consequences of oil on the efficiency of the Iranian economy it would be useful to 
look at the relative position of Iran and countries such as Korea and Turkey. These 
two countries managed to overtake Iran thanks to increase in their performance 
levels despite being net energy importers (World Bank, 2013). Figure  4–9 shows the 
comparison between per capita GDP of the three countries and the MENA average. It 
clearly depicts the dismal growth performance of the economy relative to Korea in 
the past three decades despite its initial superior position. It also shows that Iran’s per 
capita growth never recovers after Turkey overtakes it in the mid-1980s and 
furthermore its gap with the MENA average shrinks. 
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Figure  4–9 GDP per Capita of Iran, Turkey, Korea and MENA-Average, 1980-2009. 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
As discussed earlier, the presence of oil income has affected the trade strategy of Iran 
and consequently the incentives of different sectors of the economy. As Hakimian 
and Karshenas (2000) observe, both Korea and Turkey followed similar import 
substitution policies as Iran until the mid-1960s when Korea started adopting the 
export promotion strategy thanks to its abundant skilled and well-educated labour 
force. In the late 1970s Turkey also initiated the adoption of its manufacturing 
exports promotion strategy. These measures resulted in higher productivity growth 
rates and manufacturing wages in Korea and Turkey in this period due to cumulative 
learning effects of manufacturing export orientation and increases in technological 
sophistication. The experience of these two countries is in line with the neoclassical 
trade literature regarding the positive effects of trade liberalisation on productivity 
and efficiency. Studies such as Corden (1974) and Krugman (1986) among others 
emphasise that through specialisation, market widening and division of labour that is 
brought about by international trade, the economy can improve the efficiency of 
resource allocation. Grossman and Helpman (1991) argue for swifter technical 
diffusion via foreign trade even for importing countries that import intermediate 
goods which either do not exist or are of lower quality in local market as it will 
ultimately enhance the productivity of their economies. Other studies such as 
Krugman (1987) and Lucas (1988) argue that the spillover effects from LBD of firms 
in the international markets such as the employment of new technologies and 
management techniques are also growth enhancing. 
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Despite attempts of trade liberalisation especially after the war and in the reform 
period the Iranian strategy remained far from satisfactory. Table  4–1displays a 
snapshot of average tariff rate in the three countries in 2007. It shows a much higher 
tariff rate in Iran for all three indices of manufactured, primary and total product 
rates. The manufactured products rate for Iran had been as high as 28.6% in as early 
as 2000 and has relapsed to 23.1% in 2011 (World Bank, 2013). The higher 
manufactured products tariff rate compared to primary products highlights a 
‘protection trap’ that has damaged the flourishing of a strong manufacturing sector. It 
can be seen that this is the opposite for Korea and Turkey that have lower 
manufactured goods tariffs than primary goods. This has been possible due to 
establishing competitive production which was facilitated by initial limited 
protection. As a result, the domestic producers in these countries have managed to 
compete with foreign competition and reap the benefits of LBD and other spillover 
effects from trade openness. 
Table  4–1 Weighted Average Tariff Rate of Iran, Korea and Turkey, 2007 (%). 
 Manufactured Products Primary Products Total 
Iran 18.47 15.36 17.55 
Korea 4.8 11.47 8 
Turkey 1.29 3.81 2.03 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
Looking at other measures of international business activity such as FDI (from 
UNCTAD, 2014) we can see that the Islamic Republic for the major part (1979 to 
2000) has not had any meaningful inflows of investment. It was only after Khatami’s 
attempt of encouraging FDI that in 2002 it reached 2.6% of GDP. This was the 
highest share since 1973 but did not last long and dropped to 0.6% in 2013. For the 
major part, this can be attributed to political instability and the associated high risk 
which makes Iran unattractive for foreign investors. Obviously this has meant that 
the Islamic Republic has failed to engage in any outward FDI in return. As a result, 
additional benefits of this sort of international activity (compared to traditional trade) 
such as transfer of knowledge, employment and infrastructural investments have 
been forgone. 
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As discussed in  Chapter 3, a key feature of the Iranian political economic structure 
has been the role of public and semi-public monopoly in production, distribution and 
trade activities of the economy. Employment, production and pricing decisions 
especially in the Islamic Republic seems to heavily depend on the state-owned 
enterprises and parastatals which, as discussed earlier, operate based on the political 
motives of the Iranian government. These enterprises at times have employed more 
than the optimum number they need and often pay wages higher than the market 
wages. Similarly, the pricing mechanisms are far from optimum and mainly attempt 
to satisfy the broader state objectives of securing loyalists to maintain support for the 
continuation of the ruling powers’ ideology. The consequence of this type of 
economic behaviour has been the prevalence of inefficient public or semi-public 
institutions subsidised and supported by the oil revenues. In other words, it appears 
that the oil cushion not only misallocated the resources but more crucially shaped the 
industrial producers into technically inefficient producers. 
The oil income has allowed the government to maintain this system and avoid 
dealing with the thorny issue of subsidies and transfers. Historically, the price 
subsidy is an issue going back to the pre-revolutionary period. However, since the 
early days of the Islamic Revolution these subsidies expanded and intensified due to 
populist promises of protecting the dispossessed and bringing the fruits of national 
oil wealth to people’s dinner tables. For the majority of the post revolution period 
there has been wide scale subsidies for basic consumer goods, energy and utilities. 
This took the form of coupons for essential products in the war period and continued 
mainly through explicit price subsidies thereafter. Businesses were also entitled to 
various subsidies, cost exemptions and cheap credit by the state especially those with 
strong political ties in the government or other powerful factions. The consequence 
of such policies had been price-distortions, misallocation of resources and rent-
seeking activities due to disincentives for more productive and efficient economic 
activity. 
Production process has been far from optimal due to the protective subsidies that 
have been continuously injected into the Iranian economy. One example of these 
subsidies can be seen in the energy consumption behaviour in the Iranian economy. 
Figure  4–10 shows a more than twofold increase in energy intensity within the 
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aggregate Iranian economy in the last three decades. This is in complete contrast to 
the global trend including in countries such as Korea, Turkey and Malaysia where 
the corresponding figures have been predominantly on the decline or stagnant due to 
the adoption of more energy efficient machinery and processes. This increase in 
intensity is despite the lower increase of per capita energy consumption in Iran 
(3.8%) compared to a country such as Korea (15.5%) in the same period (EIA, 
2014). Furthermore, once compared with the trend of developed countries including 
United States and United Kingdom, which have witnessed a fall in their aggregate 
energy intensity (EIA, 2014), the Iranian energy usage seems to warrant drastic 
remedies. 
Figure  4–10 Energy Intensity Trend in Iran vs. Turkey, Korea and Malaysia, 1980-2010. 
 
Source: EIA (2014). 
Note: * Energy intensity is measured as total energy consumption per GDP 2005 dollar using PPP. 
With the growing domestic demand, the energy and other subsidies placed an 
enormous burden on government finances especially in years with lower oil income. 
The situation was further exacerbated due to the implementation of comprehensive 
and unprecedented economic sanctions by the United States and its European allies. 
This has recently compelled the government to reduce these subsidies. Thus, in hope 
of improving economic efficiency, a country-wide subsidy removal plan has been 
prepared and recently begun to be implemented. Under the ‘Targeted Subsidy 
Reform’ plan which was announced by Ahmadinejad in December 2010 and 
subsequently approved by Majles a large portion of price subsidies was planned to be 
removed gradually. On the consumer side, the plan is essentially a basic income 
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scheme based on which the lower income deciles are reimbursed with direct cash 
payments. Based on the law, these payments should be financed through the 
revenues generated from the subsidies that previously accrued to the remaining 
deciles. However, the legislation does not stipulate the exact criteria of qualifying for 
these payments and only states that half of the revenue is to be paid back to 
households. The subsidy burden alleviated by the reform is reported to be $50-$60 
billion. The reform plan intends to raise energy prices up to 90% of the Persian Gulf 
free-on-board prices in a period of five years (Guillaume et al., 2011).  
The legacy of the reform is yet to be seen especially since the reform has not been 
completely implemented and a new president has already taken control. In an 
interview the new finance minister has indicated that the implementation of the 
second reform phase seems to be a rather remote possibility in the near future. 
Furthermore, soaring inflation and unemployment figures have often been attributed 
to this reform by other factions and economists. Despite all of these the idea of 
subsidy reform highlights the acknowledgement of the government that the oil 
dependence cannot continue for much longer and measures have to be taken to 
reduce the negative effects of oil revenues on the economy. We shall focus on 
establishing the significance of these drawbacks within this framework in the 
proceeding chapters. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we examined the extent of oil dependence ramifications for the 
economic policy making and consequently the productive performance in the 
contemporary history of the Iranian economy. We provided stylised facts on the 
growth and the performance of the economy in different periods and drew upon the 
parallel political economic structure discussed in the previous chapter explaining 
these dynamics.  
The observations provided attempted to ascertain the relevance of the theoretical 
frameworks discussed in  Chapter 2 in the context of Iran. We showed that, contrary 
to the general Resource Curse discussion, the positive growths in oil revenue were 
mirrored by positive growths in the overall economy and vice versa. The high 
dependence on oil for as a source of foreign exchange and government revenues was 
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also shown to continue even after the revolution. This in turn has influenced the trade 
policy and competition within the economy. Alternatively, we highlighted the role of 
volatility of oil revenues as a destabilising force in an economy highly dependent on 
this income. 
Our analysis of the manufacturing sector’s growth also confirmed a positive 
relationship between it and growth of oil income. Upon closer examination of Iranian 
manufacturing sector we looked at the role of labour productivity to explain why the 
Dutch Disease framework does not explain the Iranian predicament. The biggest 
components of the output value had consistently been the share of intermediate 
goods which was largely controlled by the government policies such as subsidies. 
Nevertheless, the profitability of the manufacturing sector was closely linked with 
the share of wages in total output value which had also been affected by government 
policies most notably in the war period.  
We argued that labour productivity only explains part of the problem and as such we 
explored the negative aspect of productivity and efficiency of production in a broader 
manner. This channel of explanation has not been explored fully in this context. We 
argued that, similar to other oil economies, Iran has supported economic production 
mainly through public or semi-public production channels. While this satisfies a 
tighter grip over the entire economy for the state or serves as a means of power 
sharing between different interest groups, nevertheless, this could mean often non-
economic goals might be given priority over the economic ones. In this setting the 
main policies such as trade policy of the country would be geared towards 
maintaining this control and presence of the public sector and further marginalisation 
of private production. The failure to liberalise the economy has also prohibited 
competitive production to flourish in the economy. Moreover, this can put rise to a 
great number of inefficiencies including in management, allocation of resources and 
other productive aspects of the economy.  
Thus, it would be helpful to examine the dynamics of economic production 
throughout time and establish its relationship with the changes in oil revenues. This 
can be done by looking at the performance of the economy at the aggregate level. 
Once this has been achieved a more magnified picture would help connect the dots 
between the aggregate and disaggregate levels. The objective of the remaining 
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chapters is to explore and empirically assess the situation in the context of Iranian 
economy.  
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Chapter 5 Growth Trends and Industry Productivity of Iran 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we examine the overall growth of the economy more closely. We 
review the literature regarding total factor productivity (TFP) measurement. Using 
the Solow method we attempt to dissect the overall growth of the economy into 
factor growth and TFP growth. Focusing on the estimated productivity measure, we 
try to explain the changes in the context of Iran’s economic experience. We attempt 
to compare and contrast the results based on the key sub-periods stylised in the 
previous two chapters. In order to draw attention to the specific context of Iran we 
will repeat the exercise of TFP estimation for Korea and Turkey. Comparing the 
results we highlight the shortcomings in the Iranian development trajectory.  
After that, we attempt to explore the importance of the industrial sector within the 
economic structure. More specifically, we assess the role of manufacturing sector in 
the economy. We investigate the structure of the manufacturing sector and review the 
performance of different subsectors in the past three decades. We try to explain 
whether the potential growth contributions of this sector have been realised in light 
of the presence of the public sector and government transfers. 
5.2 Total Factor Productivity Measurement 
In a nut shell, TFP can be explained as the other component contributing to output 
besides all other inputs. In other words, productivity change takes place when the 
change in the index of inputs is different than the change in the index of outputs 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The significance of productivity in the growth 
literature arises from the inability of achieving higher growth rates through solely 
increasing input usage. As a result, the focus has shifted towards the estimation of 
TFP and establishing its determinants in order to ultimately identify the sources of 
economic growth. 
Thus, productivity enhancement has the potential to contribute positively to 
development and economic welfare. However, this does not necessarily mean that it 
always does so since the gains of productivity enhancement might not necessarily be 
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allocated to other economically valuable activities such as leisure. Furthermore, from 
a more broad developmental point of view it can well be that economic or physical 
environment change (e.g. pollution) can counter the positive aspects of productivity 
(Griliches, 1998). 
Various different methodologies have been used for the measurement of 
productivity, the earliest of which were only interested in creating an index reflecting 
productivity based on index number techniques. The key task in these researches is 
building an appropriate ratio of outputs to inputs. The benefit of such methods is that 
it avoids the estimation of a specific production function. Nevertheless, in order to 
obtain economically meaningful indices, a set of restrictive assumptions are needed. 
One index is the Tornqvist index which relies on the assumptions met in a Translog 
production function. 
There are two other widely applied methods of productivity and productivity change 
estimation, namely regression based and growth accounting methods. The first 
method is based on the estimation of an aggregate production function via regression 
analysis. The idea here is that after obtaining a fitted model the difference between 
actual and fitted values would be an index of TFP. In other words, this way an 
explicit estimate of TFP levels (not TFP growth) is obtained. However, apart from 
the drawbacks of using an aggregate production function (discussed in the next 
section) the main problem here is that these estimates cannot be used to explain the 
source of TFP related output growth. Econometrically speaking, this would mean 
that the regression suffers from omitted variable bias, since if a determinant of output 
TFP must have been explicitly included as a variable. An equivalent version of such 
procedures is to regress output growth on factor growths such as the specification in 
Equation ( 5–2) discussed in the proceeding section. Here TFP growth would be 
reflected in the intercept of the fitted regression and the slopes would be the marginal 
products of inputs. Thus, the assumption of perfect competition can be relaxed. 
However, as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) suggest, there are econometric problems 
such as endogeneity of input growth rates (both regressors) and inefficient slope 
estimates due to inherent measurement problems of capital stock and labour would 
defeat the purpose. 
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The second method or the growth accounting framework is based on the aggregate 
production function in Solow (1956) growth model (also referred to as Solow-Swan 
model) and was first introduced and empirically applied in Solow (1957). In this 
method productivity change is calculated from deducting the share of output growth 
due to change in inputs (normally, capital and labour) from total output growth. 
Hence, it is also referred to as the ‘Solow residual’. We will discuss this in the 
following section and employ it in our analysis of Iranian TFP. As we will see later, 
this method relies heavily on a number of assumptions such as the presence of a well 
behaved differentiable aggregate production function. Furthermore, the competitive 
market assumption is required as a necessary and sufficient condition to make 
estimation possible (Jorgenson et al., 1987). 
The measurement of TFP has widely been used to conduct cross-country and cross-
industry comparisons of growth performance. However, as Abramovitz (1956) states 
the productivity index, the residual component of growth, is merely a ‘measures of 
our ignorance’. Thus, refereeing to them simply as technological progress, does little 
help in understanding the fundamentals of productivity-led growth. Consequently, 
more recent non-parametric and parametric techniques attempt to not only measure 
total productivity values but also within the same framework explain the sources of 
variation across different countries or entities (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). In 
these studies productivity growth is not entirely referred to as technological progress. 
Instead, technological progress is considered as one component of TFP alongside 
allocative, production and scale efficiencies. In other words all of these factors 
together explain a country’s TFP. This necessitates the relaxation of a number of 
assumptions imposed on the methodology of estimating TFP (or TFP growth) such 
as perfect competition and constant return to scale. In this research we do not 
conduct the decomposition and thus will not explore the relaxation of these 
assumptions per se but we will look into only one of these factors role, namely 
production efficiency (technical efficiency). 
5.3 Accounting for Aggregate Growth in Iran 
In this section we attempt to construct estimates of TFP as a measure of overall 
productivity in the aggregate economy of Iran. Here the growth accounting 
framework based on a simple Solow growth model is employed. Once these values 
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are obtained we will use these to verify the validity of the political economic factors 
by comparing the growth rates of TFP after and prior to the revolution. Furthermore, 
the context specificity of our argument will further be evaluated by comparison of 
these measures with those of two other countries, i.e. Korea and Turkey. 
The growth accounting method of TFP measurement can be simply defined as the 
difference between output growth and input growth. Thus, we assume an aggregate 
production function Here we assume this function to be explained by three factors 
and expressed as below: 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐾(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡),𝐴(𝑡)) ( 5–1) 
In the above relationship, 𝑌 is total output 𝐾 is the physical capital stock, 𝐿 is labour, 
𝐴 is technology and 𝑡 is the time variable. Now if we take natural logarithms of both 
side and differentiate our model with regards to the time variable we have: 
 ?̇?
𝑌
= 𝐹𝐾𝐾
𝑌
?̇?
𝐾
+ 𝐹𝐿𝐿
𝑌
?̇?
𝐿
+ 𝐹𝐴𝐴
𝑌
?̇?
𝐴
 ( 5–2) 
Here a dot over the variable is the first derivative of that factor with regards to time 
and 𝐹𝐾 and 𝐹𝐿 are marginal products of capital and labour. We denote output growth 
rate ?̇?/𝑌 as 𝑔𝑦 and in a similar manner capital increment ?̇?/𝐾 as 𝑔𝑘 and labour 
growth ?̇?/𝐿 as 𝑔𝐿. This relationship suggests that the growth in output is a weighted 
average of the growth of the three components (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003). 
Rearranging the above equation we have: 
 𝐹𝐴𝐴
𝑌
?̇?
𝐴
= ?̇?
𝑌
−
𝐹𝐾𝐾
𝑌
?̇?
𝐾
+ 𝐹𝐿𝐿
𝑌
?̇?
𝐿
 ( 5–3) 
Consequently, the LHS of the above equation is the contribution of ‘technology’ to 
growth or what is referred to as TFP growth. Furthermore, assuming factor markets 
as being competitive, the factors would be paid according to their marginal product 
or 𝐹𝐾 = 𝑟 − 𝛿 and 𝐹𝐿 = 𝑤. Here 𝑟 is the return to capital and 𝑤 is the average wage 
and 𝛿 is a constant depreciation rate. This would follow that 𝐹𝐿𝐿/𝑌 would be equal 
to 𝑤𝐿/𝑌, the share of wages in total output. Hence we denote this ratio as 𝑠𝐿 or the 
share of 𝐿. Similarly, the ratio 𝐹𝐾𝐾/𝑌 would be the same as (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝐾/𝑌, which is 
99 
the share of capital expenditure in output and can be denoted as 𝑠𝐾. Thus, Equation 
( 5–3) can be rewritten as: 
 𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑔𝑦 − 𝑠𝐾𝑔𝐾 − 𝑠𝐿 𝑔𝐿 ( 5–4) 
This is referred to as the fundamental growth accounting relationship (Acemoglu, 
2008). Assuming we have estimates of all elements in the RHS, the growth rate of 
TFP (LHS) can be calculated as a residual based on the above equation. 
From a theoretical aspect, Robinson (1953) had earlier criticised the concept of an 
aggregate production function. She argued that due to the heterogeneous nature of 
capital, different equipment and machinery cannot be simply summed up (unlike 
labour) and result in an aggregate capital stock. This was later to be referred to as the 
‘Capital Controversy’. This criticism is more generally supported by Kaldor (1966) 
who argues that even though such theoretical abstractions allow the marginal 
productivity models to work; these a priori assumptions cannot lead to assertions 
about the real world. While these criticisms were accepted from a logical point of 
view, they were disregarded as empirically insignificant by proponents of marginal 
productivity theory such as Solow and Samuelson (Pressman, 2005).  
Other major criticism of the accounting procedure relates to the assumptions needed 
to make the accounting procedure applicable. In other words, even accepting the 
derivation of Equation ( 5–4) , the associated measurement problems of the RHS 
variables was argued to bias estimates of TFP growth. If for example labour is 
measured in the strict sense and the quality of labour is not incorporated, then the 
role of inputs is underestimated and subsequently 𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑇 is overestimated. Therefore, 
factors such as human capital and the effective labour hours have to be taken into 
consideration.  
Similarly, a big challenge lies with the measurement of capital stock. This problem 
arises due to data being expressed in value terms and thus incorporating an element 
of price. For instance, employing capital expenditure data on the value of assets can 
pose challenges. First, capital expenditures cover both equipment and structures. 
Thus, the change in the relative price of these assets throughout time can entail 
biased estimates. Furthermore, if through time, the same type of asset becomes 
considerably cheaper than the one before or has an improved quality than the 
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previous years (e.g. computers and machinery), it can bias the estimation of the 
capital stock and hence the LHS of Equation ( 5–4).  
One final issue is the fact that the above relationship has been obtained using 
derivatives assuming continuous time. However, factor shares in total output (𝑠𝐾 and 
𝑠𝐿) are available for a given point of time such as the beginning or end of a given 
time period in discrete form. Using either of these can lead to biases in the final 
results (Acemoglu, 2008). Hence, using the highest frequency data available and 
using averages of the beginning and end of period values can only help alleviate this 
drawback when the capital-labour ratio is relatively stable. Below we attempt to 
explain the measurement of these variables.  
It has been attempted to minimise the associated problem based on the data that is 
available. Starting with capital, due to a lack of a reliable dataset on Iran’s capital 
stock we will construct a new series of capital stock for the Iranian economy. There 
are various methods of measuring capital stock. We estimate capital stock based on 
the perpetual inventory method based on the below relationship:  
 𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡 ( 5–5) 
Here 𝐼 is the investment or gross capital formation (GCF), 𝐾 is the capital stock and 
as before 𝛿 is the rate of depreciation of capital. Even if data on 𝐼 is available for the 
entire period, there needs to be an initial capital stock (𝐾0) from which the 
accumulation of investment in each year can lead to capital stock in subsequent 
years. The earliest year for which data on capital formation is available corresponds 
to 1965. Investment prior to that is ‘backcasted’ based on the pre-revolution trend 
(1965-1976) and thus annual investment values until 1900 are calculated. This is 
similar to part of the approach in Wu (2008). Assuming that the capital stock in 1900 
to be almost zero and depreciate at a rate of 4.9% (Jbili et al, 2008), a capital stock 
series is generated from Equation ( 5–5). 
In order to adopt a better measure of labour and avoid problems of biased TFP 
growth values, we incorporate the schooling years into this variable. As such we will 
be constructing a proxy of human capital (𝐻𝐾) which will be used in our growth 
accounting framework. This variable has been calculated as a product of labour force 
size and average years of schooling. The years of schooling is based on the 
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measurement done by Barro and Lee (2013) for total population of over 15year olds. 
The data is provided in five year intervals hence linear interpolation is used to obtain 
annual values. See  Appendix 4 for more details on the constructed human capital and 
capital stock series. 
Going back to the growth accounting model, under a Cobb-Douglas production 
specification, with constant returns to scale assumption (𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐻𝐾𝑡1−α), the 
fundamental growth accounting relationship will be equivalent to: 
 𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑔𝑦 − 𝛼𝑔𝐾 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑔𝐻𝐾 ( 5–6) 
Based on the above definitions and explanations all values on the right hand side can 
be calculated and hence estimate of total factor productivity growth can be obtained. 
For calculation of contribution of capital to growth the depreciation and return to 
capital rates are assumed to be around 4.9% and 7% respectively, in line with Jbili, et 
al., (2007). We do not need wage data since we can use the Cobb-Douglas 
specification which imposes constant returns to scale criteria as can be seen in 
Equation ( 5–6). Thus, capital share would be one minus the human capital (labour) 
share (𝑠𝐾 = 𝛼 = (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝐾/𝑌 and thus, 𝑆𝐻𝐾 = 1 − 𝛼 = 1 − (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝐾/𝑌). 
The assumption of perfect competition is a restrictive assumption in general and 
especially in the case of Iran. Imposing this assumption on our model could bias the 
estimates of productivity since with more monopolies in manufacturing sector this 
might mean producers are demanding higher prices. This higher price and ultimately 
higher output does not originate from higher productivity and is only a result of the 
market structure. This would mean an upward bias in our estimates if this assumption 
were to not hold. However, acknowledging the possibility of deriving better 
estimates with more appropriate assumption which would rely on more detailed data 
which is not available. Nevertheless, as the main objective of this section is not the 
measurement itself, these estimates can highlight the problem in the Iranian economy 
and serve the purpose of this research. 
A brief summary of the growth accounting results is provided in Table  5–1 based on 
overall period of study and important sub-periods. The estimated TFP growth seems 
to explain the larger portion of changes in real output which as discussed in the 
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previous chapter displayed a close relationship with growth in oil income. The 
estimates suggest that the contribution of residual factors affecting growth has been 
mainly a negative one. It has consistently been lower than the contribution of the 
traditional inputs and has even managed to offset them and reduce growth in the 
post-revolutionary period. The striking point in these results is the vast difference 
between TFP growth rates prior (2.41%) and after the revolution (-9.49% and -
1.24%) periods. Even if we compare the performance of the economy with the post 
war phase there seems to be a considerable difference. This can further support our 
earlier hypothesis on how the prevalence of oil in the economy has been further 
visible in the post-revolutionary period which, as discussed earlier, is itself 
influenced by political economic structure of the country.  
The results are quite similar even if we only calculate the TFP contribution to non-oil 
GDP growth. This fact highlights the embededness of the poor productivity 
performance in the economy. More crucially, it highlights the difference in type of 
growth in the two periods based on oil income. As oil production figures confirm that 
the majority of growth in oil income before the revolution was due to growth in the 
volume of production whereas the majority of oil income growth in GDP after the 
revolution is mainly due to higher oil prices. 
Table  5–1 Output Growth and Its Components, 1966-2007. 
Period Real GDP 
Growth 
Capital 
Contribution 
Human Capital 
Contribution 
TFP 
Contribution 
1966-76 
(pre-revolution) 
11.61% 0.65% 8.55% 2.41% 
1977-88 
(revolution/war) 
-2.13% 0.56% 6.79% -9.49% 
1989-2007 
(post-war) 
5.45% 0.30% 6.39% -1.24% 
1966-2007 
(total) 
4.90% 0.50% 7.25% -2.64% 
Source: Based on CBI, (2011), Barro and Lee (2013), Feenstra, et al. (2013) (PWT 8.0), World Bank 
(2013). 
The trend can be seen more closely in Figure  5–1. What is clear from the comparison 
of the growth rates is the relative importance of capital stock growth as an indicator 
of overall growth. We see a considerable change in the rate of investment prior and 
post revolution. The growth of the capital stock hovered around an impressive annual 
rate of 15% up to 1977, for obvious reasons during the early years of the revolution it 
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more than halved to around 6.6%. However, even more interestingly, this growth rate 
further deteriorated to 3.2% after the war period despite the reconstruction phase 
after the war and high oil prices later on in the 2000s. 
On the other hand, the growth trend in human capital stock has been relatively 
consistent despite the revolution. According to Barro and Lee (2013) calculations the 
annual average schooling years in Iran in 1960 for 15 year old and older people was 
just 0.92 years. This index reached 8.64 years in 2010 which is equivalent to an 
increase of 4.6% on an annual basis. The growth in employment in the same period 
has been slightly lower at just over 3%. This has led to a growth of around 7.7% for 
the human capital index (see  Appendix 4 for the full trend). 
Figure  5–1 Growth Trend of TFP, Output, Capital and Human Capital, 1966-2007. 
 
Source: Based on CBI, (2011), Barro and Lee (2013), Feenstra, et al. (2013) (PWT 8.0), World Bank 
(2013). 
If we re-estimate productivity without using human capital as the other input and 
instead use the number of employees directly, the trend of change stays the same but 
TFP values tend to be higher8. This can be explained by the fact that since changes in 
the quality of human capital (i.e. years of schooling) is disregarded it is transferred to 
the TFP residual hence higher estimates are obtained in this manner. As Jbili et al. 
                                                 
8 See  Appendix 5 for the corresponding results when using labour instead of human capital proxy.  
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(2007) suggests the actual productivity growths would probably lay somewhere in 
between these two since the actual relationship between human capital, years of 
schooling and size of labour force would also be something in between these two 
scenarios. 
The graph clearly highlights the importance of the residual effect on overall growth 
rate of the economy. The two series (𝑔𝑦 and 𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑇) move in almost identical 
directions. This verifies the importance of further decomposition and investigation of 
the components of total factor productivity in explaining the growth.  
5.4 Cross-Country Productivity Comparison 
Before looking more in detail at the manufacturing sector in Iran it will be useful to 
compare Iran’s TFP performance compared to other countries. This comparison will 
be fruitful for our discussion as it can provide explanations on the sources of 
variation in productivity trends of Iran versus these countries. Furthermore, this 
exercise will help in establishing the relative position of Iran in the global context. 
Clearly, this comparison does not lead to an exhaustive list of explanations for the 
success of some countries compared to others. For instance, important historical and 
cultural issues clearly have a role in explaining cross-country difference which is not 
the objectives of the discussion here. 
We will conduct the same growth accounting exercise with data for Korea and 
Turkey at the aggregate level of the economy. All assumptions are kept exactly the 
same as the one made for Iran, such as rate of return to capital, depreciation rate, etc. 
For more details on the data used for these two countries see  Appendix 6. 
Looking at the same three periods we can have a better understanding of the 
productivity performance of the three countries at the aggregate economy level. The 
results in Figure  5–2 and Table  5–2 show that in the first period Iran’s average 
annual productivity is higher than Turkey and only slightly smaller than Korea. This 
reflects the high investments in modernization and the introduction of various heavy 
industries in Iran in this period. However, as expected the uncertainty and problems 
associated with production during the revolution and war periods meant that the 
productivity growth in this period witnessed a 9.64% reducing trend whereas Korea 
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not only maintained its position but also managed to increase its TFP by 4.3% up 
from 3.05% in the previous period. Meanwhile Turkey also witnessed a negative 
productivity growth of 1.67%. Interestingly for Iran the deterioration in TFP 
continued even though less negative while its neighbour, Turkey, managed to 
increase its TFP by 1.72% annually and Korea on the other hand experienced a 
growth of 2.75%. 
Figure  5–2 TFP growth trends, Iran, Korea and Turkey, 1966-2007. 
 
Source: Based on Barro and Lee (2013), Feenstra, et al. (2013) (PWT 8.0). 
Furthermore, Figure  5–2suggests that not only Korea has the highest productivity in 
all periods but it also has experienced the smallest volatility in the growth trend. The 
amount of growth instability is a bit higher in Turkey and much higher in Iran. This 
could partly be explained by the dependence of the economy directly on the price of 
oil but also lack of consistency in fiscal and monetary policy on the part of the 
government. 
Table  5–2 TFP Growth Comparison of Iran, Korea and Turkey, 1966-2007. 
Average Annual 
TFP Growth 
1966-1976 1977-1988 1989-2007 1966-2007 
Iran 2.34% -9.64% -1.14% -2.66% 
Korea 3.05% 4.30% 2.75% 3.27% 
Turkey 1.63% -1.67% 1.72% 0.73% 
Source: Barro and Lee (2013) and Feenstra et al. (2013). 
The dismal performance of the Iranian economy even after the war period and 
despite high oil prices in this period can be considered as a clear evidence for 
backward progress not only compared to its performance before the revolution but 
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also compared to other countries with relatively similar initial positions, in per capita 
GDP terms, in the 1960s. 
5.5 Industrial Sector Overview 
In the proceeding chapters we will be focusing on the manufacturing sector as a 
sector that can be vital in the development trajectory of Iran. There are copious 
studies that argue for the importance of industrialisation in the economic growth 
literature. Most notably are the works of Kaldor from 1950s onwards. An important 
part of his contribution to the economic growth literature focuses on the role of 
manufacturing in his cross-sectoral analyses of growth.  
In Kaldor (1967), he proposes three main hypotheses (also known as Kaldor’s 
growth laws). First, he argues that higher manufacturing growth contribute to higher 
total growths. Hence, the sustainable engine of growth in the economy can be the 
manufacturing sector’s performance. This does not mean that manufacturing growth 
should be at the expense of other sectors. He emphasises this point and notes that 
especially in the early stages of development, on the demand side the manufacturing 
sector growth itself depends on a strong agricultural sector. In later stages of 
industrialisation, part of the demand however is to be obtained through exports. 
Second, he states that higher growth in the manufacturing sector, in return 
encourages higher manufacturing productivity growth due to static and dynamic 
increasing returns. This is mainly an argument on the supply side of manufacturing 
production. The static reason for increasing returns is due to the decreasing average 
costs as the manufacturing sector grows bigger. The dynamic productivity gains 
would arise as a result of greater amount of capital accumulation, specialisation and 
learning by doing as higher growth rates are obtained in the manufacturing sector. 
Third, he suggests that productivity of non-manufacturing sectors are also improved 
by manufacturing growth. This is achieved through the absorption of surplus or less 
productive resources from other sectors. Furthermore, he argues that the higher 
overall rate of change of technology that is achieved through industrialisation would 
also, as a bi-product, increase the productivity of other sectors such as agriculture. 
107 
Thus, appraising the historical performance of the Iranian industrial sector in light of 
the dominant position of the economy seems to be an important factor in the 
economic development of Iran. In order to better propose prospective solutions for 
the manufacturing sector we need to comprehend its historical performance. 
The major industrialisation attempt of the Iranian economy was carried out in the 
early 1960s when a big push on establishing different manufacturing industries was 
undertaken. This was later followed by large-scale industrial projects in early 1970s 
using government investments which were a result of the sudden boost in oil 
revenues due to rapid price increases. Although these projects were predominantly 
focused in petrochemical, basic metal and crude oil production a strong 
industrialisation policy was also pursued.  
In mid 1970s with the fall of oil prices the situation changed for the worse and what 
followed was the economic downturn, the subsequent Islamic revolution and finally 
the Iraq war. The biggest economic result of these events in the post-revolutionary 
period was mass nationalisation of businesses and the emergence of public and semi-
public sectors in almost all areas of economic activity. Consequently, the 
manufacturing sector was protected by a series of implicit and explicit subsidies in an 
unprecedented manner. Among the subsidies provided were large energy subsidies 
for the manufacturers which prompted them in employing more energy consuming 
processes. Furthermore, preferential exchange rates and overvalued Rial led to the 
industrial production itself to be highly import dependent. This also meant that the 
major part of the non-oil exports was dependent on the low exchange rates (Behdad, 
2000). Nevertheless, these protective measures were feasible thanks to the oil 
revenues and thus the success of the manufacturing sector was tied to the oil sector. 
Although the government transfers helped shift up manufacturing share of GDP to 
above the 10% mark, these subsidies also gradually became embedded in the 
structure of production meaning that manufacturers did not have any incentive to 
upgrade their machinery and use more economical methods of production (see 
Figure  4–10). Thus, up to the current day the economy not only suffers from 
inefficiencies due to misallocation of resources but also from adverse effects of 
inefficient techniques used in production. 
108 
The relative importance of the manufacturing sector within the whole economy can 
be seen more broadly in Figure  5–3. The manufacturing share edges over the 10% 
mark in early 1960s but drops down in light of the oil shock of the early 1970s and 
the subsequent problems of the revolution. It recovers again in the late 1980s after 
the end of the war and peaks in 2001 accounting for 17% of the GDP. 
It can be observed that the agricultural sector share has been on an overall downward 
trend which only saw an increase during the war period due to fall in the Oil and Gas 
sector. Finally, the Services sector has been the biggest sector on average accounting 
for 50% of the GDP since the early 1960s. 
We focus on the manufacturing sector due to the major benefits of industrialisation to 
economic growth, as pointed out above, are best explained in this sector. As we can 
see in Figure  5–3 the majority of the industries group output throughout the last few 
decades can be attributed to the manufacturing output.  
Figure  5–3 GDP Shares by Group, 1959-2010. 
 
Source:  Based on CBI data (2014a). 
Notes:  GDP at current factor cost. 
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Table  5–3 Total Manufacturing Share in Province Employment, 2005-2008, (%). 
Province 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Eastern Azarbaijan 37.9 42.0 42.9 41.5 
Western Azarbaijan 19.7 21.0 22.7 23.9 
Ardebil 19.9 21.2 21.2 22.5 
Esfahan 44.1 44.6 42.3 41.8 
Ilam 16.7 19.4 21.2 22.8 
Bushehr 24.7 24.7 26.8 23.7 
Tehran 32.6 33.9 34.6 34.1 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 39.6 42.5 43.1 43.8 
Southern Khorasan 30.0 29.4 31.6 33.8 
Razavi Khorasan 27.8 29.0 28.8 30.9 
Northern Khorasan 28.2 27.9 26.4 29.5 
Khuzestan 30.8 32.4 32.1 33.4 
Zanjan 32.4 31.3 30.4 31.2 
Semnan 30.9 31.5 34.5 34.3 
Sistan and Baluchestan 33.7 43.6 37.9 32.5 
Fars 26.7 28.5 29.3 28.3 
Qazvin 31.4 31.1 32.9 35.2 
Qom 44.4 42.6 43.1 43.0 
Kordestan 23.6 23.4 24.3 22.7 
Kerman 28.2 28.7 28.1 27.8 
Kermanshah 21.0 20.2 21.9 25.0 
Kohgiluyeh o Boyerahmad 26.0 27.0 32.0 33.5 
Golestan 22.9 27.0 28.2 28.4 
Gilan 21.6 21.5 24.1 24.3 
Lorestan 25.8 26.8 28.9 31.2 
Mazandaran 26.9 27.2 28.0 29.9 
Markazi 34.3 33.7 38.4 37.7 
Hormozgan 24.5 26.0 24.2 27.4 
Hamedan 26.8 26.0 28.1 27.7 
Yazd 42.7 43.8 44.3 42.9 
Total 30.3 31.7 32.0 32.2 
Source: SCI Labour force Statistical Yearbook 2005-2008. 
Additionally, looking at manufacturing sector role as an important job creating sector 
not only highlights the importance of this sector in the economy, it can act as 
evidence in the political nature of economic decision making that was discussed 
in  Chapter 3. According to the ‘labour force yearbook’, which is compiled separately 
by SCI, the share of total manufacturing (including firms with less than 10 
employees) in total employment of the country in 2006 to 2008 was around 32%. 
These figures plus the relative importance of total manufacturing in job creation in 
different provinces is shown in Table  5–3. This table shows that in 2008, 
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manufacturing alone provided around 40% or more of employment in four provinces. 
It can be seen that in this period the plans of equal distribution of manufacturing 
across provinces has been pursued. This is evident from the fact that provinces with 
the lower average shares (Ilam, Kohgiluyeh and Boyerahmad and Lorestan) have 
experienced the highest average annual growth rates. This might seem as a step in the 
promotion of economic equality. Nevertheless, if the appropriate strategies and true 
economic incentives of production are not the basis of such geographical 
restructuring, it will ultimately lead to additional burden on government to support in 
the future. This can be an indication of the populist policies of industrial job creation 
in more deprived regions of the country in this period. 
 
5.6 Manufacturing Structure  
We briefly discussed the growth, markups and labour productivity of Iran’s 
manufacturing in  Chapter 4. Here, we will focus on the subsectors to obtain a better 
understanding of the main challenges for growth. As mentioned earlier the 
manufacturing producers are not only directly dependent on oil prices but also 
heavily rely on various government transfers such as energy subsidies (discussed in 
the previous chapter), preferential exchange rates and various tax breaks. 
In order to see the results of the policies and factors influencing the manufacturing 
sector we can look at its composition in the recent history. The proceeding four 
tables (Table  5–4 to Table  5–7) provide some stylised facts on the industrial 
composition of Iran and interpretations of key changes in the periods prior and after 
revolution using UNIDO data which covers firms with more than 10 employees. It 
provides a detailed account of the manufacturing structure by looking at the 
subsectors according to the two-digit ISIC classification (Revision 3.1). 
Table  5–4 illustrates that the manufacturing sector was initially dominated by light 
industries with food and beverages (ISIC 15) having the highest share (27%) of 
manufacturing production, followed by textiles (ISIC 27) claiming a 22% share. 
However, in the years that followed a gradual restructuring of the manufacturing 
sector took place. The above sectors lost ground to more heavy manufacturing 
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sectors such as, motor vehicles (ISIC 34), basic metals (ISIC 27) and coke and 
refined petroleum (ISIC 23) sectors. The latter group of industries together saw their 
share of manufacturing production increase from 12% in the 1960s to 40% by the 
period 1998-20069. On the other hand, the two dominant sectors in the earlier periods 
(food and textiles) saw their joint share plummet to 18% in the early 2000s. This 
reshaping of the manufacturing sector is indicative of policies, such as preferential 
exchange rates and subsidies, undertaken by the state both prior to the revolution and 
after the war with Iraq to strengthen industrial production. 
Table  5–5 illustrates the distribution of employment across manufacturing groups. In 
the latest period the biggest employers have been the food (ISIC 15), non-metallic 
minerals (ISIC 26) and textiles (ISIC 17) respectively. This table also can indicate 
the movement of labour across industries through the comparison of the first and 
latest periods covered. The data suggests that despite a change in production 
structure shown in Table  5–4, employment shares have not changed as drastically. 
For example, the food industries’ share in employment dropped from 18% to 14.5%. 
In other words, even though the food industry production share shrank by 15% its 
employee share of manufacturing only fell by 5% in four decades. Moreover, three 
industries (non-metallic minerals, fabricated metals and electrical machinery) 
witnessed an increase in their share of employment despite their share of output 
falling. This means that while some sectors’ output share importance has fallen they 
have remained important in the share of jobs they create. 
To see the underlying driver of the change in manufacturing structure we can look at 
the growth of these sectors’ output and employment. Looking at Table  5–6 it can be 
seen that overall manufacturing growth seems to be very significant in mid-1960s to 
mid-1970s with figures above 15%. However, as Table  5–7 shows, the major part of 
the post-revolutionary manufacturing growth occurred in the period after the end of 
war at a rate of 15.4% annually. This rate was primarily obtained due to the 
utilisation of unused capacities that were imposed in the previous uncertain climate 
and reconstruction. In the period between 1998 and 2005, this rate has fallen to 9.9%.  
Looking at production and employment growth we can see that in some industries oil 
income has influenced their growth directly. In Table  5–6 and Table  5–7 we can see 
                                                 
9 This change in structure is also evident even when we looked at value added data. 
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high growths in oil-based manufacturing sectors such as coke and petrochemical 
sector (ISIC 23). Throughout the four decades discussed this sector has consistently 
displayed one of the highest production and employment growth rates. Its production 
growth on a number of occasions has exceeded the 100% rate. In the 1970s the other 
industries which also enjoyed highest growth rates included machinery (ISIC 29) and 
fabricated metal (ISIC 28) industries. However, in the more recent period after the 
revolution there seems to be more emphasis on achieving growth from more 
sophisticated manufacturing production including the motor vehicle (ISIC 34) and 
other transport (ISIC 35) sectors. As the global cut-throat competition in pricing and 
quality of automotive products suggests, the important factor in the true success of 
such sectors theoretically should be their competitiveness. Nevertheless, these 
Iranian industries have managed to obtain these growth rates in the convenient 
environment of protected domestic market and subsidised inputs. Thus, the success 
of the recent focus on such industries more than ever depends on increasing 
incentives for improving their productive performance. 
Consequently, the crucial factor here is the implementation process of this structural 
change. The strategy and the mechanism employed to obtain its goals can determine 
its long-run success. By looking at the production performance of producers we can 
investigate the growth has been obtained by competitiveness improvements in these 
sectors or their increasing dependence on government support and subsidies financed 
by oil income. 
Furthermore, the above observation demonstrates that state policies addressed at 
increasing production do not necessarily tend to result in benefits with regards to job 
creation in a proportionate manner. Clearly, there has been a shift towards more 
capital intensive production. In other words, the subsidies received by producers 
seem to have enhanced the role of capital rather than labour. Thus, such restructuring 
of the manufacturing production has clear implications for the long-term prospects of 
growth and also other broad economic indices such as income distribution. 
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Table  5–4 Iranian Manufacturing Structure by Output Share, 1964-2005. 
 Share of Manufacturing Output (%) 
 Pre-Revolution Post-Revolution 
ISIC Sector 1963-
71 
1972-
75 
1976-
80 
1981-
87 
1988-
97 
1998-
2005 
15 Food and Beverages 27.2 20.7 18.4 18.9 17.1 12.9 
16 Tobacco Products 6.7 3.2 1.8 1.1 0.8 0.5 
17 Textiles 22 15.9 14.5 17.7 13.1 5.5 
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur 4.1 2.1 2.4 3.8 2.2 0.2 
19 Leather, Leather products and 
footwear 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.3** 0.5 
20 Wood Products (excl. 
furniture) 
0.9 0.7 0.9 1 0.9 0.4 
21 Paper and Paper Products 0.9 2 2.0 2 1.9 1.3 
22 Printing and Publishing 1.1 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.6 
23 Coke, Ref. Petroleum, Nuclear 
Fuel 
0.6 1 5.3 0.8 1.7 8.3 
24 Chemicals and Chemical 
Products 
5.3 8.4 6.2 6.9 9.6 11.8 
25 Rubber and Plastic Products 2.1 2.8 3.8 4 3.9 3.1 
26 Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products 
7.3 7.7 9.7 10.5 8 7.1 
27 Basic Metals 3.6 9.1 8.4 8 15.3 13.2 
28 Fabricated Metal Products 4.4 5 5.4 4.2 4.1 3.6 
29 Machinery and Equipment 
n.e.c. 
1.2 2.8 3.1 5.7 5.9 5.3 
30 Office, Accounting and 
Computing Machinery 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.2** 0.2 
31 Electrical Machinery and 
Apparatus 
4.4 6.6 6.5 5.2 4.3 3.3 
32 Radio, Television and 
Communication Equipment 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1** 1.3 
33 Medical, Precision and Optical 
Instruments 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers, 
Semi-Trailers 
7.5 10.1 9.6 8.2 7.3 18.3 
35 Other Transport Equipment N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.8** 1.6 
36 Furniture; Manufacturing 
n.e.c.  
0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 
37 Recycling N/A N/A N/A N/A ~0** ~0 
Total Manufacturing 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:  Based on UNIDO (2010). 
Notes:  * 1978 data was approximated as the average of 1977 and 1979. 
** 1994-1997 average due to absence of data prior to 1994.  
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Table  5–5 Iranian Manufacturing Structure by Employee Share, 1963-2005. 
 Share of Manufacturing Employees (%) 
Pre-Revolution Post-Revolution 
ISIC Sector 1963- 
71 
1972- 
75 
1976-
80* 
1981-
87 
1988-
97 
1998-
2005 
15 Food and Beverages 18.04 17.52 16.18 13.88 13.08 14.53 
16 Tobacco Products 2.09 1.41 1.41 1.38 1.16 0.84 
17 Textiles 41.45 30.21 22.70 21.72 20.27 13.35 
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur 3.07 3.03 3.03 3.82 2.64 0.66 
19 Leather, Leather Products 
and Footwear 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.22 
20 Wood Products (Excl. 
Furniture) 
1.37 1.08 1.54 1.79 1.40 0.91 
21 Paper and Paper Products 0.80 1.17 1.46 1.68 1.72 1.68 
22 Printing and Publishing 1.41 1.30 1.26 1.01 1.28 1.26 
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum 
Products, Nuclear Fuel 
0.34 0.38 2.32 0.57 1.22 1.73 
24 Chemicals and Chemical 
Products 
3.95 5.90 5.40 4.72 6.12 6.99 
25 Rubber and Plastics Products 2.03 3.19 4.02 3.68 3.70 4.09 
26 Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products 
10.19 11.03 14.54 16.68 13.69 13.95 
27 Basic Metals 1.74 5.85 5.82 6.19 8.61 7.42 
28 Fabricated Metal Products 3.87 5.26 5.02 4.45 5.00 5.84 
29 Machinery and Equipment 
n.e.c. 
0.97 2.10 2.90 5.35 6.96 8.01 
30 Office, Accounting and 
Computing Machinery 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.21 
31 Electrical Machinery and 
Apparatus 
3.79 5.90 5.87 5.22 4.42 4.04 
32 Radio, Television and 
Communication Equipment 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.05 
33 Medical, Precision and 
Optical Instruments 
0.21 0.32 0.31 0.39 0.71 1.11 
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers, 
Semi-Trailers 
3.93 3.70 5.65 6.64 4.63 7.89 
35 Other Transport Equipment N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.83 
36 Furniture; Manufacturing 
n.e.c. 
0.76 0.64 0.56 0.83 1.01 1.37 
37 Recycling N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.01 
Total Manufacturing 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:  Based on UNIDO (2010). 
Notes:  *1978 data was approximated as the average of 1977 and 1979. 
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Table  5–6 Iranian Manufacturing Structure by Output and Employment Growth, 1964-1980. 
 Production Growth (%)*  Employee Growth (%) 
ISIC Sector** 1964-71 1972-75 1976-80***  1964-71 1972-75 1976-80*** 
15 Food and Beverages 15.2 9.2 -1.6  8.9 10.4 5.5 
16 Tobacco Products 5.4 -1.3 -6.6  2.2 5.6 8.6 
17 Textiles 10.1 11.7 3.6  8.4 4.5 5.8 
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur 8.3 4.6 7.9  9.9 11.6 12.8 
20 Wood Products (excl. furniture) 7.3 19.2 5.1  4.4 13.9 12.9 
21 Paper and Paper Products 50.2 14.6 2.8  21.8 16.6 0.8 
22 Printing and Publishing 24.2 20.5 -5.5  13.4 8.6 3.7 
23 Coke, Ref. Petroleum, Nuclear Fuel 161.3 39.3 83.3  59.8 4.5 3.6 
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 22.8 17.2 -5  14.2 19 -3.8 
25 Rubber and Plastic Products 21.6 19.8 11.4  15 19.3 6.2 
26 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 10.9 20.5 1  8.3 17.2 9.7 
27 Basic Metals 65.1 31.1 -8.5  14.6 55.3 -6.5 
28 Fabricated Metal Products 13.5 33 -1.7  16.8 11.9 1.9 
29 Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 29.9 41.1 1.8  13.5 32.5 15.8 
31 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 40.6 18.1 -5  27.5 15.3 0 
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments 20.1 12.6 5.6  20.9 10 2.7 
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Semi-Trailers 22.6 20.9 -6.4  9.9 14.4 12.1 
36 Furniture; Manufacturing n.e.c.  8.6 17.5 3.9  6.1 11.5 6.2 
Total Manufacturing 15.2 16.7 0.4  9.5 12.1 2.6 
Source:  Based on UNIDO (2010) and World Bank (2013). 
Notes:  * Growth rate of production was obtained from CPI-deflated output figures. 
** Data for ISIC codes 19, 30, 32, 35 and 37 are only available from 1994 onwards. 
*** 1978 data was approximated as the average of 1977 and 1979. 
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Table  5–7 Iranian Manufacturing Structure by Output and Employment Growth, 1981-2005. 
 Production Growth (%)*  Employee Growth (%) 
ISIC Sector** 1981-87 1988-97 1998-2005  1981-87 1988-97 1998-2005 
15 Food and Beverages -1.9 11 7.1  5.5 2.6 4.4 
16 Tobacco Products -10.3 17.2 4.2  8.6 -2.9 1 
17 Textiles -3.3 8.8 -1.9  5.8 0.8 -4.8 
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur 5.1 -12.3 5.8  12.8 -11.3 -0.6 
19 Leather, Leather products and footwear N/A -10.5 -4.4  N/A N/A -9 
20 Wood Products (excl. furniture) 2.6 10.1 -1.7  12.9 2 -3.5 
21 Paper and Paper Products -7.8 16.7 6  0.8 6.4 3.3 
22 Printing and Publishing -0.8 14.8 13.6  3.7 7.3 3.3 
23 Coke, Ref. Petroleum, Nuclear Fuel -5.8 90.8 13.9  3.6 40.7 -1.4 
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 1.8 25 8.4  8.5 7.3 2.6 
25 Rubber and Plastic Products -4.2 14 8.4  4 2.8 5 
26 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 2.1 10.2 7.7  6.4 3.4 1.7 
27 Basic Metals 0.4 29.9 10.6  13.4 3.5 1.7 
28 Fabricated Metal Products -5.4 17.3 9.8  4.7 4.4 6 
29 Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 13.1 28.9 4.5  18.1 13.9 2.6 
30 Office, Accounting and Computing Machinery N/A 14.5 4.8  N/A N/A 8.3 
31 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus -10.7 33.3 11.4  -1.7 15.7 5.2 
32 Radio, Television and Communication equipment N/A 24.1 1.3  7.7 14 5.9 
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments  -3.2 29 4.8  N/A N/A 0.7 
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Semi-Trailers -9.5 35.8 23.7  0.3 3.9 13.8 
35 Other Transport Equipment N/A 9.7 24.1  N/A N/A 11.1 
36 Furniture; Manufacturing n.e.c. 4.6 13.8 11.3  9.7 12.2 8.2 
37 Recycling N/A -10.3 100.8  N/A N/A 80.8 
Total Manufacturing -4.1 15.4 9.9  5.5 3 2.6 
Source: Based on UNIDO (2010) and World Bank (2013) (See notes * and ** in the previous table). 
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5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have attempted to evaluate the performance of the aggregate 
growth of the Iranian economy. We saw that factor accumulation especially in 
human capital has been substantial in both periods enjoying a growth rate of 7.7%. 
We constructed a new capital stock series for Iran. The estimates suggest that capital 
deepening enjoyed unprecedented scale prior to revolution at annual growth rate of 
almost 15%. However, after the revolution the rate fell to only 4.5%. However, an 
important part of the growth of Iran can be explained in the role of total factor 
productivity. Our estimates suggest a negative growth in the post-revolutionary 
phase. While the under-utilisation and reallocation of resources in the war period can 
explain the negative figure in this period, the trend continues well into 2007. This 
explains why the real GDP growth in Iran has never recovered back to the pre-
revolutionary average of 11%. 
To further assess the situation we compared the performance of Iran with Turkey, a 
neighbouring country, and Korea since both of these countries had lower per capita 
income than Iran up to the revolution. Despite both countries being net energy 
importers their growth rates have surpassed Iran’s after the revolution. The results 
clearly suggest a much stronger TFP growth for these countries in this period. Both 
countries consistently enjoyed positive rates in the period after the revolution. 
Subsequently, we looked at the industrial sector as the engine of growth in a 
developing country to obtain clues on the negative productivity performance of the 
economy. The benefits of the manufacturing sector and its linkages with other sectors 
led us to take a closer look at more disaggregated data of the manufacturing sector. 
Clearly, a gradual restructuring process of manufacturing was ushered in the course 
of last few decades. Most noticeably the share of heavy industries in manufacturing 
output drastically increased. This is evidence of the strong state policy in Iran since it 
was implemented through various implicit and explicit government subsidies both 
prior and after the revolution. As discussed in  Chapter 3, this support strategy has 
been possible through the political economic structure of the Iran which has 
consistently relied on oil revenues (see  Chapter 4).  
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The important conclusion to take away from the observations in this chapter is that 
various protective measures in the economy have not been conducive to long-run 
economic growth of the country. As a result of such disincentives the manufacturing 
sector, a potential growth engine for the economy, has witnessed misallocation of 
resources. More crucially, it seems that the structure of production and the efficiency 
of processes employed have also suffered in this sector. If such a hypothesis is to be 
proven, it would pose a long term challenge for the prospects of the growth in Iran as 
corrective measures for the latter problem are much more complex and time 
consuming than the static allocative issues.  
In order to further dissect the sources of productivity and the ‘quality’ of growth, our 
discussion leads us to the topic of efficiency which we suggest can explain the 
dynamics of the impact of oil revenues on the industrial or manufacturing sector with 
a more detailed perspective. To this end, in the following chapters we will focus on 
evaluating the productive performance of Iranian manufacturing.  
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Chapter 6 Efficiency Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce and formalise the quantitative method of 
this research by exploring the relevant literature’s theory, methodology and empirical 
findings. We attempt to critically discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the concept 
of efficiency in microeconomics. We introduce the concept of production efficiency 
and discuss the significance of this factor with regards to the Iranian manufacturing 
sector. 
We review the literature on the two main estimation methodologies of technical 
efficiency, namely SFA and DEA. We compare and contrast the two methods and 
opting for SFA method, explore the empirical literature with the view of constructing 
an appropriate model for the case of Iran in the following chapters. 
6.2 Background and Theory 
The idea of efficiency can be referred to as the biggest characteristic of any 
economic behaviour. It is clearly central to one of the widely used definitions of 
economics by Robbins (1935, p. 16), where he defines economics as ‘the science 
which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means 
which have alternative uses’. Thus, economists have long attempted to obtain 
measures of performance for any economic activity in order to compare different 
agents, entities or countries. As a general definition, efficiency in economics is a 
value that measures the relative performance of an economic component to its 
potential value. Establishing this index, allows economists to question and 
hypothesise the underlying cause in difference among observations and ultimately 
examine possible improvements in these indices. The activity in question could be at 
different levels of aggregation, starting from firm-level all the way to the 
macroeconomic picture. 
A widely addressed question in microeconomics is to assess the allocative efficiency 
of markets which is to examine the allocation of resources between activities in that 
market and to assess the possibility of arriving at a ‘preferred state’ through the 
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reallocation of these inputs. However, often in macroeconomics and economics of 
development measures have been sought to explain why resources such as labour 
remain unused and what solutions might allow them to be utilised better. In contrast 
to allocative efficiency this is a slightly different notion of efficiency which is closer 
to the efficiency concept in other sciences of obtaining a certain goal with minimum 
possible effort, i.e. technical efficiency (Caves, 1992). 
The interest domain of this chapter lies within microeconomics where, until recently, 
the production process and profit maximisation behaviour of firms was largely left 
unchallenged. This was due to assumptions within the neoclassical framework which 
assumed producers as successful optimisers. This assumption has come under 
question with theoretical research on market failures due to information asymmetries, 
agency problems and contract or bargaining costs. The result of questioning such 
assumptions paints a more realistic picture of producers but also infers limitations on 
the ability of firms and decision makers to achieve their optimal efficiency (Arrow 
1977). This has led to a new definition of microeconomic efficiency named technical 
efficiency (also referred to as productive or production efficiency). In short, technical 
efficiency is concerned with the question of how well inputs are transformed into 
outputs within the production process. Once considered simultaneously, technical 
and allocative efficiencies jointly provide a measure of (total) economic efficiency. 
6.2.1 Neoclassical Efficiency Critique 
Interested in a more detailed picture of production processes, microeconomists began 
questioning efficiency disparities from a technical aspect. In other words, the quality 
of the transformation of inputs into outputs was finally questioned (technical 
efficiency) alongside the efficiency of allocating inputs considering their prices 
(allocative efficiency). This necessitated extending the understanding of production 
theory and re-examining the preceding assumptions on producer behaviour. 
The idea that economic agents may not perform to the maximum of their ability is 
not a new proposition. The very concept of monopolies’ market behaviour is based 
on such characteristics. This is indicated in works by people as early as Hicks (1935) 
who describes monopolies as economic agents not bothering to get close to 
maximum profits. This was followed by principle agent problems introduced by 
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works including Williamson (1964) which claims that managers will maximise their 
utility function determined by staff and compensation apart from profits. 
The ownership literature goes further and suggests private firms to be more efficient 
than public enterprises. The difference was attributed to the freedom of public 
managers to pursue their own criteria in running the business due to the dispersed 
and non-transferable quality of public ownership (e.g., Alchian, 1965). 
X-Efficiency 
Similarly, in a series of approaches focusing on agents within the production process, 
the foundation of neoclassic microeconomic theory of rationality and maximising 
behaviour was criticised. Here the ideas of bounded or selective rationality and 
‘satisficing’ behaviour10 of the economic agents were suggested. The notion of 
satisficing behaviour and bounded rationality, i.e. the behaviour of individuals 
according to what satisfies their needs which more often is not the optimal decision, 
was first suggested in the work of Simon (1956). 
Subsequently, the X-efficiency concept was introduced in the pioneering work of 
Leibenstein (1966). In his study, he questions the relative importance of the 
allocative efficiency versus the intrinsic human organisation inefficiencies both 
within and outside the firm which he called X-inefficiency. In other words, he argues 
that production is bound to be inefficient due to motivation, supervising and agency 
problems. 
Within the X-efficiency theory the basic unit is the individual unlike the firm or 
household in standard microeconomic theory. This individual is not assumed to 
maximise income compared to the household or firm in the neoclassical framework. 
The question here is the amount of effort which is exerted by the individual. In other 
words what influences the effort of the individual will ultimately determine the 
efficiency of that unit. These factors include the person’s personality and the nature 
of relations within that firm. 
Another assumption of the X-efficiency idea is the selective rationality argument. 
Here it is argued that different personalities react differently to supervision and work 
                                                 
10 The term satisficing refers to the combination of the terms satisfy and suffice which was first used 
by Simon (1956) representing an opposing notion to the theory of optimised decision making.  
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pressure and ultimately will not choose maximising effort. Leibenstein (1978) 
models this behaviour of an individual based on its trade-off between the utility of 
leisure and the moral undertaking of obligations. Leibenstein refers to this reality as 
the amount of ‘constraint concerns’ that elements within the firm actually exhibit. 
Furthermore, unlike conventional theory, X-efficiency assumes inertia in the basic 
unit behaviour as an important variable. This inertia behaviour depends on 
considerations such as the utility cost of decision making and habitual behaviour of 
doing things by that individual. Generally speaking, the inert area infers two cost 
components; the utility costs of moving away from a previous position and the cost 
of settling down in a new position. 
As mentioned earlier, another factor impacting the effort barometer of the individual 
is the principal-agent effect which is not addressed in neoclassical theory. In addition 
to these factors, other sources of X-efficiency such as inter personal communication 
effects can have a role. Clearly, the extent of what and how much these factors 
impact output are case specific. 
Even though there is no direct indication in the X-efficiency literature to Marx 
(1867) labour process theory, Leibenstein’s explanation of the causes of X-efficiency 
resonates with parts of Marx idea of the dynamics between the employers and 
employees within the production process. The underpinnings of the internal and 
external pressures on constraint concerns that Leibenstein (1978) introduces as the 
causes of X-inefficiency are partly explained by the conflict of interest between the 
employers and employees in Marx’s work. So the more internal pressure on 
constraint concerns is reduced due to a more powerful labour union the less efficient 
the production will be. 
Nevertheless, referring to it as an incompletely specified model Stigler (1976) and 
others question the very existence of X-inefficiency by proposing the leisure 
argument. They argue that if the worker is not contributing to the firms’ production it 
is expending energy in producing leisure and thus the lazy worker is as efficient as 
the most hard-working one. Consequently, regardless of the emphasis of X-
inefficiency firms are producing on the production possibility frontier. 
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What is essentially important here is that Leibenstein did assume that individuals can 
make avoidable errors in their income-leisure trade-off choice due to laziness and 
wrong habits (Frantz, 1992). Thus, if leisure is seen as such it means that competitive 
firms produce more commodity output and less leisure whereas monopolies create 
more leisure and produce fewer commodity output. So people are as likely to prefer 
the monopoly bundle of commodity and leisure over the competitive bundle. In this 
way, the monopolist can be considered as allocatively efficient as the competitive 
producer. Thus, if leisure is viewed as such, not only X-efficiency does not exist but 
also allocative efficiency should not exist. This is simply not the case. Frantz (1992) 
also discusses the other theoretical arguments against the existence of X-efficiency, 
and after presenting counter arguments concludes that X-efficiency is a determining 
element in growth and its criticism is mainly a cause of the critics’ models and 
language use. 
Since the ‘micro-micro’ model proposed by Leibenstein (1978), the quantification of 
the X-efficiency concept and the welfare analysis based on this notion has not 
progressed as fast as other literature in this field. Furthermore, a consistent 
methodology seems absent due to the main reason that establishing an appropriate 
counterfactual in order to compare to actual performance seems challenging (Button 
and Weyman-Jones, 1994). However, in a related field of research, the technical 
efficiency literature was making fast progress. 
6.2.2 Technical Efficiency 
Concept 
The first paper formally defining technical efficiency was the work of Koopmans 
(1951) in which he defined a technically efficient producer as one that cannot 
produce more of one output without either reducing the production of another output 
or using additional input. Following this, Debreu (1951) and Shephard (1953) then 
complemented Koopmans work by incorporating the concept of distance functions in 
order to measure the radial distance of the producer from the frontier by output 
oriented and input oriented models respectively. 
In the first empirical attempt to measure technical efficiency Farrell (1957) used a 
mathematical linear programming approach. He also defined the duality of cost 
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efficiency and using this concept, he decomposed economic efficiency into technical 
and allocative elements. 
Within the efficiency literature technical and X-efficiency are sometimes are used 
interchangeably which can be misleading. One of the major differences between X-
efficiency and technical efficiency is that the former questions the conventional 
assumption of rational behaviour by the economic agents and looks at the causal 
relationship of efficiency, where as technical efficiency literature based on Farrell 
(1957) focus on the measurement issue and highlights the technical aspect of 
production and management staying within the neo-classical modelling frameworks. 
In this respect technical efficiency corresponds with the neoclassical framework but 
as mentioned above X-efficiency does not. This distinction is highlighted by 
Leibenstein (1977) himself. He explains that the cause of X-inefficiency is not solely 
a technical issue but one that is intrinsic to human organisation which can be both 
due to factors within (such as relationships between employees) and outside the firm 
(such as cultural background of workers). This is quite distinct from the notion of 
technical inefficiency that sees the problem only inside the firm and a lack of 
management which can be interpreted as a factor similar to normal inputs. 
Nevertheless, due to the difference of the motive of the two literatures (measurement 
vs. examining motivation and managerial objectives), they could have a 
complementary relationship. Technical efficiency can be a baseline for measuring X-
inefficiency. Even though the assumptions of X-inefficiency are not necessarily met 
in technical efficiency measurement, it does still provide an index of the extent to 
which costs have not been minimised (Button and Weyman-Jones, 1994). 
Determinants 
An additionally interesting research question is to examine the underlying causes and 
external factors that explain the variation in efficiency estimates amongst a given set 
of firms. These factors are external in the sense that they are neither inputs nor 
outputs but have an effect on the firm’s production and characterise the environment 
of where production takes place. These environmental factors can impact production 
by either influencing the technology structure of production or the efficiency of 
transforming inputs into outputs. 
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A lack of a widely accepted theoretical model of technical efficiency determinants 
has meant that different studies have introduced variables according to the specific 
observations of their interest. However, these determinants are predominantly related 
to examining the effects of competitive conditions, heterogeneity and the 
organisational characteristics of each group on their relative efficiencies (Caves and 
Barton, 1990). 
Variables representing competitiveness or market conditions are considered to be the 
most important determinants. Carlsson (1972) and Caves and Barton (1990) claim 
that higher competition facilitates the circulation of information which can then 
translate to higher efficiency in production. The market conditions of the country and 
the industry is the background that the firm operates and partially defines the set of 
production strategies and techniques available to the firm to pursue. Various factors 
shape the market conditions, including but not limited to, property rights, labour 
market flexibility, existing market size or heterogeneity, trade openness and credit 
access. For example, in some studies, tests relating technical efficiency to product 
heterogeneity are carried out. The more heterogeneous the industry is the more their 
costs on research and development (R&D) would be. This could entail higher 
innovation rate and when complemented with higher advertising expenditure, it can 
be translated to higher efficiency (Alvarez and Crespi, 2003).  
On the other hand, other variables are internal to the firms. These factors can mainly 
be described by organisational characteristics of firms which are the true source of 
variations between firms in a given business climate. Examples of such factors 
include the acquisition of new machinery and fuel intensity. These variables can 
proxy the occurrence of change and innovation in that firm, which in turn, can 
explain higher efficiency levels in firms that undertake these expenditures. Other 
firm characteristics have also proved significant results in the literature. These 
include the firm size, ownership, education of the employees and inter-firm relations. 
6.2.3 Iranian Manufacturing 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the introduction of modern manufacturing 
production was conducted by the state more than half a century ago and gradually 
became a significant component of the Iranian economy. Nevertheless, it has been 
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strongly influenced, supported and mainly protected by various governments 
throughout its history. This has meant that even today, manufacturing in Iran is 
heavily dependent on oil money in various aspects such as project financing and 
imports of necessary machinery. In the existing literature explaining the effect of oil 
revenues on economic efficiency have mainly focused on the inefficiency of resource 
allocation due to the presence of the state. Thus, our objective here is to complement 
this literature by examining the technical efficiency side of the oil-efficiency 
hypothesis. 
Thus, looking at these policies and their implications on the production behaviour of 
manufacturing sector can be helpful in explaining why some firms outperform others 
in terms of efficiency. Crucially, the oil income has considerably shaped the market 
structure and other determinants of technical efficiency. 
One important factor in the more contemporary context is the effect that the 1978 
revolution had on the ownership status of these companies (see  Chapter 3). Due to 
the subsequent appropriation of factories and companies after the revolution 
ownership can give a great amount of explanation on the nature of the technical 
efficiency of the industry in Iran. The initial emergence of the foundations or 
bonyads was a result of these changes in ownership. Ironically, they have also 
increased their presence through the recent privatisation attempts. These factors 
emphasise the significance of firm ownership in our micro analysis of efficiency. 
The post-revolution period not only affected the ownership of assets and production 
but also changed the openness of the economy. This was initially due to the political 
events after the revolution and the unilateral sanctions and asset freezes that were 
placed on Iran by the US and more recently by the EU due to Iran’s nuclear 
programme. These events have led to the country’s economic policy-making be (to a 
large extent) reluctantly pushed towards inward looking or self-sufficiency routes by 
means of various tariffs, quotas and subsidies. It should be noted that despite this, 
during the post revolution period distinctive attempts of liberalisation and greater 
integration with the world economy have been made. Most noticeably, these efforts 
started after the war with Iraq in the late 1980s in the presidency of Rafsanjani 
(See  Chapter 3). The extent of dependence is even more acute in manufacturing 
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production where a large amount of machinery and often material is imported due to 
lack of know-how inside the country. 
The competitiveness of manufacturing firms is largely constrained by the amount of 
political connections and influence of the owners. A closer tie to the key political 
factions often translates to cheaper credit and other favourable cost rates. 
Competition is also restricted via the presence of the aforementioned semi-
governmental foundations which many of them are much larger than the average 
private firm in terms of employees and scale of operations. Thus, cautiously 
interpreting the size-efficiency relationship we can verify these claims. 
6.3 Methodology Theory 
In this section we discuss the two most widely applied methodologies in the technical 
efficiency literature. Normally, models using efficiency are constructed based on two 
complementary components. The first component deals with establishing estimates 
and the second component consists of determining what exogenous factors have a 
meaningful explanatory power in explaining efficiency estimate variations between 
observations. As we will discuss, some studies take a two-stage approach. Others 
criticise this method and conduct both stages simultaneously. Below we will 
introduce and discuss these two parts of research from a theoretical perspective. 
6.3.1 Efficiency Estimation 
The most widely used methods of establishing technical inefficiency estimates are 
the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and the data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
techniques. Both of these methods have been applied to different cases at different 
levels of aggregation (Cook et al., 1990; Leibenstein and Maital, 1992; Majumdar, 
1995). Nevertheless, the most successful empirical studies for confirming non-
allocative efficiency theory which have applied these techniques have been at the 
industry or firm level. 
Before moving on to the developments of these two approaches it is worth 
mentioning that building on the work of Farrell (1957), some studies have measured 
both allocative and technical efficiency using shadow profit or cost function 
procedure using a deterministic (Atkinson and Cornwell, 1994; Parker, 1995) or 
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stochastic frontier (Fan, 2000) model. The shadow profit approach was first 
suggested by Lau and Yotopoulous (1971). 
6.3.1.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
The linear programming method was first applied by Farrell (1957). Through the 
work of Charnes, et al. (1978) this evolved to the current form nonparametric linear 
programming method which is more often referred to as data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). In this approach efficiency estimates are obtained in a pure relative manner 
by comparing each unit to the best performing one. The best performing firm acts as 
a benchmark and roughly is the equivalent to a production frontier line. The 
estimation is achieved either through an output-oriented analysis where the 
maximum output for given levels of inputs is derived or by an input-oriented scope 
where minimum inputs needed for achieving a certain level of outputs are 
constructed. Consequently, the deviations of other decision-making units (DMUs)11 
from the optimum case defines their relative technical inefficiencies and allows for a 
measure of comparison not only for the firms’ performance evolution along time but 
also its relative position to the others in the same cohort (Charnes, et al., 1994). The 
DEA approach is a non-parametric method so there is no need for assumptions on a 
production function and specification problems associated with it. It accommodates 
analyses on multiple outputs and inputs and can take returns to scale into 
consideration. Simply put, the DEA approach has minimum a priori assumptions on 
the production activities (Majumdar, 1995) and is reasoned to be more suitable in 
estimating technical efficiency.  
We can formulise the general DEA as a model which establishes the frontier as a 
convex industry-wide hull of 𝑛 firm observations. Where, 𝐗 and 𝐘 are the inputs and 
outputs of all observations within the industry in question. By defining vector 𝐱 and 
scalar y as the set of inputs and output values of a specific firm, the solution to the 
below linear programming model is the efficiency index, θ, for a given firm: 
                                                 
11 Due to a more diverse field of application of DEA in contexts such as schools, intra-firm 
departments, etc. the units of analysis are referred to as DMUs instead of firms. 
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 Choose {θ,𝛌} to: min θ such that:  
 θ𝐱 ≥ 𝛌′𝐗  ( 6–1) 
 y ≤ 𝛌′𝐘  
 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0,        ∑𝜆𝑖 = 1,        𝑖 =  1, … ,𝑛   
Here, 𝛌 is an intensity vector which forms convex combinations of the input vectors 
and output vector in the sample at hand. The solution to the above model (θ∗) is the 
fraction that a firm can multiply the inputs it uses and still manage to produce more 
(or equal) output. So θ∗ = 1 means that it is not possible for the DMU to obtain the 
same output with lower inputs, in other words, it is an efficient DMU. So the 
presence of technical inefficiency would mean that θ∗ is smaller than 1. The variable 
return to scale assumption can be relaxed by relaxing the constraint on the weights to 
∑𝜆𝑖 ≤ 1 resulting in a non-increasing return to scale model. 
DEA Limitations and Remedies 
A number of shortcomings for the DEA method have been raised by critics of the 
procedure. First, it is claimed that this approach does not factor in the environmental 
differences among the DMUs. For example, in contrast to what the conventional 
DEA approach assumes, in practice, not all of the observations would have access to 
the same technology and also barriers hindering the implementation of the best 
available technology may exist. In other words, the choice of technology solely 
depends on the firms’ own preferences. Various studies have linked the inefficiency 
question to the very same technology acquisition issue at different levels of 
aggregation. Stewart (1977) attributes the notion of inefficiency for LDCs to their 
inability in adopting ‘appropriate technology’ which is restricted by the technology 
that is at their disposal. Clearly, choosing the right technology is a factor of the 
known techniques and more crucially the available methods to that unit or country. 
Therefore, the fundamental criteria would be the selection process that results to an 
appropriate technology which would be an ideal fit for the characteristics of that firm 
or country. Thus, it would be more than likely that in the absence of competitive 
pressure, appropriate technology adoption will be far from optimum not only due to 
X-inefficiency attributes of the production process but also the technology access 
limitations due to factors such as principal-agent relations. 
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The other drawback of the traditional DEA is that it does not take into account the 
potential slacks in the inputs and outputs and thus the efficiency measures are argued 
to be imprecise. The third criticism of this model is that due to it being a 
deterministic approach, it does not consider statistical error or exogenous shocks. 
Finally, from an empirical point of view the estimates obtained by DEA appear to be 
sensitive to the aggregation of the inputs. Generally, the more disaggregated the 
inputs are defined the higher efficiency estimates tend to be (Gempesaw, 1992). 
In order to remedy these limitations a number of studies have attempted to build 
upon the initial model and make it more accommodating. Banker and Morey (1986), 
propose a DEA model where the environmental effects are explained exogenously. 
They index the DMUs with reference to their operating environment. A three-stage 
DEA procedure was presented by Fried, et al. (2002) to decompose the distance from 
the optimum case into statistical error, environmental effect and managerial 
efficiency. In this hybrid procedure, after establishing the raw efficiency score in the 
first stage, stochastic frontier analysis is applied to the total slacks where the 
regressors are the environment factors. This decomposes the slacks into the above 
mentioned components. Finally, in the third stage the inputs or outputs data are 
adjusted according to the components and then DEA model is employed. In an 
empirical study, Lan and Lin (2004) conduct a four-stage DEA approach and argue 
that conventional DEA approaches can underestimate the measurements of 
efficiency. 
6.3.1.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
Parallel to the above developments, the work of Farrell was also extended to a 
deterministic frontier approach with a positive error term of inefficiency (Aigner and 
Chu, 1968; Seitz, 1971; Afriat, 1972). Later, the stochastic frontier approach was 
proposed simultaneously in the studies of Aigner, et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van 
den Broeck (1977a). 
The general stochastic frontier analysis is based on an assumption of a parametric 
frontier of either a production, cost or profit function. In the case of the stochastic 
production frontier (SPF), also referred to as output oriented approach, the maximum 
obtainable output by a vector of inputs 𝒙𝑖 is assumed as a function such as𝑓(𝒙𝑖). 
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However, the production of the typical firm falls short of this amount by 𝜖𝑖 1T, as 
below: 
 ln 𝑦𝑖   =  ln 𝑓 (𝒙𝑖)  + 𝜖𝑖  𝜖𝑖 ≤ 0 ( 6–2) 
Consequently, the dual relationships for the cost and profit frontiers can be expressed 
as below: 
 𝒘′𝒙𝑖   =   𝐶 (𝑦𝑖 ,𝒘𝑖)  + 𝜖𝑖 𝜖𝑖 ≥ 0 ( 6–3) 
 𝑝𝑦𝑖  –  𝒘′𝒙𝑖 =  𝜋(𝒘 ,𝑝)  + 𝜖𝑖 𝜖𝑖 ≤ 0 ( 6–4) 
Where 𝒘 is the vector of input prices and 𝑝 is the output price. In this approach, the 
error term in the regression of the stochastic frontier is assumed to be composed of a 
normal distributed noise term 𝑣 and an element of technical inefficiency 𝑢 which is 
deemed to have a one-sided or asymmetric distribution. Due this assumption the SFS 
method is also called the composed error frontier. We can re-express ( 6–2) as: 
 ln 𝑦𝑖 =  ln𝑓 (𝒙𝑖)  +   𝑣𝑖   –  𝑢𝑖  𝑢𝑖  ≥  0 ( 6–5) 
The noise term 𝑣 is a way of dealing with random shocks due to statistical noise such 
as measurement and aggregation errors. It also incorporates changing environmental 
factors such as weather conditions or physical conditions of the specific observation. 
Unlike normal regression analysis when estimating Equation ( 6–5) the main 
objective is not estimating parameters of the production function ln 𝑓(𝒙𝑖). Rather it 
is attempted to somehow obtain an index related to 𝑢 as a measure of technical 
inefficiency.  
The difference between technical inefficiency (𝑢) and the second component (𝑣) is 
that the former is asymmetrical whereas the latter is symmetrical. For example, 
weather conditions can have both positive and negative effects on output and thus 
has a symmetrical distribution. This allows the identification of the two elements at 
the estimation stage. 
It should be mentioned that the distribution that is assumed for 𝑢 in the analysis is 
mainly a choice of the researcher. The distribution is one of the half normal, 
truncated normal, exponential or gamma distributions. The choice of either of these 
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will lead to different estimates but in reality there is no a priori reason or argument to 
prefer one distribution over another (Coelli, et al., 2005). This is why some studies 
consider all three cases and report the results for each case (Forsund et al., 1980). 
SFA Limitations and Remedies 
A number of weaknesses have been regularly associated with the stochastic 
production frontier analysis approach. First, there is no prior knowledge on the 
validity of the distribution assumptions made with regards to the composed error 
term. Thus, the choice of a half-normal versus an exponential distribution (or any 
other distribution) for the 𝑢s are made on an ad-hoc basis. Second, in the earlier days 
of research it was argued that it would not be possible to actually decompose the 
difference between the actual and potential outputs into 𝑢 and 𝑣 and have a firm 
specific measure of inefficiency. Therefore, only average measures of inefficiency 
for the industry were largely used. This criticism was short lived since Jondrow et al. 
(1982) showed that the mode or mean of the conditional distribution of 𝐸[𝑢𝑖|(𝑣𝑖 −
𝑢𝑖)]1T could be used as estimates of firm specific efficiency (This estimate is presented 
in  Chapter 7). Third, in practice the measurement of technical inefficiency will 
include the input price inefficiency as well. This is not a problem of the model 
however. Subject to data availability on factor prices, it can be shown that a 
simultaneous input demand frontier can be constructed to deal with this problem 
(Yoo, 1992). 
Regression Estimation 
The estimation of Equation ( 6–5) is carried out using either maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimation or the Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) method proposed 
by Aigner et al. (1976). We provide a brief explanation on COLS procedure is given 
as it can help clarify the concept better. 
Corrected OLS is a convenient approach of providing consistent estimators for the 
SFA regression. Denoting 𝜇 ≡ 𝐸(𝑢) > 0, we can rewrite Equation ( 6–5) in the 
following manner: 
 ln𝑦i = –𝜇  +   ln 𝑓(𝒙𝑖)   +   (𝑣𝑖–𝑢𝑖 + 𝜇) 𝑢𝑖  ≥  0 ( 6–6) 
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This equation satisfies all the assumptions to apply the usual OLS apart from the 
normal distribution of the error term due to the asymmetric distribution of 𝑢. By 
assuming linear parameters in ln 𝑓 (𝒙𝑖), OLS will provide unbiased estimator for the 
parameters apart from the intercept which would be biased by µ. So what is left now 
is to have a consistent estimator of µ based on the distributions of 𝑣 and 𝑢. Weinstein 
(1964) obtained the expression for µ from the probability density function of 𝜖 as 
below: 
 𝐸(𝜖𝑖) =  𝐸(𝑣𝑖–𝑢𝑖) =  𝐸(–𝑢𝑖 ) = −𝜇 =  −𝜎𝑢�2𝜋 ( 6–7) 
Hence, if we obtain a consistent estimator of 𝜎𝑢which can be obtained from the 
second and third central moments of the residual 𝜖 (𝑚2(𝜖) and 𝑚3(𝜖)) we would 
have: 
 𝜎𝑢2 = ��𝜋2 � 𝜋𝜋 − 4�𝑚3(𝜖)�2 3⁄            ( 6–8) 
 𝜎𝑣2 = 𝑚2(𝜖) − �𝜋 − 2𝜋 �𝜎𝑢2 ( 6–9) 
Consistent estimators for 𝜎𝑢2 and 𝜎𝑣2 are obtained by using the samples moments 𝑚�2 
and 𝑚�3 (Yoo, 1992). Consequently a consistent estimator of µ will be obtainable 
using Equation ( 6–7). 
What is crucial to bear in mind before estimating the above regression is that this 
procedure is almost entirely dependent on the correct skewness of the residuals. In 
other words if the assumptions are violated there is the possibility that the standard 
deviations of 𝑣 and 𝑢 cannot be calculated due to them equalling the square root of a 
negative number. Two main problems can arise here. The type I failure occurs if the 
skewness of the overall residual (𝜖) is positive and the second type failure can arise if 
the variance of 𝑢 is greater than 𝜖 (Yoo, 1992). This drawback of the COLS urges 
careful interpretation of the estimates. 
Technical Efficiency Estimates 
Apart from the method of Jondrow et al. (1982) on obtaining firm-specific estimates, 
different average measures of technical efficiency have been proposed in various 
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studies, as a sector or industry level measure. However, there is no a priori criterion 
to prefer one to the other. The most widely used measures are (Yoo, 1992): 
 𝐸𝐹𝐹 = 2exp�𝜎𝑢22 � [1 −Φ(𝜎𝑢)] ( 6–10) 
The 𝐸𝐹𝐹 measure of technical efficiency was proposed by Lee and Tyler (1978) as 
the expected value of the ratio of the actual observation of output, 𝑓(𝑥) ∙ exp (𝑣 − 𝑢) 
to the optimum output on the production frontier, 𝑓(𝑥) ∙ exp (𝑣). Here, Φ is the 
standard normal distribution function. So 𝐸𝐹𝐹 falls between 0 and 1 and the more 
efficient the observation the closer this measure is to 1. 
 𝐴𝐴𝐼 = 𝜎𝑢�2 𝜋�ln(𝑦)������� +  𝜎𝑢�2 𝜋�  ( 6–11) 
Average technical efficiency (𝐴𝐴𝐼) measures the disparity of the production frontier 
and the average production function (the numerator), which is normalised by the 
mean of the production frontier measured on the y axis (the denominator). 
Similarly, 𝐴𝐴𝐼 is constrained within the (0, 1) interval and in the occurrence of a type 
I failure 𝐴𝐴𝐼 = 0 and 𝐸𝐹𝐹 = 1. 
 𝜆 = 𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
 ( 6–12) 
Here, 𝜆 indicates the degree of asymmetry present in the distribution of 𝜖 = (𝑣 − 𝑢) 
since we have assumed a half normal distribution for 𝑢 and a normal distribution for 
𝑣. In other words, 𝜆 is a measure of technical inefficiency (𝜎𝑢) normalised by the 
degree of variation in the SPF function (𝜎𝑣). Thus, indirectly, it shows whether the 
gap between 𝑦 and 𝑓(𝑥) stems from 𝑢 or 𝑣. 
 𝑆 = 𝑚3(𝜖)[𝑚2(𝜖)]3 2⁄  ( 6–13) 
Another measure is the skewness of 𝜖1T, denoted as 𝑆, which is directly related to 𝜆 
under Equation ( 6–8) and Equation ( 6–9). Since higher levels of technical 
inefficiency cause a more negative skewness in the distribution of 𝜖, 𝑆1T can be used as 
a measure of technical efficiency. In the case of type I and II failures 𝑆 exists but 𝜆 is 
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not defined. It is clear that unlike 𝐴𝐴𝐼 and 𝐸𝐹𝐹, here, 𝜆 and 𝑆 comprise of both 𝜎𝑢 
and 𝜎𝑣. Nevertheless, it can be seen that all four measures are independent of inputs. 
The Production Function 
The estimates obtained by the methods above explicitly depend on the specification 
of the production function 𝑓(𝑥) and also the distributions that have been assumed for 
the two components of 𝜖. Different functional forms of production can be used and 
tests can be carried out to compare the results to establish the best fit. The most 
widely used functional form in the literature is the transcendental logarithmic 
functions (Translog) model which can be appropriate due to fewer prior constraints 
as compared to the Cobb-Douglas or Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
specifications where, for example, output elasticity is assumed to be constant. This 
can be useful especially if there is considerable heterogeneity of observations within 
different industries regarding returns to scale (Harris, 1989). 
6.3.1.3 DEA - SFA Analysis 
The main theoretical difference between the two methods discussed is that in 
parametric techniques such as SFA, the frontier (e.g. production) represents an 
assumption of maximising behaviour. This is intrinsic to the notion of the production 
function involved that is estimated through the use of each firm’s input output data. 
Thus, contrary to nonparametric models such as DEA, X-inefficiency will not be 
incorporated in parametric models (Weyman-Jones and Button, 1992). 
Empirically, different studies have compared these two methods and have shown that 
they can yield to different results with the same data. Furthermore, disparities 
between the assumptions made by researchers in implementing each method can not 
only exacerbate the divergence in the results for a given firm but it can also translate 
to contradicting ranking of firms or units studied (Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992). 
On the other hand, a number of studies have concluded that the two methods appear 
to be compatible and converge to similar results (Resti, 2000; Uri, 2001). 
This obviously would make the comparison of the results between the two measures 
of efficiency problematic and thus a body of literature has focused on comparing the 
two measures. The main theoretical difference between the two methods is that in 
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parametric techniques such as SFA, the frontier (e.g. production) represents an 
assumption of maximising behaviour. Thus, contrary to nonparametric models, X-
inefficiency will not be incorporated in parametric models (Weyman-Jones and 
Button, 1992). 
The SFA approach is predominantly applied in economics research whereas the DEA 
approach is used by operations and managerial researchers particularly in the public 
sector since it is often likely that output prices cannot be specified. For the majority 
of their existence they have been developing almost independently. Most studies on 
the comparison of DEA and SFA have tried to conclude a clear cut answer on the 
preference of one over another based on different scenarios such as level of noise in 
the data (Banker, et al., 1993; Yu, 1998). Basically, these studies suggest that DEA is 
more appropriate where the neoclassical behavioural assumptions are in question or 
where data accuracy does not pose a great threat. On the other hand SFA is more 
useful when simple production forms have a good explanatory power of the effect of 
technology on production levels or when statistical errors are important. 
However, more recently, attempts of bridging the two almost separate fields of DEA 
and SFA have been made. The relationship between the two has been redefined as a 
complementary association and some studies have adopted a hybrid strategy of DEA 
and SFA (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Sengupta, 1998) and an increasing number of 
studies use both methods simultaneously in order to compare and show a more 
comprehensive attempt of efficiency estimation. Mortimer (2002) provides a list of 
41 of these studies and the results of their comparisons. 
6.3.2 Efficiency Determinants 
The way the determinants or exogenous factors are incorporated in the model has 
also evolved and has been implemented in a number of different ways in various 
studies. Overall three main approaches have been suggested in the SFA literature. 
The first method is a single stage approach mostly used in the earlier studies on 
efficiency. Here it is assumed that the exogenous variables influence the production 
process itself, for example, in transportation studies, network characteristics 
influences the production technology itself. Thus, 𝒛 = (𝑧1,𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑄) or the vector of 
exogenous variables enters the SFA model directly alongside other inputs. 
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 ln 𝑦𝑖 = ln [𝑓(𝒙𝑖, 𝒛𝑖)] + 𝑣𝑖–𝑢𝑖 𝑢𝑖 ≥  0 ( 6–14) 
Equation ( 6–14) can be estimated similar to a normal SFA model. However, here an 
additional assumption arises and that being 𝒛 is uncorrelated with 𝒗 and 𝒖 similar 
to 𝒙. In this method the differences in efficiencies are not explained but only a more 
accurate possibility frontier is constructed. 
The second approach is different since it attributes the estimated efficiency variations 
to differences of the environmental variables. In other words unlike the first approach 
here it is assumed that the 𝑧 variables influence efficiency itself and not the 
production structure. Thus, after estimating the efficiency scores from Equation ( 6–
5) in the first stage, in the second step these efficiency scores are regressed on the 
exogenous variable vector according to Equation ( 6–15):  
 𝐸(𝒖𝑖|𝒗𝑖 − 𝒖𝑖) =   𝑔(𝒛𝒊;𝜹)  + 𝜺𝑖 ( 6–15) 
Here 𝜺 is an independent identically distributed error term and 𝜹 is a parameter 
vector that is estimated.  
The second approach is argued to have serious econometric problems. One problem 
is that in the first stage COLS or ML estimation we need to assume that 𝒛 and 𝒙 are 
uncorrelated otherwise the estimates will be biased. However, if in the second stage 
we need to assume that 𝒛 is correlated with 𝒖, this means that we should have 
included 𝒛 in the first model to avoid the problem of omitted variables and biased 
estimates. Furthermore, the two step method will still cause a bias in the 𝜹 even if 𝒛 
and 𝒙 are independent. The reason is that 𝑢�𝒊’s are calculated via the shrinkage of [ln 𝑦𝑖 −  ln 𝑓 (𝒙𝑖)] and the amount of shrinkage depends on the relative variance of 
𝑣𝑖s and 𝑢𝑖s but if the all 𝑢𝑖s are deflated by the same 𝜎𝑢2 then 𝒖� will be 
underdispersed and thus the influence of 𝒛 on 𝒖 will be underestimated (Schmidt, 
2011). What follows is that simple tests on the significance of the relationship 
between 𝒛 and 𝒖 (𝐻0:𝜹 = 𝟎) will ultimately be invalid since the error in estimating 
𝒖� affects the distribution of the test statistic. The other obvious contradiction is that 
in the first stage 𝒖 is assumed to be identically distributed however in the second 
stage a functional relation between 𝒖 and 𝒛 is assumed (Kumbhakar, 2000).  
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The second stage is also carried out in the DEA approach to investigate the 
differences in efficiency figures obtained from the preceding mathematical 
programming technique. In the DEA approach, Equation ( 6–15) is estimated using a 
Tobit model since the dependent variables have to be censored to be between 1 and 0 
and thus OLS is inappropriate. It is worth mentioning the two stage method for DEA 
models avoids these problems due to the underlying procedure in evaluating 
inefficiency (Schmidt, 2011) but still relies on heavily restricting assumptions that 
often are questionable (Simar and Wilson, 2011). An alternative method used in 
Barnum and Gleason (2008) is a two stage reverse application of the second 
approach where initially the relation of production values and the external variables 
is examined and then the estimation stage is implemented which allow the correction 
of the bias and imprecision. 
Finally, the third popular approach in incorporating determinants is the simultaneous 
two stage approach introduced by Battese and Coelli (1995). This approach has been 
widely implemented in more recent empirical research. They express their procedure 
for panel data which will also mean that the vector 𝑧 can include time varying 
explanatory variables. Assuming 𝑢 to be 𝑁(𝜇𝑖𝑡,𝜎𝑢2), they express the model of 
inefficiency effects as: 
 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜹 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡 ( 6–16) 
Here 𝑤𝑖𝑡 is a random variable defined by the truncation of the normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance 𝜎2, such that the point of truncation is – 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜹. To 
estimate Equations ( 6–5) and Equation ( 6–16) simultaneously the method of 
maximum likelihood estimation has been used. The likelihood function is expressed 
in terms of the variance of the parameters 𝜎𝑠2 ≡ 𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎2 and 𝛾 ≡ 𝜎2/𝜎𝑠2. 
Hence in a cross sectional representation of the model, technical efficiency for the 𝑖th 
firm is defined as: 
 𝑡𝑒i = exp(−𝑢𝑖) = exp (−𝑧𝑖𝜹 − 𝑤𝑖) ( 6–17) 
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6.4 Empirical Survey 
Empirical applications of stochastic frontier efficiency analysis have been carried out 
within a myriad of contexts in economics, management science and operational 
research literatures including fields as diverse as manufacturing and banking to 
policing and municipal services. An indicative (but certainly not exhaustive) list of 
these studies based on area of research is given in Fried, et al. (2008).  
This wide spectrum of fields dealing with efficiency has adopted different 
components of different theoretical models in order to adapt their analysis according 
to the specific context of their research. As a result, efficiency analysis has been 
increasingly treated in a topical manner. A review of this literature would shed light 
on the benefits and disadvantages of each component for different research 
objectives. Consequently, the ranges of efficiency estimates themselves are quite 
varied. One of the earlier studies, Pitt and Lee (1981), looks at Indonesian weaving 
industry and based on different specifications, report efficiency estimates between 
61.8 % and 76.6%. This is analogous to the 62.5% estimate of Lee and Tyler (1978) 
for overall Brazilian industry and Tyler and Lee (1979)’s 55.4% and 55.8% for 
Columbian apparel and footwear industry. However, these values were considerably 
lower than the 90.9% reported in Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977b) for the 
French Textile industry.  
The lack of a well-founded theoretical framework is even more evident when it 
comes to establishing determinants of efficiency which demonstrates the difficulties 
involved (Lundvall, 1999). As Karamagi (2002) notes, the choice of variables to be 
included in the technical efficiency model is mainly based on little more than 
common reasoning. 
Here we will investigate the differences between these studies with the aim of 
constructing an empirical model relevant to the case of Iran. In this respect the 
survey is not attempting to be exhaustive, but tries to review that part of the literature 
which can help develop our empirical model of Iranian industry. 
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6.4.1 Survey of determinants 
As it has already been mentioned the list of empirical studies looking at technical 
efficiency using firm-level data is quite diverse, this is indeed the case for 
manufacturing firms. The problem of identifying which determinants directly 
contribute to economic growth in a more broad sense has also not been entirely 
resolved in the economic growth literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997) identifies around 60 
variables from the growth literature which have at least in one instance been proven 
to be significant. Even though tests of robustness of these variables have been 
suggested initially by Levine and Renelt (1992) and a less extreme test by Sala-i-
Martin (1997), the empirical models in the growth literature have predominantly 
chosen variables based on the availability of data or certain contextual parameters of 
their specific research question. 
The efficiency literature has also mainly drawn inspiration from the productivity 
literature, and for the major part, it has had a similar experience. We begin with a 
look at empirical findings on the influence of different variables on efficiency. As 
noted above, it is important to remember that different firm-level studies of 
efficiency have adapted their research based on their research objective. It seems that 
some studies start off with a priori hypotheses to show a relationship between a few 
(normally one or two) main firm characteristics and efficiency. Often in these studies 
the title of the work even highlights their approach. Other works undertake a more 
exploratory approach. They generally include all relevant variables in the model to 
see which determinant has the most significant effect. 
Finally, some studies pursue only estimation of efficiency with the aim of relating it 
to more macro measures such as country productivity and do not incorporate the 
determinants formally in the manner discussed so far. We will review all types of 
research based on their findings and relate them to each possible efficiency 
determinant. 
6.4.1.1 Size and Age 
In most studies it is generally argued that larger firms should be more efficient. Some 
explain this because of their advantages in terms of organisation and technical 
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knowledge. Also, older firms are expected to produce more efficiently due to LBD 
gains and their survival through a longer period. 
Using the two-stage procedure, Pitt and Lee (1981) find three firm characteristics, 
size, age and ownership to have an important role in explaining technical efficiency. 
Interestingly, the effect of age was found to be negative and the size variable 
(proxied by number of workers) had a positive effect on efficiency estimates. The 
negative age effect is again confirmed in the Indonesian garment industry by Hill and 
Kalirajan (1993). This might be explained by the fact that a large number of the 
young firms were foreign firms with superior technical know-how (Pitt and Lee, 
1981). 
In a study of the effect of size on technical efficiency in Indian industries (shoes, 
printing, soap and machine tools), Page (1984) finds a maximum measure of 68.8% 
and a minimum of 42.4% respectively for the machine tools and shoe manufacturing 
based on a deterministic frontier in the first stage. In the next stage he shows that the 
machine tool sector is the only industry in which firm size displays a significant 
positive effect on the estimates. Furthermore, for at least one or more sectors, firm 
characteristics of employee experience, age, capacity utilisation and entrepreneur 
experience proved significant determinants. 
Other works including Mengistae (1996) for Ethiopia, Brada et al. (1997) for 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary (using value added as a proxy for size) and Lundvall 
and Battese (2000) for Kenya, find a positive size-efficiency relationship. Soderbom 
and Teal (2004) find a significant quadratic relationship of firm size, meaning that a 
threshold in this relationship exists in a study of manufacturing in Ghana. Similarly, 
Chow and Fung (1997) and Alvarez and Crespi (2004) do not find a simple linear 
size-efficiency relationship. Both studies report a u-shaped picture with the biggest 
and smallest firms being more efficient than the firms in the middle of the size 
distribution. 
Furthermore Alvarez and Crespi (2004) find evidence for a positive age-efficiency 
effect. This is in contradiction with related works such as Patibandla (1998) where an 
inverse u-shaped relationship describes the medium-sized firms as relatively more 
efficient than the other two groups. 
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6.4.1.2 Ownership 
Foreign or domestic 
Domestic ownership can have a positive effect on firm efficiency since firms owned 
by foreigners might be less familiar with the local environment. Pitt and Lee (1981) 
find a significant negative effect of foreign ownership on firm efficiency in 
Indonesian weaving sector. At the same time, local owners might be less efficient 
due to less experience or lack of knowledge or culturally be less receptive of new but 
more efficient techniques (Chen and Tang, 1987). 
Private or public 
One of the key motives behind the pursuit of privatisation that has always been 
argued is the productivity and efficiency gains that are followed through more 
accountability and more competition of firms. Bottasso and Sembenelli (2004) show 
that in the context of large Italian manufacturing firms, the identity of the ultimate 
owner matters and privatisation brings efficiency improvements. 
6.4.1.3 Openness and competitiveness 
Market openness in terms of exports has usually been explained on two grounds to 
enhance efficiency: (i) export is a learning by doing process itself which enhances 
firm productivity; (ii) the most efficient firms can survive the competitive markets; 
hence this is called the selection process.  
It is also argued that export oriented growth strategy makes firms more efficient 
compared to import substituting policy. One reason is that under import substitution 
firms are protected by tariffs and subsidies and hence tend to be less efficient. In a 
study of foreign firms in Taiwan electronics industry, Chen and Tang (1987) estimate 
export oriented firms to have an average efficiency of 72% and the import 
substituting oriented firms 60.4%. After controlling for other characteristics they test 
the hypothesis of equal efficiency in the two groups but manage to reject it at 2.5% 
level and conclude that export oriented firms tend to be more efficient. Similarly, 
Hossain and Karunaratne (2004) reject the null hypothesis of no export orientation 
effect on levels of efficiency in a study of trade liberalisation in the Bangladeshi 
manufacturing sectors. Other empirical studies including Clerides, et al. (1998), Sun 
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et al. (1999) and Bechetti and Sierra (2003) also provide evidence of this positive 
relationship. 
Other channels of international exposure such as FDI and licensing have also been 
argued to affect production efficiency especially in country-level studies (Bhagwati, 
1978). However, the FDI literature goes further to suggest a large magnitude of spill-
over effects of increased efficiency in other industries in the host country due to the 
presence of foreign firms (Markusen and Venables, 1999). 
6.4.1.4 Subsidy 
Martin and Page (1983) find an average technical efficiency of 72.4 and 84.4% for 
logging and sawmilling industries in Ghana. Via the two stage procedure, they 
attempt to look at managerial factors that could explain the difference of technical 
efficiency (or as they refer to it, X-efficiency). The only factor that displayed 
significant explanatory power for the efficiency estimates for both industries and 
different model specifications was the dichotomous subsidy (government loan) 
variable which showed a negative effect on technical efficiency. Focusing on Italian 
manufacturing, Sena (2006) also argues that with less access to external financial 
resources and grants, firms will be forced to become more technically efficient. 
6.4.1.5 Geography 
The location advantage of firms has been shown to be a factor in their level of 
technical efficiency. Obvious reasons such as better infrastructure such as better 
roads or being closer to coasts or industry clusters or even other geographical 
differences such as crime levels can explain this relationship. 
Bechetti and Sierra (2003) show that firms in the south of Italy are less efficient and 
thus at more risk of bankruptcy due to the probable higher crime rate and weaker 
infrastructure in the south. 
6.4.1.6 ICT 
The impact of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on economic 
growth has been increasingly the subject of studies in the last two decades. Several 
firm-level studies have showed the presence of a positive ICT-efficiency relationship 
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(Shao and Lin, 2001; Becchetti et al., 2003; Gholami et al., 2004; Castigione, 2012). 
Gholami et al. (2004) finds that in the Iranian case the effect of ICT is positively 
significant. However, some studies focusing on developing countries struggle to find 
the same relationship (Dewan and Kramer, 1998; Pohjola, 2001). This disparity has 
been attributed to the low levels of ICT investment to GDP and the lack of 
complements such as public infrastructure and knowledge base to increase the 
effective utilisation of ICT (Gholami, 2004). 
6.4.1.7 R&D 
Another factor explaining the extent of efficient performance by producers is R&D. 
In a country-level study, Wang and Wong (2012) show that R&D transferred through 
both FDI and imports has a significant effect in explaining efficiency levels of the 
receiving country. They conclude that especially LDCs (Less-Developed Country) 
are shown to benefit from 6% increase in their average technical efficiency if they 
increase the foreign R&D they receive to levels that US receives. 
6.4.2 Methodological Survey 
In this section we conduct a methodological review of empirical models on the 
estimation of efficiency and its determinants is given. Various issues have been 
criticised and subsequently adjustments are proposed. Below, we will broadly 
discuss four main aspects of the current empirical models. While the issue of 
functional form is only a problem for the SFA models, the remaining three 
characteristics of models can equally apply to both SFA and DEA studies (albeit in 
slightly different sense). 
6.4.2.1 Functional form 
The overwhelming majority of the empirical literature addresses the functional form 
issue by adopting either a Cobb-Douglas or trans-logarithmic model. Becchetti and 
Sierra (2003) assume a Cobb-Douglas function to test the relationship between the 
technical efficiency of manufacturing firms and their bankruptcy risk. Generally if 
there is no prior assumption regarding constant elasticity of inputs the Translog form 
is preferred due to fewer restrictions on the production function. Some studies 
provide a comparison of the two functions. Yang and Chen (2009) test the Translog 
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model against a Cobb-Douglas specification using the generalised likelihood ratio 
statistic which rejects the Cobb-Douglas model. Similarly, Lundvall and Battese 
(2000), Hossain and Karunaratne (2004) and Faria, et al. (2005) empirically conclude 
on the preference of the Translog model. However, Uri (2001) considers both forms 
but does not conclude any significant difference between the two. We shall test the 
sensitivity of our results to functional form assumption in the following chapters. 
The adoption of the most appropriate form for the estimated function (e.g. production 
function) is mainly treated as a tangential issue to the analysis. Nevertheless, it can 
entail the imposition of certain restrictions which can ultimately influence the 
estimated efficiency measures. A few studies have focused specifically on dealing 
with the functional form effect on efficiency estimates. Caves et al. (1980) used a 
Box-Cox functional form in an attempt to accommodate for zero values of some 
outputs within the data. Others such as Huang and Wang (2004) and Tsionas (2004) 
have suggested more generalized functional forms such as the Fourier flexible 
functions to reduce such restrictions on the inefficiency estimates. 
6.4.2.2 Choice and Measurement of Variables 
The decisions on the type of variables that are used in different empirical works are 
likewise quite varied. We can look at this choice in different ways: 
Relevant Inputs and Outputs 
The usage of different dependent variables such as gross product versus value-added 
or ratios of output per employee are a few of the common variations in the literature. 
Also, sometimes the dependent variable is expressed in per capita terms, i.e. as the 
ratio of gross output or value-added to labour (Yoo, 1992). 
Furthermore, the choice of what inputs to include is a topical matter but the simplest 
versions have included only labour and capital (Torii, 1992). Some studies include 
material cost as an input in the frontier alongside capital and labour this is because 
they have used gross output instead of value-added as the dependent variable (Page, 
1984; Yoo, 1992). 
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Value or Quantity 
The theoretical premise of the SFA model relies on the use of quantities. However, 
due to capital, labour and output heterogeneity in the applied sense such 
measurement is almost impossible. Hence, normally the deflated output values as 
opposed to nominal values are predominantly used in time series or panel data 
models. One important reason for this is that in studies involving more than one 
period the price change effect should be omitted in order to avoid misleading 
estimates. In other words, this way the inflationary effects of the prices of outputs are 
put aside and hence a more purified measure of the technical aspect of production 
efficiency is reflected in the results. 
Labour is predominantly used as a quantity variable shown by the number of 
workers. Some studies use working hours. It is not uncommon that some leave the 
hours as unadjusted for the labour skill level. On the other hand, some studies use 
labour compensation as the input variable instead which implicitly recognises the 
quality of labour. Capital is also used in value terms which itself is obtained through 
a number of different methods such as the perpetual inventory method discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
One advantage of the DEA approach is that unlike SFA models it can use a 
combination of values and quantities as inputs and outputs. This can be explained 
based on the fact that the objective of linear programming in these models is not 
estimation of a given predefined parameter. Here the closest notion to a frontier is the 
benchmark firm which can be compared to any given firm based on a relative input 
or output values assigned to that ideal firm. Thus, in some studies that focus on a 
specific industry, industry-specific outputs and inputs can be employed. For instance, 
in a study of US telecommunications industry, Majumdar (1995) uses inputs such as 
the number of telephony switches and total number of access lines. Moreover, these 
models allow the usage of rank data to arrive at estimates of technical efficiency. 
Nevertheless, in studies that use values rather than quantities, again, real values have 
to be used to avoid the price effects. 
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Control Variables 
Some studies include variables directly in the frontier regression in order to control 
for possible differences in producers industry or context. These include variables 
such as capital intensity, ratio of production workers to overall workers, ratio of costs 
of electricity and fuel to material cost, index of specialisation and ratio of inventory 
to capital, only to name a few. In some panel-data studies such as Wang and Wong 
(2012) the time variable is included to control for the effect of different years on the 
efficiency of production. In a more aggregate level study, Nourzad (2008) employ 
the country stock of foreign direct investment as an input alongside labour and 
capital in the frontier regression. 
6.4.2.3 Cross-Sectional vs. Panel Data 
From an econometric point of view the advantage of using panel data is that the 
strong distributional assumptions on the inefficiency term can be relaxed and thus 
these estimates would have better statistical properties (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) suggest that while the adoption of cross-sectional data 
would require the assumption of independence of inefficiency term from the inputs 
this assumption is not needed for panel data analysis. They also argue that in panel 
models distributional assumptions for the inefficiency component would be 
unnecessary since estimation of the frontier parameters can be done via the 
traditional fixed-effects and random-effects procedures. 
Clearly, one of the practical advantages of panel data analysis over cross sectional 
analysis is that in the former the changes in efficiency throughout time and also 
technical change can additionally be measured. Two main types of panel models are 
used in the literature: time-invariant and time-varying models. The former which is 
generally used in shorter panels assumes that efficiency for each producer is constant 
through time. On the other hand, in the latter, efficiency is allowed to change across 
time. In other words, time-varying technical efficiency models are mainly extensions 
of the maximum likelihood cross-sectional models whereas the time-invariant 
models employ the conventional panel data procedures. 
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In panel data such as the empirical application of the Battese and Coelli (1995) the 
time variable is inserted directly in the determinants’ equation. However, Sena 
(2006) incorporates the time variable in the first equation in level, squared and cross 
products with other inputs. The latter clearly assumes that the time factor influences 
the production process the same way as other inputs whereas the prior is assuming 
that time acts as determinant of technical efficiency among different observations. 
6.4.2.4 The Distribution of the 𝒖 
The distributional assumption of the 𝑢𝑖s will have a clear effect on the sample mean 
efficiencies related to each distribution. This is confirmed by various studies 
assuming different specifications simultaneously. Corbo and de Melo (1986) show 
why the exponential distribution is expected to yield higher estimates than the half-
normal assumption. Green (1990) suggests that even though the estimated 
inefficiency values will be different for each distributional assumption, the ranking 
of the firms seems mainly unaffected. Using empirical evidence, Ritter and Simar 
(1997) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) support the use of the relatively simple 
half-normal and exponential distribution compared to the more flexible truncated-
normal and especially gamma distributions. The argument is based on a lack of 
evidence for the advantages of the two parameter distributions and being impractical 
due to identification problems and in some circumstances due to non-existent log-
likelihood functions. Furthermore, they even suggest that the choice between the 
half-normal and exponential distributions are largely immaterial. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the general concept of efficiency and focused on one of 
its components, namely technical efficiency. We introduced SFA and DEA 
methodologies of estimating technical efficiency.  
Having looked at the benefits and drawbacks of each method, it seems that in line 
with the existing literature in the economics literature, SFA would be more useful for 
the purpose of this research. The main reason for the preference of SFA is the fact 
that it allows for the controlling of random shocks and thus it provides the 
conventional econometric method of analysis. Furthermore, it is in line with our 
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methods and assumption in the previous chapter when we obtained Iran’s TFP 
estimates. This method can allow us to have grounds on comparing and relating our 
estimates of efficiency with the overall productivity trend that has been estimated. 
Furthermore, we avoid the restrictiveness of the DEA estimates as we can use these 
data to compare with estimates of different studies using the similar models obtained 
here. 
Furthermore, the review on other empirical challenges such as choice and 
measurement of variables also allows the amalgamation of the existing methodology 
with the key issues specific to Iran’s economy discussed in the previous chapters. 
Consequently, our review in this chapter will ultimately assist us in derivation (and 
estimation) of a tailored model for the case of Iranian manufacturing performance in 
the proceeding chapters.  
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Chapter 7 Model, Data and Initial Efficiency Estimates 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we attempt to build upon our survey of methodological and empirical 
literature of efficiency analysis to obtain measures of efficiency using data from the 
Iranian manufacturing production. We will introduce the model and variables that we 
will use for the first task of efficiency analysis, namely efficiency measurement. We 
will discuss the firm-level dataset that will be used and summarise the key features of 
manufacturing sector with special focus on 2007, the most recent year the data is 
available for. 
Finally, we attempt to build our initial estimates of manufacturing efficiency. It is an 
initial estimate in the sense that they are obtained without the incorporation of the 
determinants and thus are not the final results. Nevertheless, this exercise will allow 
us to have an initial snapshot of the performance of the manufacturing sector. We 
will attempt to identify the important points that may be relevant in the case of Iran 
that has been discussed so far. This will allow us to re-specify and arrive at the full 
model in the subsequent chapter. 
7.2 Model and Variables 
In accordance with the overwhelming majority of the literature the production 
process examined is expressed in two functional forms, namely the Cobb-Douglas 
(CD) and the transcendental logarithmic (Translog) functions. This will be the 
foundation of our exercise regarding technical efficiency estimation. 
The log form of our CD production function can be expressed as: 
 𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑝𝐿𝑖) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝐾𝑖) + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 ( 7–1) 
And the Translog specification: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑖) = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑛(𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑝𝐿𝑖 ) + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑛(𝐾𝑖 ) + 𝛽3 [𝐿𝑛(𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑝𝐿𝑖 )]2 2⁄+ 𝛽4 [𝐿𝑛(𝐾𝑖 )]2/2 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑛(𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑝𝐿𝑖 ).𝐿𝑛(𝐾𝑖 ) + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 ( 7–2) 
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Here 𝑉𝐴𝑖, 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑝𝐿𝑖 and 𝐾𝑖 are the value added, total compensation of employees and 
the capital stock of the 𝑖th firm respectively. 
Output is represented as value-added rather than gross output. Using gross output 
would require the inclusion of raw material as an input. Salim and Kalirajan, (1999) 
argue that this could conceal the role of labour and capital. Additionally, they state 
that value-added is preferred in different studies since it accounts for the differences 
and changes in the quality of inputs. They argue that another advantage of value 
added is that it allows the estimation of efficiency for firms with multiple products. 
In a similar context of productivity growth estimation, Griliches and Ringstad (1971) 
state that using value-added allows the inclusion and comparison of firms that are 
heterogonous in the raw material inputs and hence it is more appropriate than gross 
output.  
The value added definition used here is based on the definition provided by the 
Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) which reflects the way the data are gathered. Broadly, 
value-added can be defined as below: 
 𝑉𝐴𝑖 = 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖 − 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖  ( 7–3) 
According to SCI, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖 is defined as the sum of the following components for 
each firm: total value of produced output, net changes in inventory of work in 
progress, difference between the purchase and sale value of sold unused goods or 
material, value of capital assets built by the firm, total value of water and electricity 
(produced or sold) and receipts from other industrial services undertaken. The other 
industrial services include contractual works, minor repairs to building, machinery, 
office equipment, transport vehicles and setting up or installation of the produced 
goods. Furthermore, 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖 is the sum of five components: total value of raw 
material, nondurable tools and equipment used in production, value of purchased 
electricity and water, value of material or parts used in production of capital assets by 
the unit and payment for other industrial services. All of the above components are 
reported in current prices. 
The labour input 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑝𝐿𝑖 is the sum of total compensation to production and non-
production employees of each firm. The purpose of using compensation instead of 
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employee numbers is to control for the quality of labour. Clearly, this assumes that 
high skilled labour are expected be compensated higher due to their skills. 
Finally, since data on the value of capital services and replacement cost of fixed 
assets is not available capital stock has been calculated as below: 
 𝐾 = (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑏) 2⁄ + (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎 + 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑏) 2⁄  ( 7–4) 
Where 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑎 and 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑏 are the beginning and end of year value of total capital 
assets for each firm. These assets include machinery, durable goods and equipment, 
office equipment, transport vehicles, buildings and installations, land and computer 
software packages. In the dataset 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑎 is given for each year but we calculate 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑏 by subtracting the change of capital asset (purchase or selling of assets) 
throughout the year. Also, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑎 and 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑏are the total inventory in the beginning 
and the end of the year. Total inventory is the sum of the inventory of finished goods, 
work in progress, untransformed goods and raw materials. 
The estimation is carried out using Stata 12. The method of estimation is maximum 
likelihood (ML). Stata maximises the log-likelihood function of the model using the 
Newton-Raphson method. Equations ( 7–1) and ( 7–2) are estimated via ML under 
two assumptions on the technical efficiency component’s (𝑢𝑖) distribution. We build 
estimates first by assuming a half-normal and then an exponential distribution for the 
inefficiency component of the error term. 
Restating the above models as below: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝒙𝒊𝜷 + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 ( 7–5) 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the value added of the 𝑖th firm, 𝒙𝒊 is a 1 × 𝐾 vector of regressors for 
firm i, 𝜷 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector of coefficients to be estimated. The log-likelihood 
functions for the models based on the two distributional assumptions for 𝑣 and 𝑢 are: 
Normal 𝑣 / half-normal 𝑢 
 ln𝐿 = ��12 ln �2π� − ln𝜎𝑆 + lnΦ�−𝜖𝑖𝜆𝜎 𝑆 � + 𝜖𝑖22𝜎  𝑆2 �𝑁𝑖=1  ( 7–6) 
and 
 153 
Normal 𝑣 / exponential 𝑢 
 ln𝐿 = ��−lnσ𝑢 + 𝜎𝑣2𝜎𝑢2 + lnΦ�−𝜖𝑖 − 𝜎𝑣
2
𝜎𝑢2
𝜎𝑣
� + 𝜖𝑖
𝜎𝑢
�
𝑁
𝑖=1
 ( 7–7) 
Where 𝜎𝑠 = (𝜎𝑢2 + 𝜎𝑣2)1/2 , 𝜆 = 𝜎𝑢/𝜎𝑣 , 𝛾 = 𝜎𝑢2/𝜎𝑆2 , 𝜖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝒙𝒊 𝜷 and Φ( ) is the 
cumulative probability density function of the standard normal distribution. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the seminal work of Jondrow et al. (1982) 
proved that firm specific efficiency estimates can be computed. Below the estimates 
of 𝑢𝑖 are obtained using the mean of the conditional distribution 𝑓(𝑢|𝜖) in the 
following manner: 
 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜖𝑖) = 𝜇∗𝑖 + 𝜎∗ �𝜙(−𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )Φ(𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ ) � ( 7–8) 
Here 𝜙( ) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. 
Having decomposed the inefficiency components (𝑢𝑖’s), actual firm-specific 
technical efficiency scores are constructed as below: 
𝑡𝑒𝑖 = 𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝜖𝑖} = �1 −Φ(𝜎∗ − 𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )1 −Φ(−𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ ) � exp �−𝜇∗𝑖 + 12𝜎∗2� ( 7–9) 
Where 𝜇∗𝑖  and 𝜎∗ are defined as: 
Normal\half-
normal 
𝜇∗𝑖 = −𝜖𝑖𝜎𝑢2 𝜎𝑆2⁄ 𝜎∗ = 𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣 𝜎𝑆⁄  ( 7–10) 
and 
Normal\ 
exponential 
𝜇∗𝑖 = −𝜖𝑖 − 𝜎𝑣2 𝜎𝑢⁄ 𝜎∗ = 𝜎𝑣  ( 7–11) 
Ultimately, a likelihood ratio (LR) test can be constructed to examine which 
functional form (CD vs. Translog) is more appropriate for the data used. The LR test 
statistic has approximately a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of parameters of the restricted model (CD): 
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 𝐿𝐿 = 2 [𝑙(𝐻0) − 𝑙(𝐻1)] ( 7–12) 
Here 𝑙(𝐻0) and 𝑙(𝐻1) are the log-likelihood values of the restricted and unrestricted 
models respectively. However, in this context the test is carried out via a one-sided 
general LR test instead of a standard likelihood-ratio test since the test lies on the 
boundary of the space in which 𝜎𝑢2 is defined (Gutierrez, et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, a comparison between efficiency estimates based on the two 
distributional assumptions can clarify the sensitivity (if any) of the analysis to these 
two hypotheses. 
7.3 Data 
In this section we introduce and explore the dataset that is used in the model 
discussed in this chapter and  Chapter 8. 
7.3.1 Dataset Description 
The first industrial census in Iran was carried out in 1963. According to the website, 
SCI (2012), the SCI officially started census data gathering on ‘large firms’, i.e. 
firms with 10 or more workers, from 1972 to 1987 with the exception of 1977 and 
1978 (the revolution years). The data gathering between the 1988 and 1991 period 
was conducted for industrial units of all size under a new ‘Comprehensive Industrial 
Survey Programme’, but then reverted back to the census gathering for large firms 
and survey data for firms having less than 10 employees. In, 2002 a survey of small 
firms (those with less than 10 employees) was also conducted. The structure and type 
of data gathered by the centre has changed throughout the years, but the most recent 
format of data for large firms has been relatively unchanged since 1994.  
The annual raw dataset at our disposal of this research covers the years 1988 to 2007. 
There are no identifier variables for the firms. Thus, each year’s data has to be 
treated as a cross-section. This has been implemented in the spreadsheets provided 
by SCI to keep the identity of each firm and their production data confidential. The 
format of the dataset slightly varies across these years parallel to the changes in the 
procedures of SCI mentioned earlier. However, the questionnaires and hence the data 
follows a relatively cohesive structure since 1994. 
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The dataset is relatively rich and offers data regarding general characteristics of each 
firm and includes: whether or not the firm has been industrially active for at least 30 
day; the type of ownership being cooperative or private or public; the legal status 
being either an unofficial company, a governmental company, a cooperative 
company, an official company or a public entity. 
Firm employee data is provided in terms of numbers and compensation by gender, 
paid or unpaid and type of worker (production workers according to their skill level 
and non-production employees). Furthermore, employees’ educational levels for 
each firm are tabulated which represent a measure of human capital for each firm. 
Information on the firms’ consumption of raw material, non-durable tools and 
instruments of production are provided in quantities and nominal values. 
Additionally, the quantity and value of inputs that are imported is available. These 
are followed by output measures such as production, sales and export values in both 
quantity and value. 
After this, the dataset provides the inventory values of finished goods, work in 
progress and raw material at the beginning and end of year. This is followed by data 
on the consumption of energy and other utilities used by the units based on the type 
of energy source and utility is presented. 
Data on firms’ end of year value of capital assets are given alongside the changes in 
each year is available. The capital assets are classified into seven categories 
including: machinery, durable tools and instruments, office equipment, transport 
vehicles, building and infrastructure, land and software packages. 
The dataset provides details on other expenditure and earnings of the units such as 
advertisements, building rent, minor building repairs and others. Furthermore, the 
amount of R&D expenditure (if any) is given together with the educational level of 
the researchers. Finally, numbers of unique outputs of each producer and a count on 
how many of the outputs have national or international certification is provided. 
It is worth noting that in this dataset the data gathered for firms with 10 to 49 
employees in 14 provinces are sample data and for other provinces covers all firms. 
However, for larger firms (i.e. those with 50 or more employees) the data are 
 156 
population data which cover all manufacturing establishments in all provinces (SCI, 
2011). This means that there are minor disparities between the figures reported in 
some reports compared to analyses such as ours which rely only on raw data. For 
instance, the raw data in 2007 covers 13,239 firms, however in the summaries 
provided (e.g. SCI, 2013), which includes more 10-49 sized firms, the corresponding 
value is around 17,593. 
7.3.2 Iranian Manufacturing in 2007 
We have discussed the longer term picture of manufacturing structure in  Chapter 5 
for the period between 1963 and 2005. The data specifically used in this research is 
obtained from the above mentioned Statistical Centre of Iran’s industrial census 
dataset for 2007 (year 1386 in the Iranian calendar) as the most recent available data. 
As mentioned earlier, the 2007 dataset includes data on 13,239 manufacturing firms 
with 10 or more employees. Furthermore, only for the 2007 data an additional data 
on the location of each firm is available which can allow identification of the 
province that the firm is located in. This will also be useful in creating location based 
variables explicitly in our models. 
Considering the type of information available in the dataset, it will be useful to first 
examine the structure and other essential indicators in the manufacturing sector in 
2007 and depict an overall picture of the industry. Finally, a selection of this data 
will be utilised in the context of efficiency analysis. 
Table  7–1 illustrates the ownership composition of manufacturing firms. The data 
reveals that the overwhelming majority of the firms’ (92.6%) are classified as 
privately or non-cooperatively owned. The data also shows that 3.9% are cooperative 
and 3.5% have a public ownership. These ownership types can be considered to be 
based on loose definitions. A private unit is one that the majority of its capital or 
assets are owned by individuals, whereas a cooperative firm is a unit that is 
registered as a cooperative company and more than 50% of its capital is owned by a 
cooperative board. Finally, a public unit is a unit that the majority of its capital is 
owned by ministries, governmental institutions, banks, revolutionary foundations, 
municipalities or other public sector entities. 
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The average size of cooperative, private and public firms is 34, 71 and 330. While 
this confirms the fact that public firms are on average bigger than the others, it is 
important to remember that this classification can be a bit misleading. For example, 
quasi-public firms such as the foundations might well be considered as private units 
in this data. This is clearly evident as the biggest private firm here employs 21,569 
employees which is more than twice the amount employed by its biggest public 
sector counterpart. This firm is clearly too large to be a conventionally defined 
private firm in the Iranian context. 
Table  7–1 Manufacturing Firm Ownership Structure, 2007. 
Ownership Type Number of Firms 
Percent of Total 
Firms 
Average 
Number of 
Employees 
Maximum 
Number of 
Employees 
Cooperative 517 3.91% 34.46 488 
Private 12,264 92.64% 71.3 21,569 
Public 458 3.46% 330.06 8,843 
 13,239 100%   
Source: Based on SCI (2007). 
The dataset covers a total of over one million (1,043,417) employees in the 
manufacturing industry for 2007. Around 90% of the workers are male accounting 
for 93% of total labour compensation. Table  7–2 suggests the annual cost of 
employing a male worker in 2007 was on average 20.5 million Rials more than that 
of a female employee. In other words, the average female worker earns 30% less 
than her male colleague. The disparity in labour compensation between males and 
females can partly be attributed to the type of jobs that females are engaged in that 
are deemed to be less productive. However, this might also provide evidence on 
gender-based wage discrimination and extraction of surplus output simply due to the 
less favourable conditions for the general female workforce.  
Table  7–2 Gender composition of Labour, 2007. 
 Employees Share of 
Workforce 
Labour 
Compensation 
Per Capita 
Compensation 
(Rials) 
Male 938,067 90% 93% 45,384,113 
Female 105,350 10% 7% 65,848,961 
 1,043,417 100% 100%  
Source:  Based on SCI (2007). 
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Overall there are 11 establishments that employ only female workers, however, 
4,412 have solely male employees. These observations clearly highlight the stark 
difference in not only compensation but also employability of male and female 
workers. 
Additionally, the composition of the labour force can be looked at in terms of 
production and non-production labour. Non-production labour is defined as an 
employee that either has an office job, works in transportation (such as drivers) or 
one that offers any type of service which indirectly supports the production of the 
firm. The data suggests that at the aggregate level the ratio of production to non-
production workers is close to 3.34. In other words, production workers account for 
77% and non-production employees for 23% of the manufacturing workforce. This 
index can be a proxy of the level of bureaucracy or management in the structure of a 
given firm.  
The geographical concentration of the manufacturing industry in Iran is mainly 
focused in a number of few important provinces. As Table  7–3 suggests, the biggest 
province is Tehran, where 21% of the firms are located. These firms jointly account 
for 28% of Iran’s manufacturing sales in 2007. Tehran is followed by Esfahan 
accounting for 11% of firms and around 14.6% of total manufacturing sales. 
Interestingly, Khuzestan which hosts 3.2% of total firms represents a 14.1% share of 
total manufacturing sales in this year. This is probably due to the concentration of 
number of petrochemical and oil industry related firms in this oil-rich province. A 
possible confirmation of this is the relative large size of the average firm in 
Khuzestan. Concentration and linkages in these provinces show possible 
explanations of production differentials from a geographical dimension. 
Table  7–4 illustrates the share and composition of different industrial subsectors. The 
top three manufacturing sectors in terms of total sales are the motor vehicle, basic 
metals and chemical sectors. However, the biggest number of firms operates in the 
food and beverages sector followed by the non-metallic mineral sector, which both 
have a smaller average number of employees per firm compared to the motor vehicle 
and basic metals industries. These are in line with our observation for the period 
1998-2005 in  Chapter 5. 
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Table  7–3 General Firm Characteristics by Province, 2007. 
Province Average 
Firm Size 
Share of Total 
Sales 
Proportion 
of All Firms 
Number of 
Firms 
Markazi 101 5.48% 4.51% 597 
Gilan 66 1.27% 3.27% 433 
Mazandaran 63 2.32% 4.47% 592 
Eastern Azarbaijan 78 4.39% 5.24% 694 
Western Azarbaijan 52 0.81% 2.05% 271 
Kermanshah 46 0.74% 1.88% 249 
Khuzestan 111 14.10% 3.26% 432 
Fars 73 2.62% 4% 530 
Kerman 119 2.88% 1.1% 145 
Khorasan Razavi 82 4.68% 6.99% 926 
Esfahan 76 14.62% 11.81% 1,564 
Sistan and Baluchestan 44 0.13% 0.68% 90 
Kordestan 31 0.26% 1.27% 168 
Hamedan 39 0.62% 2.34% 310 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 52 0.30% 0.99% 131 
Lorestan 83 0.56% 0.74% 98 
Ilam 52 0.07% 0.24% 32 
Kohgiluyeh and Boyerahmad 44 0.05% 0.28% 37 
Bushehr  1.78% 0.42% 55 
Zanjan 121 1.50% 1.29% 171 
Semnan 44 1.99% 5.94% 787 
Yazd 92 2.64% 2.97% 393 
Hormozgan 64 2.16% 1.27% 168 
Tehran 107 28.33% 21.01% 2,782 
Ardebil 38 0.36% 1.61% 213 
Qom 40 0.97% 3.99% 528 
Qazvin 93 3.26% 3.89% 515 
Golestan 43 0.57% 1.53% 202 
Northern Khorasan 63 0.30% 0.52% 69 
Southern Khorasan 69 0.23% 0.43% 57 
  100% 100% 13,239 
Source:  Based on SCI (2007). 
Based on Table  7–4, total manufacturing exports of this group of Iranian firms in 
2007 was just over 10 billion US dollars. Around 1,179 firms (roughly 9%) officially 
engaged in export activity. As the table suggests the biggest exporting sector was the 
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chemicals sector with over 55% of total manufacturing exports of all 13,239 firms. 
The next main exporting sector is the basic metals industry which accounts for 
around 18% share of manufacturing exports of our sample. 
Table  7–4 General Firm Characteristics by Sector, 2007. 
Two-Digit ISIC Code/Sector 
(rev. 3.1) 
Average 
Firm Size 
Share of 
Total 
Sales 
Proportion 
of Total 
Firms 
Number 
of Firms 
Exports* 
15 Food and Beverages 65.14 10.10% 19.22% 2,544 595 
16 Tobacco Products 3,423.50 0.18% 0.02% 2 0 
17 Textiles 83.56 2.92% 7.92% 1,048 119 
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur 48.12 0.12% 1% 132 4.26 
19 Leather, Leather 
Products and Footwear 
39.68 0.30% 1.49% 197 81.2 
20 Wood Products (Excl. 
Furniture) 
54.03 0.40% 1.03% 137 2.49 
21 Paper and Paper Products 60.39 0.94% 2.27% 301 12.7 
22 Printing and Publishing 48.96 0.24% 1.78% 235 0.12 
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum 
products, nuclear fuel 
128.26 7.94% 1.03% 136 567 
24 Chemicals and Chemical 
Products 
85.44 16.60% 6.93% 918 5,580 
25 Rubber and Plastics 
Products 
57.58 2.67% 6.16% 816 72.6 
26 Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products 
58.20 5.52% 17.33% 2,294 254 
27 Basic Metals 139.06 18.68% 4.25% 563 1,820 
28 Fabricated Metal 
Products 
63.22 3.74% 8.04% 1,065 70.1 
29 Machinery and 
Equipment n.e.c. 
81.33 4.60% 7.43% 984 124 
30 Office, Accounting and 
Computing Machinery 
83.69 0.09% 0.24% 32 0.14 
31 Electrical Machinery and 
Apparatus 
109.90 3.47% 3.35% 443 230 
32 Radio, Television and 
Communication Equipment 
111.66 0.48% 0.55% 73 4.13 
33 Medical, Precision and 
Optical Instruments 
79.81 0.37% 1.13% 149 2.64 
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers, 
Semi-Trailers 
197.68 19.26% 4.76% 630 456 
35 Other Transport 
Equipment 
101.55 0.87% 1.33% 176 33.1 
36 Furniture; Manufacturing 
n.e.c. 
45.27 0.51% 2.66% 352 1.13 
37 Recycling 23.00 0.01% 0.09% 12 0 
Total Observations  100% 100% 13,239 10,022 
Source:  Based on SCI (2007). 
Notes: * Export values are in million USD. 
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Data Correction 
As it has been already mentioned the data at hand consists of 13,239 firm 
observations. However, our sample reduces by 84 observations due to negative or 
zero value added data for these firms. 
Furthermore, outliers are defined by firms having values more or less than 5 times 
the standard deviation of the two-digit ISIC industry average levels of inputs (𝐾 and 
𝐿) and output (VA). These observations are omitted since they can influence the 
frontier significantly and provide a less reliable picture. Based on these criteria 140 
outliers were omitted from the estimation of the frontier. 
Overall the dataset consists of 59 unique three-digit industry sectors and around 135 
different four-digit sectors classified within these subsectors. 
7.4 Initial Technical Efficiency Estimation Results 
Our results suggest that for both functional forms and for either distributional 
assumption, the presence of technical inefficiency can be confirmed. The null 
hypothesis of no technical efficiency (𝐻0: 𝜎𝑢2 = 0 vs. 𝐻1:𝜎𝑢2 > 0) is strongly rejected 
with a p-value of close to zero. 
Furthermore, the restrictions of the CD model (𝐻0: 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 0) is rejected via 
the likelihood ratio test with a p-value of almost zero (a 𝜒  (3)2  test statistic of 49.28 
for the half-normal models). 
Table  7–5 represents the estimation results for the models. There does not seem to be 
a great amount of disparity between the two Translog regressions. Also since there is 
no theoretical or empirical apriority to favour the half-normal over the exponential 
distribution, the prior is chosen to simplify the subsequent analyses in this chapter. 
This is in line with the majority of studies in the relevant literature. Thus, the analysis 
henceforth will rely on estimates obtained through the Translog specification with a 
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half-normal distributed inefficiency term. The efficiency scores for this model will 
be called teho212. 
Table  7–5 – ML Estimation of Production Functions, 2007. 
 Cobb-Douglas (CD)  Translog  
Parameter Half-Normal  Exponential  Half-Normal Exponential 
Constant -0.279** 
(0.131) 
-0.346* 
(0.126) 
 9.740* 
(1.719) 
10.777* 
(1.675) 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 0.842* 
(0.008) 
0.837* 
(0.008) 
 0.819* 
(0.133) 
0.778* 
(0.13) 
𝑳𝑳 0.210* 
(0.007) 
0.216* 
(0.007) 
 -0.621* 
(0.122) 
-0.678* 
(0.119) (𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳)𝟐    3.41e-24*** 
(1.87e-24) 
-3.33e-24*** 
(1.82e-24) (𝑳𝑳)𝟐    0.018* 
(0.004) 
0.0184* 
(0.0041) 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 × 𝑳𝑳    0.000455 
(0.00056) 
0.002 
(0.0055) 
𝝈𝒗 0.717 0.681  0.713 0.678 
𝝈𝒖 0.489 0.348  0.499 0.35 
Log-Likelihood -15154.864 -15000.825  -15129.163 -14968.724 
Notes: 1) Dependent variable is logarithm of firm value added in Rials. 
2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at 1 %, 5% and 10% level respectively (standard error 
in parentheses). 
Table  7–6 shows a brief summary of the estimated efficiency values. This show that 
a great amount of concentration is located around the mean efficiency estimated. The 
calculations show that around 242 firms have an efficiency of less than 50% whereas 
the number firms with higher than 85% efficiency is around 175. 
Table  7–6 Summary of Overall Efficiency Estimates in Iranian Manufacturing (teho2), 2007. 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Number of 
Observations 
0.7004 0.0698 0.0715 0.9070 13,015 
The histogram of the entire manufacturing firms’ technical efficiency estimates 
obtained from the Translog model is presented in Figure  7–1. The figure clearly 
                                                 
12 Here ‘te’ in ‘teho2’ stands for technical efficiency, ‘h’ reflects the assumption of half-normal 
distribution for the second component of the error term (u), ‘o’ shows that outliers have been omitted 
and ‘2’ represents the Translog production function specification. 
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shows a wide potential for firms’ improvement in the efficiency of their production 
with highest concentration of firms around 70% efficiency level. The relatively small 
size of the standard deviation mirrors the steep peak of the histogram. 
Figure  7–1 Histogram of Manufacturing Technical Efficiency Estimates (teho2), 2007. 
 
Furthermore, the output elasticities of each input in the Translog model can be 
defined as below: 
 
𝜕𝐿𝑉𝐴
𝜕𝐿𝑛(𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑝𝐿) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑝𝐿𝑖) + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐾𝑖) ( 7–13) 
 
𝜕𝐿𝑉𝐴
𝜕𝐿𝑛(𝐾) = 𝛽2 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐾𝑖) + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑝𝐿𝑖) ( 7–14) 
The results show that both elasticities are positive and overall the production 
processes show minor increasing returns to scale. However, this measure of returns 
to scale is not significant since the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot 
be rejected at any meaningful level of significance. 
In the proceeding section we will explore various categorisations of the firms and 
assess their corresponding relationship on the efficiency results. The results are 
presented in a way that can assist us in identifying determinants of the efficiency 
performance in the context of Iranian manufacturing. 
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Table  7–7 Output Elasticities of the Translog Function. 
Input  Mean Elasticity Standard 
Deviation 
Labour 0.8313 0.0119 
Capital 0.2079 0.0470 
Exports and Efficiency 
The results in Table  7–8 show a significantly superior production performance for 
exporters compared to those firms that do not engage in any export activity. The 
average exporter firm is around 2% more efficient than a non-exporter. This result 
highlights the efficiency gains achieved by firms due to exposure to international 
markets. As discussed earlier, since exporter firms have to compete with highly 
competitive foreign firms they need to use the best production performance and 
strategy to survive. Additionally, the experience of engaging in new markets itself 
acts as a means of LBD which in turn can boost the performance of such firms.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that some firms seem to export despite not being very 
efficient. For example, 15 exporters have an efficiency of less than 50%. 
Furthermore, a valid point to consider is the notion of reverse causality which has 
been addressed in the literature. In other words, it could be that firms export 
precisely because they are more efficient. A comprehensive explanation for such 
estimates and hypotheses requires controlling for more factors and adds additional 
dimensions to the analysis. As the objective of this section is identifying key 
efficiency determinants we will leave part of these issues to the next chapter and part 
of these would fall out of the main scope of this research. 
Table  7–8 Technical Efficiency (teho2) Summary Statistics by Exporter and Non-Exporter 
Firms, 2007. 
Type of Firm Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. 
Non-Exporter 0.6996 0.0693 0.0728 0.9071 11,915 
Exporter 0.7183 0.0676 0.3389 0.8818 1,100 
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Sectoral Efficiency 
In Table  7–9 the estimates are given by each ISIC sector. The data suggests that in 
terms of all estimates the efficiency of coke and refined petroleum sector is the 
highest (Actually, the tobacco products sector has the highest score but is ruled out 
due to only having two firms). However, the least efficient sector in is the textiles 
sector. Interestingly, the most efficient firm is also in the coke, refined petroleum and 
nuclear fuel sector (ISIC 23) with an efficiency of 90.7% but the least efficient firm 
is in the food and beverages industry with a measly value of 7.15%. 
The mean estimates show that efficiency scores tend to be higher for less labour 
intensive (i.e. those with higher capital-labour ratio) production processes. It is clear 
that apart from the petroleum sector, the efficiency of chemicals and chemical 
products and other transport equipment sector show the higher bounds of efficient 
production. In contrast to this, sectors such as textiles or leather products which have 
a higher proportion of labour input seem to possess relatively lower levels of 
efficiency. 
Figure  7–2 clearly illustrates the greater concentration of efficiency scores of 
between 50% and 80% for the textiles sector and a number of firms being less than 
40% efficient. In contrast to this, in the coke and petroleum products sector in all 
firms operate above the 40% level and most are in the 60 to 90% levels of efficiency 
boundaries. 
Figure  7–2 Firm Technical Efficiency Histogram, Textiles vs. Coke and Refined Petroleum 
Sectors, 2007. 
 
We can look deeper into each ISIC sector to see if these trends hold at a less 
aggregated level. For instance, within the ISIC 23 sector, the refined petroleum 
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subsector has a capital-labour ratio which is more than three times the ratio for coke 
oven subdivision. This is clearly reflected in that the average efficiency score of the 
first group of around 72.5% compared to 70% for the coke oven product sector. This 
wide difference between the two shows how the nature of production can influence 
the measures of efficiency even in the upper bounds of the performance spectrum. 
Table  7–9 Technical Efficiency (teho2) Summary Statistics by Sector, 2007. 
Code ISIC Sector (rev. 3.1) Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. 
15 Food and Beverages 0.6978 0.0748 0.0715 0.8943 2,467 
16 Tobacco Products 0.7491 0.0371 0.7229 0.7754 2 
17 Textiles 0.6843 0.0734 0.2364 0.8587 1,035 
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur 0.6957 0.0513 0.4889 0.8371 128 
19 Leather, Leather Products and 
Footwear 
0.6909 0.0806 0.2008 0.8358 194 
20 Wood Products (Excl. Furniture) 0.6933 0.0794 0.2124 0.8738 133 
21 Paper and Paper Products 0.7059 0.0670 0.3066 0.8586 300 
22 Printing and Publishing 0.6823 0.0628 0.2071 0.8072 227 
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum 
Products, Nuclear Fuel 
0.7238 0.0868 0.4359 0.9070 132 
24 Chemicals and Chemical 
Products 
0.7127 0.0743 0.2503 0.8985 904 
25 Rubber and Plastics Products 0.7007 0.0662 0.2491 0.8823 804 
26 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.7076 0.0688 0.2904 0.8890 2,260 
27 Basic Metals 0.7093 0.0694 0.3017 0.8817 555 
28 Fabricated Metal Products 0.7003 0.0657 0.2706 0.8629 1,053 
29 Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 0.6945 0.0574 0.3261 0.8808 978 
30 Office, Accounting and 
computing Machinery 
0.7034 0.0771 0.4045 0.8568 32 
31 Electrical Machinery and 
Apparatus 
0.7026 0.0650 0.2812 0.8933 437 
32 Radio, Television and 
Communication Equipment 
0.7048 0.0498 0.5900 0.8370 71 
33 Medical, Precision and Optical 
Instruments 
0.7021 0.0625 0.4784 0.8336 146 
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Semi-
Trailers 
0.6962 0.0658 0.2720 0.8554 626 
35 Other Transport Equipment 0.7120 0.0716 0.3745 0.8485 173 
36 Furniture; Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.6923 0.0645 0.2889 0.8702 346 
37 Recycling 0.7118 0.0359 0.6767 0.8127 12 
Total observations     13,015 
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Firm size 
Table  7–10 shows the average efficiency score for firms based on four groups in 
terms of firm size proxied by the number of employees of each firm. The estimates 
partially display a positive relationship between the estimates and size of the firm. 
The table also suggests that both the most efficient firm and the least efficient firm in 
the smallest firm size group employing between10 to 20 people. 
Table  7–10 Technical Efficiency (teho2) Summary Statistics by Firm Size, 2007. 
Number of Employees (L) Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. 
𝟏𝟎 ≤ 𝑳 < 𝟐𝟎 0.6984 0.0748 0.0715 0.9070 4,428 
𝟐𝟎 ≤ 𝑳 < 𝟓𝟎 0.6998 0.0676 0.2706 0.8884 4,652 
𝟓𝟎 ≤ 𝑳 < 𝟏𝟎𝟎 0.7029 0.0633 0.2008 0.8954 1,946 
𝟏𝟎𝟎 ≤ 𝑳 0.7034 0.0688 0.0825 0.8641 1,989 
Ownership 
Another important perspective on efficiency determinants is the ownership effect. 
Table  7–11 shows that based on the estimated measures of technical efficiency, the 
cooperative and private firms are on average more efficient than their public 
counterparts. Furthermore, the minimum and maximum efficiency scores belong to 
the private sector. This uniform result on this firm characteristic might imply the 
crucial role that ownership plays in our analysis. 
Table  7–11 Technical Efficiency (teho2) Summary Statistics by Ownership, 2007. 
Ownership Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. 
Cooperative 0.7028 0.0666 0.3883 0.8677 502 
Private 0.7006 0.0685 0.0715 0.9070 12,101 
Public 0.6926 0.1031 0.0825 0.8786 412 
Geographical Location 
Table  7–12 illustrates the technical efficiency of firms by their geographical location 
i.e. the province that the firm is located in. The result suggests that on average Qom 
and Kohgiluyeh and Boyerahmad have the least efficient manufacturing firms and 
the most efficient firms operate in Western Azarbaijan, Kerman and Khuzestan. 
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Table  7–12 Technical Efficiency (teho2) Summary Statistics by Province, 2007. 
Province Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. 
Markazi 0.7062 0.0789 0.2630 0.8817 591 
Gilan 0.6845 0.0735 0.2812 0.8817 419 
Mazandaran 0.7161 0.0659 0.2124 0.8436 579 
Eastern Azarbaijan 0.7044 0.0653 0.3212 0.8762 685 
Western Azarbaijan 0.7244 0.0708 0.3467 0.8890 270 
Kermanshah 0.7035 0.0726 0.3119 0.8531 246 
Khuzestan 0.7236 0.0721 0.0825 0.8705 417 
Fars 0.6963 0.0958 0.2706 0.8750 514 
Kerman 0.7251 0.0623 0.4600 0.8943 142 
Khorasan Razavi 0.6947 0.0523 0.2071 0.8632 912 
Esfahan 0.6968 0.0574 0.2364 0.8626 1,544 
Sistan and Baluchestan 0.7144 0.0764 0.4591 0.8493 90 
Kordestan 0.7084 0.0383 0.5834 0.8045 164 
Hamedan 0.7190 0.0461 0.5337 0.8734 309 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 0.7181 0.0711 0.4778 0.8823 130 
Lorestan 0.7002 0.0586 0.5361 0.8433 97 
Ilam 0.7142 0.0638 0.5634 0.8335 31 
Kohgiluyeh and Boyerahmad 0.6796 0.0945 0.4650 0.8485 37 
Bushehr 0.7037 0.0661 0.5573 0.8334 50 
Zanjan 0.7103 0.0581 0.2720 0.8501 166 
Semnan 0.6993 0.1107 0.0715 0.9070 776 
Yazd 0.6987 0.0786 0.2491 0.8590 386 
Hormozgan 0.7031 0.1005 0.3368 0.8650 163 
Tehran 0.6939 0.0495 0.2008 0.8626 2,740 
Ardabil 0.6915 0.0627 0.3565 0.8269 206 
Qom 0.6793 0.0941 0.2970 0.8985 525 
Qazvin 0.7055 0.0648 0.4373 0.8618 503 
Golestan 0.6966 0.0729 0.3456 0.8453 198 
Northern Khorasan 0.7166 0.0460 0.5513 0.8090 69 
Southern Khorasan 0.7023 0.0768 0.4353 0.8441 56 
Nevertheless, big industrial provinces such as Tehran and Esfahan do not seem to 
have performed particularly more efficiently than other provinces. This can be 
interpreted in different ways. It might be an indication of a lack of adequate 
interconnectedness of production even in provinces with the highest concentration 
and better infrastructural access. On the other hand, it is reasonable to also argue that 
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an aggregation of data in places such as Tehran which house a much more diverse 
range of industrial sectors can obscure any potential agglomeration effect. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we proposed our initial model for the estimation of technical 
efficiency in Iranian manufacturing using firm-level data. Using an output-oriented 
SFA procedure, we obtained estimates for four scenarios depending on the functional 
form of the production function and the hypothesised distribution of the technical 
efficiency component of the residual. The test results confirmed the preference of the 
Translog function and the simple notion of a half-normal distribution led us to prefer 
the estimates of this scenario for our subsequent analysis and comparisons. 
The results showed that in 2007 our sample of manufacturing firms operated at 
around an average rate of 70% of the production frontier. This suggests a great 
amount of potential for these industries to improve upon. 
In line with the efficiency determinants literature discussed in the previous chapter 
we looked at tabulations of the estimates based on important variables discussed in 
the literature which could be relevant to Iran. Our initial findings suggest an 
important amount of disparity based on different classifications. We showed that 
exporter firms on average have higher efficiency estimates. Cross-industry variation 
of productive performance was one of the important factors differentiating firms. The 
most efficient firms tended to be those that have higher capital-labour ratios. Our 
findings also provide evidence for sizable cross-province disparities. 
On the other hand, some variables do not seem to explain much of the efficiency 
disparities. The results suggest a relatively average productive performance for firms 
in the biggest industrial provinces (Tehran and Esfahan). This runs contrary to ideas 
of industrial concentration benefits. The ownership variable also does not show a 
meaningful difference between public or private firms in our initial estimates. This 
partly can be explained by the way this variable and others are defined. 
As mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, these findings are only initial estimates 
and warrant further clarification. Nevertheless, this exercise has provided a brief 
glimpse into the manufacturing sector performance. This will assist us in arriving at a 
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more appropriate model in the following chapter which addresses the question of 
identifying the sources of efficiency variation more directly. 
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Chapter 8 Efficiency Determinants 
8.1 Introduction 
As discussed in  Chapter 6, the second aspect of assessing the technical efficiency of 
production in Iran’s manufacturing production is to determine what factors can truly 
explain the difference in the efficiency estimates among different units or industries. 
These factors are sometimes referred to as environmental or exogenous factors 
affecting production efficiency. 
In this chapter a more detailed comparison of these factors which was briefly 
discussed in the previous chapters will be presented. The key goal here will be to 
establish the relevance of the important variables in light of our initial estimation of 
Iranian manufacturing efficiency in  Chapter 7. Based on the model specified in this 
particular context determinants of efficiency are empirically tested based on the two-
staged and simultaneous estimation methods. 
8.2 Efficiency Determinants – Concepts and Definitions 
With different applications of efficiency analysis the choice of determinants has been 
predominantly treated as a context specific issue. Thus, different models vary 
considerably. For example, the determinants of efficiency in agricultural economics 
are considerably different form the crucial factors explaining the efficiency of 
education in a given country. Furthermore, within each of these fields there is no 
exhausting list of determinants applied in different studies. The reason for this is that 
there are additional sources of heterogeneity that are often unique to the country or 
sector that is being studied.  
This might make comparisons between different models rather tedious. Regardless, it 
also provides the convenience of applying context specific and probably a more 
accurate evaluation in each study. It is worth mentioning that as with any other 
empirical study, data availability and limitations have also partially determined the 
variables included and ultimately the model itself. 
In practice most studies attempt to explain an overview of the relevant studies and 
normally pick the most successful and widely used variables for their own analysis. 
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They sometimes add a few variables or employ new definitions or proxies to have a 
model that is more accommodating not only to their case study but also to the 
datasets that is available to them. 
In a number of studies, these determinants have been used as control variables which 
enter the model directly in the stochastic function itself. This highlights the 
previously mentioned ad-hoc aspect of different empirical approaches additionally in 
the way they use these data in their models.  
The question of the number of relevant determinants to be included is also treated 
differently. Some papers only focus on one or two specific factors which are the 
main research question in that study (e.g. Driffield and Munday, 2001) while others 
include as many variables as they see fit and then focus on those that have had 
significant role in explaining the efficiency estimates (e.g. Taymaz and Saatci, 1997). 
Here it is attempted to have a closer look at the rationale behind the choice of 
determinants themselves but also the way these variables are constructed. 
Ownership 
The ownership category has been approached differently. As the examples provided 
in  Chapter 5 suggest, the literature has mainly used ownership dichotomies such as 
private versus public or foreign versus domestic. Sometimes the legal status of the 
company corporate versus non-corporate or other categories is used as a proxy of 
ownership effect on technical efficiency. 
In studies that the type of ownership is defined in terms of private or public criteria, 
the dominant rationale is that generally private companies might have better 
supervision and quality control compared to public firms which allocation of 
responsibilities and thus accountability are often vaguely defined. This is usually 
translated to public firms having less efficient production. 
In the second categorisation of ownership, it is often argued that foreign owned firms 
might have additional knowledge or advantages due to be operating in an 
international context and thus might make a more efficient use of the inputs in 
production. Normally a dummy variable is used to show this difference. 
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Alternatively, ownership can be expressed as the unit’s legal status. For example, 
creating three categories of corporate, non-corporate and other types of units can be 
differentiated. 
The overwhelming majority of studies use a dummy approach for inclusion of these 
effects. The only difference amongst them is the way that each category is defined. A 
few resort to the majority ratio of shareholders as a description for each firm. Some 
studies use the predefined definitions of the data gathering body which is normally 
the statistical centre for each country. 
In instances where there are additional data, other ownership related factors such as 
ownership concentration defined as the percentage of shares owned by the biggest 
shareholder is also introduced for which some studies suggest a U-shaped 
relationship between it and firm performance (e.g. Su and He, 2012). 
Operational Characteristics 
Various properties of the firms’ operational attributes have been used to explain 
variations in efficiency index. These variables normally try to differentiate the firms 
organisational from various aspects. These include size, age, number of plants, 
research and development and other ‘firm-infrastructure’ expenditures. 
Firm size has been incorporated in a number of studies. This variable has been 
defined in a varied number of ways including the number of employees, value of 
intermediate inputs and total sales. Taymaz and Saatci (1997) define size as the 
number of employees of a firm and find a significant positive relationship between 
the logarithm of firm size variable and efficiency in two sectors (cement and motor 
vehicle) but not in the textile sector. In their study of a panel of Turkish 
manufacturing firms they also demonstrate greater variation among efficiency 
estimate for small firms compared to their larger competitors. This confirms the fact 
that business failure and turnover for small firms tends to be higher. 
Age has normally been hypothesised to entail a positive effect due to benefits of 
greater experience and establishing stronger industrial linkages. Some studies 
demonstrate a U-shaped relation especially for firms entering a new market where 
they initially tend to react to the change and gradually manage to favour better modes 
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of production. Often the variable used is a simple count measure representing the 
number of operating time periods. However, in some instances a dummy approach of 
operation beyond a certain year has also been implemented to emphasise a certain 
structural age related notion (He and Su, 2012). 
Other factors such as energy, advertising, R&D and communications spending are 
used to accommodate for firm or product characteristic and business strategy of the 
units. Usually, these variables are defined as intensities, i.e. the share of each of 
above components in total costs or sales of that firm. 
If a reasonable number of firms being studied have more than one plant one can 
hypothesize a relationship between having multiple plants versus having one 
vertically integrated unit. Here it is expected for the multi-plant firms to be more 
technically efficient due to greater specialisation. Furthermore, provided that there 
are detailed plant-level data available, an intra-firm analysis of the above variables 
might be even more informative. For example the amount of investment or training 
expenditures based on different departments, 
Management Characteristics 
Studies focusing especially on small or medium enterprises sometimes suggest 
equivalent variables as those discussed above but with regards to the owners or 
manager characteristics of firms to explain firm efficiency results. Factors such as the 
age, experience, education level and foreign versus domestic origin of the managers 
are sometimes employed as determinants to examine the influence of such factors in 
productive performance of such units. 
Labour Union Power 
The greater the number of national or industry union members the greater the power 
of the unions on affecting industry’s firms on their behaviour often in contrast to the 
decision of the management. The orthodox literature generally suggests a negative 
relationship between efficiency and employees union participation. Again sometimes 
simple dummies regarding the presence of unions are used. Where data is available 
some employ the number of employees being a union member for each firm to 
examine the validity of their hypotheses. 
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Financial Characteristics 
Financial indicators are also sometimes used to explain the inefficiency of firms. 
These include the availability of cheap credit. This might be due to government 
intervention or the default risk of companies and various other aspects of a firm’s 
financial properties which might influence the availability of credit to it. For 
example, cheap credit often provided by governments often might lead to firms not 
investing appropriately and thus increase an element of slack in their production 
behaviour. Alternatively, other studies argue that financial constraints of firms such 
as high default risks can provide incentives for firms to become more technically 
efficient. Again, these factors have been expressed in terms of both dummy and 
intensity variables.  
International Activity 
Whether or not a firm engages in cross-border activity in different modes of 
production have also received interest in efficiency analysis. These trade modes of 
engagement include exports, foreign direct investment, licensing or any other form of 
international collaboration. The rationale of greater efficiency that firms tend to have 
to be able to compete in the international markets is the basis of the inclusion of 
related variables. Some studies only employ a dummy approach to explore the 
differential effect of the different categories. Alternatively the extent of international 
exposure or activity of a firm Receipt or purchase of licensing agreement, 
international technology knowledge transfer or intensity measures of export or FDI 
have been incorporated in some models. 
Geographical Location 
The location factor is also introduced to establish locational advantages such as 
benefits of better access to trading routes such as ports. In some studies it is 
attempted to establish the effect of regional government regulation or the contrast in 
their enforcement which might ultimately influence the efficiency of producers 
differently. Most studies use dummy variables and normally define them based on 
the official provincial or federal divisions of a country while others divide the 
country in different segments based on a prior hypothesis such as regions’ distances 
to sea ports.  
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Agglomeration 
There exists a wide literature on the reasons for economic clusters and the effects of 
agglomeration on productive performance of businesses. From the perspective of a 
firm a cluster has potential benefits that are associated with closer interaction of 
firms around a geographical core. This concentration is argued to encourage the flow 
and accumulation of innovative ideas and entrepreneurial activities (e.g. Sorenson 
and Audia, 2000). Agglomeration also allows the firms to specialise in production of 
certain goods which can contribute to other firms’ production and thus create a 
network of specialised firms. These linkages can encourage additional diffusion of 
knowledge and technology. Furthermore, the skilled labour is increasingly drawn to 
the cluster meaning that there is a positive effect on productivity and wages of these 
regions. On the other hand, there are also negative aspects (referred to as congestion 
effects) of agglomeration such as increase in pollution, social problems and land 
prices that can have negative effects on the region as a whole and the firms more 
specifically (Glaeser, 2010). 
From a more macro point of view, while the roots of the clustering notion can be 
traced back to ideas of Marshall (1890) regarding specialisations of trade in districts, 
it has been addressed more closely in recent studies. Hirschman (1975) talks about 
‘growth poles’ that countries start their development path from and maintains that 
through a subsequent trickling effect the rest of the economy would benefit from 
such poles. Furthermore, Romer (1986) incorporates increasing scale returns in his 
growth model by highlighting the role of knowledge as a capital good with non-
diminishing marginal productivity. Based on this, Krugman (1991) uses increasing 
returns to scale and shows that firms choose places where manufacturing labour is 
initially concentrated. Nevertheless, Krugman and Venables (1995) highlight the role 
of low transportation costs that can foster a core geographical concentration only to a 
certain threshold. In other words they claim that after transport and transaction costs 
become sufficiently low the forward-backward linkages in the cluster becomes less 
attractive and firms would even move out of the concentrated core. 
In empirical studies agglomeration effect is either captured through pure size 
variables or through a variable representing density of operations. For example, 
Handerson (1986) finds a positive relationship between industry size and industry 
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productivity in a study of statistical metropolitan areas in US and Brazil. 
Furthermore, Meyer-Stamer (1998) compares evidence from three industry clusters 
in South of Brazil and argues that clusters can facilitate change from one 
development path to another, especially in the face of crises. On the other hand, 
Ciccone and Hall (1996) use the variable measuring employment per unit of physical 
space and argue that such density variables are more appropriate in capturing 
agglomeration effects.  
Similarly, some empirical efficiency models use the latter type of variable definitions 
such as proportion of region output out of total country output to measures the effect 
of agglomeration. 
Inter-Firm Relations 
The inter firm relations in recent studies have been shown to influence the technical 
efficiency of firms in a positive manner. The positive effect is attributed to better 
transfer of knowledge and specialisation of production when subcontracting takes 
place. This networking is normally captured in subcontracting activities that firms 
engage in. This subcontracting can either take place in the use of inputs that a firm 
uses or the outputs. 
Taymaz and Saatci (1997) find a positive effect of subcontracting inputs in all three 
manufacturing sectors they study. However, they do not conclude a significant 
efficiency enhancement for the subcontractor firm itself or for firms that subcontract 
outputs. Thus, they suggest that the inter-relatedness of firms seems to be beneficial 
in the above context. 
Market Structure and Government Regulation 
Clearly, the environment in which the firms operate in is also an important indicator 
of how productive the production performance of firms is. For instance, the extent of 
market power that a firm may possess and consequently the degree of monopoly in a 
given sector can have an important explanatory power of the efficiency that this firm 
displays. This can be captured by the firm’s share of total market sales. 
Furthermore, the extent of government intervention can also have important 
explanatory power on firms’ efficiency scores. These include the different amount of 
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direct and sometimes indirect subsidies that is provided to firms. Moreover, the 
extent of trade barriers such as import or export tariffs and quotas might impact the 
production behaviour. Where there is disparity of regulations that the government 
enforces due to different laws in different states or provinces the geographical 
characteristic of a firm can provide explanation on firm performance. For example, 
the extent to which pollution regulations are enforced (e.g. inspections or other 
monitoring means) might be different across states and thus this might influence the 
production behaviour of units differently. 
It is clear from the above passage that there may be overlaps in the variables used in 
each category above and depending on the context and the way variables are defined 
a different efficiency explanation can be hypothesised. 
8.3 Efficiency Determinants of Iran 
We have discussed the recent trends in the Iranian economy and more specifically in 
the manufacturing sector in the previous chapters. On this basis, a number of 
potentially important determinants of efficiency are proposed for Iranian 
manufacturing production in the proceeding paragraphs. It is clear that due to the 
context many of these factors are either directly or indirectly related to the role that 
the state or government plays. Hence, we will group our determinants in terms of 
those that are determined to a great extent by the government and those that are not. 
8.3.1 State Related Factors 
One of the important factors in the case of Iranian industries is the type of ownership 
of firms. It is possible that this factor might explain disparities among firms. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, the ongoing protection and special treatment that 
public firms enjoy in various forms might contribute to them being less motivated in 
achieving improvements in the efficiency of their production processes. As discussed 
in  Chapter 3, the influence of the state is even more important yet less transparent in 
the case of the bonyads or foundations. Often due to the large size of their operations 
they might influence other firms that operate in the same sector. 
Subsidies can also possess an important role further showing the effect of 
government policies on the production of firms. It is important to see if, for example, 
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subsidies levied on inputs and energy have incentivised firms to be dependent on 
these and thus be less technically efficient. 
Trade barriers such as tariffs have always been imposed throughout the majority of 
the industrialisation history of Iran. It potentially has influenced the performance of 
firms in different aspects. First, import barriers undermine their competitiveness by 
protecting domestic firms from products of more efficient firms outside the country. 
Furthermore, any government policy that can restrict the import of intermediary 
goods (e.g. choice of exchange rate regime), which the manufacturing sectors heavily 
depend on, can strongly shape firms decisions. Additionally, the government in 
various instances has enforced export restrictions which again can equally reduce the 
incentives for firms to choose more efficient means of production needed to compete 
at global scale. 
8.3.2 Other factors 
Apart from the above state related factors there are some determinants that are 
primarily based on operational aspects of each firm. It is reasonable to assume that 
larger firms tend to be better organised and equipped in monitoring their 
performance and thus are expected to have higher levels of efficiency. These firms 
tend to have established wider economic ties to other firms and can utilise better 
production processes such as more advanced machinery and better quality control 
practices. This should be an important factor in the Iranian context. 
The age-efficiency relationship might also be an indicator of how experience and the 
greater history of a firm in the business might explain better decisions in line with 
optimal production. Furthermore, location related factors discussed above both in 
terms of agglomeration or other geographic characteristics can help explain 
efficiency. 
Finally, other strategic characteristics of firms such as interrelatedness with other 
firms, R&D intensity and export intensity can also be important factors. 
Other factors such as the effect of labour unions in the technical efficiency of firms 
seem less plausible in the case of Iran. Rather than a technical aspect, this lack of 
relevance of these institutions has been mainly political. In the contemporary history 
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of Iran (both pre and post revolution) trade unions have not been really allowed to 
operate freely and influence manufacturing policy due to political and security 
concerns.  
8.3.3 Variable Definition and Availability 
In the dataset ownership is defined broadly and does not include any information on 
the foundations. As we observed in the previous chapter there is indication that some 
bonyad firms are classified as private in the data and thus those labelled as public are 
those SOEs that their majority shares are owned by state institutions including the 
government. It will be attempted to use a dummy variable representing public firms 
to assess whether there is a considerable difference between public and non-public 
sector. 
There is no direct data on the amount of subsidies in the data. However, one of the 
biggest sources of subsidies is in the form of subsidies on fuel. Thus, the inclusion of 
a fuel intensity variable defined as relative share of fuel expenditure to total input 
value can act as a good indicator of the effect of fuel subsidies on the performance of 
more fuel-intensive production.  
In the absence of data on tariff payments by firms we look at export intensity of 
firms to capture the effect of additional international market exposure on the 
production efficiency of these firms. We define this variable as the ratio of exports 
(in Rials) to total sales of exporting firms. 
Firm size will be measured in terms of the natural logarithm of the number of total 
employees. Additionally, the effect of monopoly power of a firm and thus the 
amount of competition it faces can increase incentives to achieve better efficiency. 
This effect in the model will be proxied by the relative share of each firm’s sales in 
total two-digit ISIC sector sales that it operates in. 
Furthermore, the importance of the composition of the labour force will be examined 
via a ratio of number of production labour to total employees. This can partly 
represent the effect of additional management and more complex production on 
performance of firms. Another aspect of type of production is the capital labour ratio. 
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We also use this variable to explain the relative importance of firms’ efficiency 
scores according to the level of their capital intensiveness. 
There is no data on firm age thus it is not included. Location dummies are suggested 
based on Iran’s provinces we will compare the two main hubs of manufacturing, 
Tehran and Esfahan against all other provinces. This will capture any possible effects 
of agglomeration of industries. Finally R&D intensity will be defined as the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to total input value.  
8.4 Estimation 
In the first instance a simple two-staged estimation will be conducted. We conducted 
the first stage in the previous chapter and obtained firm-specific inefficiency 
estimates from the Translog specification with half-normal distribution. Here for the 
second stage, the inefficiency regression is estimated by regressing the estimates 
from stage one on the chosen efficiency determinants in order to identify the 
significant sources of technical efficiency.  
As it has been discussed in the estimation theory chapter, the two-stage estimation 
suffers from econometric problems which might cause both regressions to have 
biased estimates. Nevertheless, it will be useful to see if these results are 
considerably different form the simultaneous estimation of the two regressions which 
will also be carried out. For the single-stage estimation, the model of Battese and 
Coelli (1995), discussed in  Chapter 6, is implemented to simultaneously estimate the 
production frontier and also model the sources of firms’ heterogeneity. Under this 
setting the technical inefficiency component is hypothesized to follow a truncated 
normal distribution. Thus, each firm will have a unique mean which its distribution 
can be explained by a set of the determinant variables as below: 
 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖𝜹 + 𝑤𝑖 ( 8–1) 
Here 𝜇 is the mean of the inefficiency terms (𝑢𝑖), 𝑧𝑖 is a vector of determinants of 
inefficiency, 𝜹 is a vector of 𝑚 parameters to be estimated and 𝑤𝑖 is the random 
disturbance term following a truncated normal distribution with the truncation point 
of −𝑧𝑖𝜹 and a variance of 𝜎2. 
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8.5 Determinants Results 
8.5.1 Two-Stage Estimation 
The inefficiency regression below is estimated using OLS estimation. 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐+ 𝛼5𝐴𝑒ℎ𝐸𝑠𝑓 + 𝛼6𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐿𝑛𝐿+ 𝛼9𝐾𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 + 𝑒𝑖 ( 8–2) 
Here, 𝑢𝑖 is the inefficiency component of the error term that was estimated for each 
firm in  Chapter 7, 𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm is a 
public firm and 0 if the firm is a private or cooperative firm, 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡 is fuel 
intensity, 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 is the firm’s industry share, 𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 is the share of 
production labour to total labour of the firm, 𝐴𝑒ℎ𝐸𝑠𝑓 is a dummy equalling to one if 
the firm is in either Tehran or Esfahan provinces, 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 is export intensity and 
𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑡 is R&D intensity. Finally, 𝐿𝑛𝐿 and 𝐾𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 are the size and capital labour 
ratio variables as described earlier. 
Below the result of the estimation is given in Table  8–1. The results suggest that 
apart from 𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑡 and 𝐿𝑛𝐿 all other determinants seem to have a statistically 
significant role in explaining how far away firms are from the frontier13.  
Looking closer at the signs of the coefficients some variables have the expected 
signs. The estimation suggests evidence for positive effect of the public ownership 
dummy on inefficiency or in other words a negative relationship with efficiency. The 
greater the relative usage of subsidised fuel the less efficient the firms tend to be. 
Also, the more export oriented the firm the more efficient it seems to be. Finally, as 
the ratio of production workers to total employees of a firm rises, the firms’ technical 
efficiency seems to fall. 
However, the other three factors show relationships that were not expected in the 
first instance. Interestingly, the positive effect of agglomeration on efficiency some 
extent seems to be rejected. We discussed possible causes of this when we were 
analysing the initial estimates in the previous chapter. The negative sign of the 
                                                 
13 Dropping both variables does not make any considerable change in the size or significance of other 
estimates. 
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𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 variable suggests that as firms are a bigger player in the industry they 
tend to be more technically efficient. Also, the higher the capital-labour ratio the less 
efficient the firm tends to be. This might be an indication of the low returns to capital 
investments, due to factors such as low capital utilisation, in Iran and more generally 
the inefficiency of investments in the economy. Nevertheless, as mentioned this 
procedure could be affecting the results seen here. Thus, we reserve the final 
interpretation of the determinants to the single-stage estimates presented below. 
Table  8–1 – Second Stage Regression of Inefficiency Determinants and Variable Summary 
Statistics. 
 Inefficiency Model Variable Summary 
Variable Parameter 
estimate (𝜶�𝑳) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Max. 
𝑳𝑳𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄  0.346* 0.009    
𝑳𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒊𝑳  0.028* 0.007   1 
𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑳𝒊𝒄𝒄  0.023*** 0.013 0.035 0.089 0.980 
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒄𝑰𝒄𝑰𝑰  -0.485* 0.110 0.001 0.010 0.856 
𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑳𝑰𝒄𝒄𝒊𝑳  0.056* 0.010 0.790 0.120 1 
𝑻𝑰𝑰𝑭𝒄𝑻  0.011* 0.002   1 
𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑻𝒊𝒄𝒄  -0.042* 0.008 0.030 0.141 1 
𝑬𝑰𝒊𝒄𝒄  0.001 0.014 0.005 0.085 5.486 
𝑳𝒄𝑳  -0.00086 0.00119 3.544 0.990 8.811 
𝑳𝑳𝑰𝒄𝒄𝒊𝑳  0.00021* 0.00005 15.672 25.458 1017.853 
R2 0.0107     
Obs. 12082     
Notes: * and ***indicates significance at 1% and 10% levels of significance. 
8.5.2 Single-Stage Estimation 
In this estimation procedure we will incorporate the same determinant variables used 
in the two stage procedure. The results are based on the Translog production frontier 
with inefficiency model. This is because similar to the restrictions test in previous 
chapter the Cobb-Douglas production specification was also estimated but was 
rejected in favour of the Translog specification with a p-value of less than 0.001.  
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Table  8–2 Final Model Estimation Results, Battese and Coelli (1995) Procedure. 
Variable Parameter Estimate Estimate Standard 
Error 
Frontier Model 
 
   
𝑳𝑳𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 𝛽0 8.610* 1.559 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 𝛽1 1.056* 0.143 
𝑳𝑳 𝛽2 -0.708* 0.126 (𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳)𝟐 𝛽3 0.002 0.012 (𝑳𝑳)𝟐 𝛽4 0.052* 0.010 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 × 𝑳𝑳 
 
 
𝛽5 -0.013 0.010 
Inefficiency Model 
 
   
𝑪𝑳𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 𝛿0 -0.503 0.335 
𝑳𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒊𝑳 𝛿1 0.401* 0.098 
𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑳𝒊𝒄𝒄 𝛿2 0.251 0.263 
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒄𝑰𝒄𝑰𝑰 𝛿3 -2.309 5.209 
𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑳𝑰𝒄𝒄𝒊𝑳 𝛿4 0.985* 0.241 
𝑻𝑰𝑰𝑭𝒄𝑻 𝛿5 0.124** 0.057 
𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑻𝒊𝒄𝒄 𝛿6 -0.338** 0.159 
𝑬𝑰𝒊𝒄𝒄 𝛿7 0.266* 0.097 
𝑳𝒄𝑳 𝛿8 -0.150* 0.038 
𝑳𝑳𝑰𝒄𝒄𝒊𝑳 
 
 
𝛿9 0.00254* 0.00032 
Other Parameters 
 
   
𝝈𝒄
𝟐 = 𝝈𝟐 + 𝝈𝒗𝟐  0.4343* 0.022 
𝜸 = 𝝈𝟐/(𝝈𝒖𝟐 + 𝝈𝒗𝟐 )  0.8459* 0.040 
Log-Likelihood  -15,039.045  
LR-test for presence 
of inefficiency 
 211.420  
    
Notes: *, ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% levels of significance (Model estimated using 
NLOGIT5 program). 
Table  8–2 presents the results of the two components of the model. Clearly, the 
estimated coefficients of the frontier model are not identical to the results in the 
previous chapter (Table  7–5) however, they are fairly similar. Also, since the frontier 
estimated is slightly different the estimated efficiencies tend to be different from the 
previous chapter’s model. As Table  8–3 suggests the overall mean efficiency is lower 
by approximately 5% compared to the half-normal model in Table  7–6 in the 
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previous chapter. It is important to remember that part of this disparity is obviously 
due to the assumption of a truncated normal distribution for the inefficiency 
component in the frontier model and part of this is due to the simultaneous inclusion 
of the determinants. 
The comparison of the average technical efficiency with a few other studies can 
highlight the relative weak performance of Iranian manufacturing. Taymaz and 
Saatci (1997) find an average technical efficiency of above 80% in four Turkish 
manufacturing sectors for the period 1988 to 1992. Hossain and Karunaratne (2004) 
find an average efficiency of around 70% in the case of Bangladesh manufacturing 
sector. Lundvall and Battese (2000) in a study of four Kenyan manufacturing sectors 
find the smallest mean of 68% for the wood industries versus 80% for the metal 
sector. Nevertheless, in a study a panel sample of Fortune 500 two-thirds of which 
were manufacturers, by Shao and Lin (2001) find an average technical efficiency 
estimate of around 84% for the pooled version of their model. 
The results for the inefficiency part of the model are also slightly different to those 
obtained by the two-stage method. Most notably, the two coefficients for 𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑡 and 
𝐿𝑛𝐿 that were previously insignificant have replaced two other coefficients for 
𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡 and 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 that had been significant. The relationship between the size 
and industry share variables can partly explain at least half of the problem here. We 
can see this relationship even in two-stage procedure. If we drop the industry share 
variable and replace it with the firm size variable we see that the p-value of the 
significance of 𝐿𝑛𝐿 drastically improves to a lower value of 12.8% (down from 
47.1%) in the model in Table  8–1.  
Table  8–3 Summary of Overall Efficiency Estimates in Iranian manufacturing (tebcsi2)14. 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Number of 
Observations 
0.657 0.099 0.065 0.930 13,015 
                                                 
14 The letters in the ‘tebcsi2’ name stand for: ‘te’ for technical efficiency, ‘bc’ for Battese and Coelli 
estimation, ‘si’ for simultaneous estimation and 2 stands for the second model i.e. the Translog 
frontier. 
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A summary of the results can be expressed in the following descriptive statement for 
a hypothetical firm: a large private firm that has a lower share of its labour directly 
engaged in production, situated outside Tehran or Esfahan and exports a labour 
intensive product with minimum R&D expense is likely to be a very technically 
efficient firm in Iranian manufacturing in 2007. 
The two determinants that have shown a significant negative effect on inefficiency 
and therefore a positive relationship with efficiency itself are the size and export 
intensity variables. These confirm the hypothesis that bigger firms tend to benefit 
from their size and produce in a more efficient manner. Furthermore, the experience 
of engaging in cross-border activity via exports seems to help firms become more 
efficient due to stronger competition and interaction with better and alternative 
production processes. 
On the other hand, the estimates suggest that firms which are public tend to be less 
efficient. This provides additional evidence on the inefficient characteristic of SOEs’ 
operations in Iranian manufacturing. As discussed in the previous chapter we can 
confirm that overstaffing or other structural problems in these firms have not only 
misallocated oil revenues but also have encouraged poor technical efficiency in 
production. Yet the negative coefficient for the firm size variable shows that larger 
firms have been able to use greater specialisation to their advantage. 
That large but private firms tend to be more efficient is reminiscent of firms such as 
the bonyads. This can mean that the flexibility of such firms in imports, capitalisation 
and choice of more modern machinery compared to the average firm through 
bypassing various bureaucratic obstacles and red tapes has allowed these 
conglomerates in pursuit of better returns to opt for more technical efficient 
production processes. Such benefits for these firms come at the expense of and 
marginalisation of other smaller businesses and thus do not help improve the 
situation of the less-privileged private counterparts. These issues warrant further 
investigation which unfortunately due to limited data on these firms is a rather 
tedious task. 
The negative effect of firms being situated in provinces such as Tehran or Esfahan is 
very important in terms of the Iranian context. Our finding is contrary to the 
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discussion on the linkage and spillover benefits of agglomeration suggested in the 
literature (see  Chapter 7) and thus warrants further research to clarify the underlying 
reasons for such a result. Nevertheless, this potentially highlights a fundamental 
problem in the industrial strategy of Iranian manufacturing. It can be translated as a 
mismanagement of oil revenues in that the vast amounts of investments in expanding 
the production base has not led to strong linkages and cross-firm cooperation. Thus, 
the potential benefits of a more organic manufacturing sector are yet to be realised. 
Our evidence of positive effects of export activity shows that the exposure to 
international markets leaves little option for firms to attempt to reduce their distance 
from the efficient industry frontier. Moreover, this result can be generalised in the 
broader context of competitiveness. It highlights the positive benefits from the 
pursuit of gradual adjustment of policies towards increasing the competitiveness of 
domestic firms domestically and then at the international level. 
The significant positive coefficients for production labour share and capital labour 
ratio variables suggest that the type of industry is an important determinant in 
technical efficiency performance. As discussed earlier the negative effect of capital 
intensive firms on their performance supports the hypothesis of low efficiency of 
investment in Iran. The importance of management and a more dynamic production 
structure can explain the negative effect of greater 𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 on efficiency. 
The underlying reason for the negative effect of R&D expenditure by firms seems 
less clear. Some studies point to the ‘disruptive’ aspect of the adjustments necessary 
for new technologies as an explanation for negative R&D effect (Bower and 
Christensen, 1995). However, a more valid explanation for Iran might be the fact that 
firms engage in R&D due to other incentives such as access to loans or help provided 
by the government which has requirements on R&D expenditure by these firms. 
Regardless, this result suggests that the quality of firms R&D operations has not been 
satisfactory and thus has not been conducive to performance improvements. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reviewed the main determinants of technical efficiency and 
explored the applied method of definition of such determinants. Based on this review 
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we narrowed down these determinants to a number of important variables in the case 
of Iran. We identified ownership, subsidies and trade openness as important 
indicators which are directly related to the state presence in the economy. Other 
factors including firm size, agglomeration and LBD effects were indicated as 
important determinants. These actors while are mainly firm related matters can also 
be influenced by government policy.  
Based on the data available to us we defined nine determinants to be incorporated in 
to our efficiency estimation procedures. We first implemented the two-stage 
estimation method. Having carried out the first stage in  Chapter 7 we used those 
results and regressed our inefficiency terms on the list of determinants. Acting as an 
initial prototype model it presented us with significant results for a number of our 
hypothesised relationships.  
Thus, in order to have a model which is more econometrically robust we 
implemented the single-stage estimation method of Battese and Coelli. (1995).Our 
new adjusted efficiency estimates for 2007 suggest that the manufacturing firms are 
on average performing at 66% of the hypothesised frontier. This shows a sizable 
inefficiency in the average manufacturing firm. Comparing the results with findings 
for other countries highlights the extent the production structure is behind even low 
income countries such as Bangladesh. 
The results of the inefficiency model suggest that seven of the determinants have a 
statistically significant effect on firms’ technical efficiency. We have shown that 
factors such as exports and size have a positive role in improving the productive 
performance of manufacturing firms. On the other hand public ownership and greater 
concentration of industries have had negative effects.  
Our findings are micro-level evidence in support of our  Chapter 5 estimates of low or 
negative overall productivity growth (TFP) trend and hence overall growth especially 
in the recent post-revolutionary phase of Iran’s economy. As discussed in the 
previous section, inconsistent policy making and mismanagement of oil income has 
influenced the structure of production in a negative manner. This has even led to 
some determinants such as greater geographic concentration of production has 
ironically acted as a deterrent to productive efficiency.   
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we provide a summary of the key findings of our research in the 
preceding chapters. We provide a final conclusion of our research. We will reflect on 
the significance of our approach and also discuss its limitations. After discussing 
these issues, we will identify the important directions for further research in this 
field. 
9.2 Research Summary 
The aim of this research has been to provide an alternative examination of the role of 
oil income in the development trajectory of Iran, by focusing on efficiency aspects of 
oil economies at the microeconomic level. 
In  Chapter 2 we reviewed the literature on natural resources and economic 
development. First, we discussed the Dutch Disease literature. We argued that such 
models mainly focus on the misallocation of resources at the sectoral level and rely 
on extremely restrictive assumptions. For instance, the assumptions of full 
employment and perfect factor markets implied in such models are far from the 
experience of oil exporters with large populations such as Iran. Furthermore, the 
resource effect is generally negligible for resources such as oil. We next reviewed the 
Resource Curse literature and concluded that this literature which is by and large 
based on empirical models with weak theoretical rationales and suffer from 
econometric problems such as omission of important variables and endogeneity bias. 
Furthermore, the models used in this research are rather ad-hoc and overgeneralise 
the results for a cross-section of non-homogenous countries. However, the biggest 
drawback of these models is the fact that they do not conform to the experience of 
oil-rich countries. The Rentier State literature provides a plausible argument in 
highlighting the context specific dynamics of the effect of natural resources in the 
political structure and ultimately the economic growth of the economy. Nonetheless, 
it falls short of an adequate paradigm that can measure and explain the experience of 
resource-abundant countries in an analytical manner. We concluded that an important 
limitation of the literature is that it does not explain the long-term effects of oil 
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revenues in the productive sectors. The empirical evidence shows that it is not the 
lack of investment, but rather the low efficiency of investment which distinguishes 
the oil economies. We suggested that looking at the technical efficiency of 
production can help explain the deeper embedded adverse effects of overdependence 
on oil revenues. 
In  Chapter 3 we looked at the political structure of Iran and concluded that the 
duality in power distribution breeds factionalism and conflict of interest. Looking at 
the modern history of Iran we confirmed the numerous instances of power struggle 
throughout the history of the Islamic republic. The economic implications of the 
1979 Revolution were discussed based on the three dominant economic institutions. 
We argued that wide scale nationalisations that happened after the revolution led to a 
bloated public sector and were dependent on various subsidies. Furthermore, we saw 
that the emergence of a semi-public sector which enjoys monopolistic profits due to 
various subsidies and privileges has further marginalised the private sector and 
hindered attempts of privatisation of SOEs. We showed that while the relative size of 
some of these bonyads in the recent years is not as big as some earlier estimates 
suggest, their direct and indirect use of oil revenues have had negative effects for 
their private counterparts. Furthermore, the traditional merchants have also used their 
influence especially in imports to maximise their own benefits. We concluded that 
these unique elements of the Iranian political economic structure all play an 
important role in explaining the productive performance of Iran in light of its oil 
revenues. 
In  Chapter 4 we looked at the experience of Iran’s economy and investigated the 
adequacy of the theoretical frameworks discussed in  Chapter 2 in explaining the 
impact of oil on economic growth. We demonstrated a strong positive correlation 
between GDP growth and oil revenue growth. We also showed that manufacturing 
grows and contracts simultaneously as the oil revenues increase and decrease. We 
argued this was a result that Dutch Disease did not explain since the assumption of 
small open economy of the framework did not hold due to semi-non tradable nature 
of the protected manufacturing sector. To explain the reason for the positive 
relationship between oil and manufacturing growth we looked at the profitability of 
manufacturing sector and showed that the markup of manufacturing has not fallen 
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even when labour productivity decreased and wage shares stayed relatively stagnant. 
We showed that this is only possible through the provision of subsidised 
intermediary goods by the state. We also looked at the broader consequence of such 
policies on the competitiveness of Iranian production and compared it with the 
export promotion success of Korea and Turkey. As an example we compared the 
energy efficiency of Iran with these countries and saw a deteriorating situation in 
Iran. We concluded this chapter with the need for an examination of overall 
productivity. 
We started  Chapter 5 by exploring the literature on productivity estimation. We then 
obtained the estimates of Iran’s TFP growth for the period between 1966 and 2007. 
Our results showed that during this period TFP in Iran fell by an average of 2.7% 
annually. When we compare the pre and post revolution period we see that the 
productivity in the pre-revolutionary phase was increasing whereas even in the post 
war period in Islamic republic we see a 1.24% drop on an annual basis in this index. 
This shows that the production environment after the revolution has not been 
conducive to strong growth. Furthermore, we estimate the TFP of Korea and Turkey 
and see the strong contribution of TFP in these countries’ strong economic growth 
trends. We clarify part of this by focusing on the industrial sector and show that both 
in terms of GDP share and employment share this sector is crucial to the growth of 
the economy. Analysing the manufacturing sector, we demonstrate a structural shift 
towards heavy industries. But, we show that this shift is based on support of the 
government confirming our findings in  Chapter 4 when we looked at manufacturing 
collectively. We concluded at the end of this chapter that in line with our theoretical 
framework in  Chapter 2 we can use technical efficiency analysis to explain the 
dismal productivity trend as a result of mismanagement of oil revenue.  
 Chapter 6 dealt with the main methodologies of estimating technical efficiency. We 
concluded that due to better statistical properties of the SFA method and the 
conformity with the estimation of TFP in the previous chapter it was more 
appropriate in our analysis than the linear programming models. We used this 
approach in  Chapter 7 and obtained initial estimates of Iran’s manufacturing 
efficiency in 2007 which was around 70% for the entire sample. We concluded that 
this highlights the big distance between the average firm’s position and the frontier. 
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We categorised the firms and found considerable variation in their efficiency based 
on their industry, location, ownership, firm size and their export activity. We 
concluded that these factors are potential determinants of technical efficiency.  
In  Chapter 8 we introduced our final model using a list of potentially relevant 
determinants of technical efficiency which can be created based on our dataset. Our 
final efficiency estimates showed that when we simultaneously control for the effect 
of these determinants, the average technical efficiency of the sample decreases to 
66%. All determinants, apart from industry share and fuel intensity, are shown to 
have a significant effect on the technical efficiency of producers. We found evidence 
that public ownership, greater ratio of production labour to total employees, 
agglomeration, research intensity and capital-labour ratio have a negative impact on 
technical efficiency. On the other hand, export intensity and size have a positive 
effect on the firms’ production performance. The most important variables for the 
purpose of our research are ownership, agglomeration and exports. The ownership 
variable confirms the discussion in  Chapter 3 that public firms tend to be less 
efficient producers. This explains why such firms are truly less profitable and rely 
heavily on oil income to survive. The implication of our conclusion that 
manufacturing firms inside Tehran and Esfahan provinces, despite housing 32% of 
all firms in our sample, highlights the mismanagement of economic policies to the 
extent that a potentially enhancing factor has had the opposite effect. Finally, the 
positive contribution of exports shows that the oil income’s true potential 
contribution to manufacturing should be towards measures of boosting their 
competitiveness. 
9.3 Contributions  
This research is based on a synthesis of two major economic literatures. By bridging 
the gap between the economic growth and natural resource literature it has provided 
an alternative approach to explain the deeper effects of inappropriate use of oil 
revenues.  
The framework of our analysis is consistent across different levels of aggregation as 
we have covered different levels of the Iranian economy. In this light, it can be 
interpreted as microeconometric approach that can answer the bigger macro 
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questions in the economy in a consistent manner. Similarly, it allows for an 
explanation of the micro consequences of macro policy making. 
Part of our work can be considered as a contribution to the growth and productivity 
literature in Iran on its own. We constructed a new TFP growth series for Iran and 
conducted a cross-country comparison within a consistent framework with two other 
countries. For this purpose we have constructed a new capital stock series for the 
Iranian economy at macro level.  
Furthermore, to our knowledge, the technical efficiency estimates obtained here are 
the most comprehensive attempt, both methodologically and in terms of using the 
most recent data in the context of the Iranian economy. 
9.4 Policy Implications 
As mentioned above, the absence of a close assessment of productive efficiency in 
the Iranian economy had been long overdue partly due to lack of appropriate data. 
Thus, there are important policy implications from the findings of this study. This 
research is also a timely analysis of the Iranian economy especially in the view of the 
current economic and political developments in Iran. The new administration of 
President Rohani has promised to embrace more rational economic policies. There 
are early signs of such actions in the government’s attempts to follow a more 
disciplined annual budget plans and there are already signs of significant reductions 
in the inflation rates down to around 21% in the middle of 2014 (CBI, 2014c). On the 
other hand, the ongoing global economic crisis and the downward spiral of oil prices 
in the final months of 2014 will undoubtedly have important results for oil dependent 
countries such as Iran. Our research finding of average technical efficiency of around 
66% highlights the necessity of undertaking policies that can address these embedded 
inefficiencies especially in the face of challenges such as falling oil prices and the 
ongoing US-EU sanctions implemented against the Iranian economy.   
Our analysis provided an explanation of how political economic structure of Iran has 
facilitated poor productive performance in its manufacturing production. Most 
noticeably the negative effect of public ownership on efficiency scores presents a 
very clear direction for economic and industrial policy. Though, this does not imply 
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the abolishment of all public production, it highlights the need for a better and more 
transparent privatisation implementation strategy. As discussed due to the strong 
influence of public and semi-public institutions this would require bold decisions to 
resist the pressure of such entities.   
Our findings also highlight the need for a more comprehensive export promotion 
strategy in the manufacturing sector. The main objective of such policies should 
ultimately be the improvement of the domestic producers’ competitiveness in line 
with the experience of East Asian growth strategy. An important step in this direction 
is to improve economic infrastructures such as adequate transportation, energy and 
communications. Such policies can then be complemented through a gradual process 
of increased openness and entry of more competitive foreign firms. Encouraging 
exports can additionally improve the dependence of the country on oil as the major 
source of foreign exchange. 
The result of better productive performance in larger firms also provides evidence for 
implication of strategies that encourage utilisation of scale economies. The benefits 
of larger firms also arise from acquisition of better machinery and quality control 
practices. 
Our framework also provides a benchmark for the implementation of economic 
diversification. Our estimates either based on type of industry or the province can 
provide an eye-opening assessment on the inter-industry and inter-regional 
disparities. For example, as we discussed above the negative effect of firms being 
located in the two biggest provinces emphasises the need for addressing in previous 
industry policies and guide the way for future decision-making. Therefore, arriving at 
a more diversified economy allows a quicker transition to a more robust economy as 
a whole to external shocks such as sanctions. 
9.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
From a theoretical point of view this research has addressed the growth of Iran which 
contributes to explaining part of the wider development question. While the 
incorporation of the political economic factors partly proxies social, cultural and 
historical aspects of the country it does not capture their full effects and thus does not 
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intend to do so. For instance, an important question that was not assessed in this 
research is the presence of any meaningful welfare effect arising from better and 
more efficient production. It is important to assess the relative extent that the current 
productive performance of sectors such as manufacturing might entail for the 
inequality index of the economy. A potential causal relationship between technical 
efficiency in a given sector or industry and the livelihood of the lower income deciles 
could be an important piece of evidence that can have even greater policy 
implications. 
A number of limitations of this research are due to the absence of appropriate data in 
the micro dataset. The lack of an identifying variable that would allow us to identify 
each firm uniquely rules out any possibility of analysing technical efficiency over 
time. This also means that we cannot undertake a dissection of productivity change 
to its components that involve time, such as technological progress, in a systematic 
manner. Furthermore, despite presenting possible evidence on channels through 
which the impact of bonyads can be explained, we highlight the need for identifiers 
of these institutions in a more focused analysis. This would help clarify the true 
performance of these foundations as producers and their impact on the privately 
owned firms that compete with them. 
In this research we have focused on the role of manufacturing sector. It seems 
necessary to conduct efficiency analyses in other sectors such as services and 
agriculture. Such studies can complement our findings in providing a more holistic 
picture but also address the specific characteristics and challenges of each sector. 
From a methodological point of view, future work can use alternative efficiency 
estimation methodologies such as DEA to conduct the same research and compare 
the results to our findings. Clearly, our parametric restrictions influence the estimates 
to a great extent. Moreover, in our research we have only looked at technical 
efficiency. Prospective research can extend our approach and simultaneously 
incorporate technical and allocative efficiency in their framework and assess the 
significance of their different methodology. 
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Another fruitful exercise would be to apply our framework to a number of other oil 
economies and compare the results between these cases to see whether a more 
general pattern can be observed despite path dependencies of each country. 
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 IRMF Annual Accounts Appendix 1.
In Table A and Table B (Below) we have used data from the four annual reports 
available on the website of IRMF (IRMF, 2014a). The Product Price Index column is 
calculated from the data on growth in IRMF’s products’ prices. Initially the index 
was calculated with a base year of 2005 but later the base year has been changed to 
2008 in order to conform to the base year used in the reports. The Manufacturing and 
Mining Output column represents IRMF’s total output in these sectors and is 
calculated by using the shares originally reported in the report multiplied by the Total 
Output column. Finally, the IRMF Share in Total Manufacturing and Mining column 
is the bonyad’s manufacturing and mining output value divided by the sum of 
manufacturing and mining output of the entire economy, reported in CBI (2014a). 
Table A. IRMF Performance Indicators. 
Year 
Output 
(2008 
prices) 
Product 
Price 
Index 
Total 
Output 
Manufacturing 
& Mining 
Output 
IRMF Share in Total 
Country 
Manufacturing and 
Mining 
2006 35 70.9 49.4 22.21 6.52% 
2007 41 84.0 48.8 19.39 4.93% 
2008 48 100.0 48 16.56 3.50% 
2009 56 107.1 52.3 15.74 3.10% 
2010 71 111.8 63.5 18.29 3.01% 
Source:  Based on CBI (2014a) and IRMF (2014a) 
Notes:  All output values are in thousands of billion Rials. 
Here we can see a gradual decreasing share of IRMF in the manufacturing and 
mining sectors of the economy. The additional cost and profit details of IRMF can be 
seen in Table B.  
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Table B. IRMF Cost and Profit Structure. 
Year Sales 
Wage 
Bill to 
Sales 
Total 
Employees 
Finished 
Price to 
Sales 
Operating 
Profit 
Total 
Investment 
2003 18      
2004 20      
2005 24      
2006 28 13.5% 34,912 79% 18%  
2007 40 10.8% 34,652 80% 15% 10 
2008 51 9% 33,806 75% 14% 18 
2009 60 8% 32,254 71% 21% 19 
2010 81 7.2% 34,471 70% 24% 20 
2011 105 6.5% 34,825 71% 21% 23 
2012 147 5.9% 36,231 70.8% 23% 27 
2013 204 5.2% 36,343 70.4% 24% 36 
Source:  IRMF (2014a). 
Notes:  Sales and investment values are in thousand billion Rials and employment in persons. 
The results suggest an impressive profit margin. The foundation’s reports attribute 
this increasing trend in investment and acquisitions of successful companies such as 
Irancell Telecommunication Company and Pak Diary Company and Glocozan 
Company in 2010 website itself. Nevertheless, in light of the removal of subsidies 
and the increase in the cost of production inputs for the average producer seems 
contradictory to this trend. The real explanation for this might be the preferential 
treatment that these organisations continue to receive from banks, cheap exchange 
rates and tax exemptions on top of the weakening of other competitors due to subsidy 
reform. 
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 Production, Exports and Price of Iranian Oil Appendix 2.
Figure A. Oil Production and Exports Annual Average Daily Quantities, 1971-2011. 
 
Source: IEA (2013). 
The increasing gap between production and export quantities highlights the growing 
domestic consumption of oil due to increasing population, increase general energy 
intensive usages and petrochemical production. 
Figure A also highlights the fact the production volume has never returned to the 
peak of six million barrels per day in the 1970s. This highlights the problems the 
country has faced in investments in oil projects due to US sanctions preventing 
foreign firms entering the Iranian projects. Furthermore the conditions of the 
buyback contracts have not been enough of an incentive for companies to think about 
bypassing these limitations. 
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Table A. Iranian Light and Heavy Crude Oil Prices post-1980 (USD per barrel). 
Year Iran Light Iran Heavy Year Iran Light Iran Heavy 
1980 34.68 32.99 2009 60.19 60.46 
1981 38.61 38.13 2010 78.1 77.36 
1982 32.91 31.24 2011 109.66 106.88 
1983 30.21 29.2    
1984 29.11 28.64    
1985 27.8 27.24    
1986 14.99 15.05    
1987 18.32 17.98    
1988 14.79 14.34    
1989 17.14 16.77    
1990 22.8 20.48    
1991 19.58 17.87    
1992 18.56 17.51    
1993 16.18 15.2    
1994 15.59 14.92    
1995 16.91 16.63    
1996 19.89 19.55    
1997 19.02 18.26    
1998 12.12 11.64    
1999 16.25 16.01    
2000 27.19 26.95    
2001 23.83 23.37    
2002 23.94 23.7    
2003 27.82 27.2    
2004 35.12 33.74    
2005 49.41 47.3    
2006 62.07 60.04    
2007 67.33 67.08    
2008 95.46 96.63    
Source: IEA (2012).  
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 Calculations of Manufacturing Real Wages, Product Wages and Appendix 3.
Labour Productivity 
The data for Figure  4–4, Figure  4–5, Figure  4–6, Figure  4–7 and Figure  4–8 are 
extracted from UNIDO (2013), World Bank (2013) and CBI (2013). In this appendix 
we provide a brief summary on how these were calculated. The UNIDO Indstat2 
database provides data on aggregate manufacturing sector of firms with more than 10 
employees. It provides data on output, employees, wages, etc. CBI (2013) is the 
national accounts dataset and World Bank (2013) is the bank’s World development 
indicators database. 
Figure  4–4: Wage bill (𝑊. 𝐿) in Rials, output value, (𝑂. 𝐿) in Rials and 
consequently their ratio is calculated based on data from the UNIDO database. The 
database does not cover the year 1978, the year of the revolution, thus it has been left 
as a missing data point in the graphs using UNIDO data. 
Figure  4–5: Manufacturing labour productivity is measured as constant output per 
employee. Nominal output and employee are obtained from UNIDO. The price index 
for deflating the nominal manufacturing output from data provided in CBI (2013) 
implicitly via dividing nominal output to constant 2004 output. The base year for the 
price series is subsequently changed to 2005 to conform to the next table. 
We calculated labour productivity in value-added per employee terms with relatively 
similar outcome (see below) and thus in order for our graph to conform to the 
equation we kept the output per worker definition. 
Figure A. Value-Added per Employee in Iran’s Manufacturing Sector (2005=100). 
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Figure  4–6: Product wage is obtained by deflating average annual money wages 
with manufacturing price index. Average money wage is calculated by dividing 
wage-bill (𝑊. 𝐿) by total employees (𝐿) which are both obtained from UNIDO 
(2013). For creating the real wage series, average money wages are deflated by 
Consumer Price Index obtained from World Bank (2013). 
Figure  4–7: Intermediate input value is obtained by subtracting output value from 
value-added given in Indstat2. Next, the share is calculated by dividing intermediate 
input value to total output value. 
Figure  4–8: The profit markup is simply calculated as a residual after rearranging 
Equation ( 4–3) in the below manner: 
 
𝜋 = 1
�
𝑊
𝑃
𝑂
𝐿
+ 𝑝𝑚.𝑚𝑃.𝑂 � − 1 (1) 
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 Variable Definition and Tables - Iran’s TFP Estimation  Appendix 4.
Capital Stock: 
As discussed the capital stock series is calculated based on the conventional 
perpetual inventory method shown in Equation ( 5–5). The calculation of the series 
relies on the gross capital formation (GCF) data obtained from World Bank (2013), 
according to which: 
Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of 
outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the 
level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, 
drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or 
unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress." 
According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered 
capital formation. Data are in constant local currency. 
The series is in constant Rials based on 1997 prices and covers 1965 to 2007. 
However, to have capital stock in 1965 we need to have the GCF data for prior to 
this. We artificially create this by backcasting the data using a nonlinear 
extrapolation of data from 1965-1967 (our method is partially influenced by Wu, 
2008). The relationship we use is as below: 
 𝑦 = 2 × 1013𝑒0.1541𝑥 (2) 
Here 𝑦 is the backcasted GCF and 𝑥 is the difference of the backcasted year and year 
1965. For instance, GCF in year 1975 is calculated by inputting -10 into the above 
equation as 𝑥. Following this relationship we obtain values for GCF all the way back 
to 1900. 
Next, we assume that in 1900 the capital stock to be zero. Therefore, by adding 
(1 − 𝛿)GCF in 1900 we build capital stock for the year 1901. Subsequently, by 
adding the depreciated capital stock for each year to the previous year value we build 
our capital stock series. As noted in  Chapter 5 we use a depreciation rate of 4.9% in 
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line with the IMF study of Jbili et al. (2007) and their suggestion of 7% which is the 
long run international return to capital estimated in Siegel (1998). 
There are other methods of obtaining capital stock. One such method is using the 
capital output increments ratio and generating data for prior to 1965 accordingly. 
After estimating capital stock in this method it was concluded that the choice of this 
method does not substantially change our findings in TFP growth estimates. The 
series in provided in Table A, at the end of this appendix. 
Human Capital: 
As discussed the proxy for human capital has been calculated based on two variables. 
The employment data was obtained from the new Penn World Tables Version 8 
(Feenstra, et. al., 2013), or PWT8, measured in number of employed persons. The 
years of schooling is obtained from the Barro and Lee (2013) dataset which provide 
average years of schooling for a country under different age specifications. We use 
the variable for the above 15 year old population. The only problem here is that the 
data are provided in 5 year intervals. In order to obtain an annualised version, we use 
linear interpolation and calculate four points between each successive pairs of 5 year 
averages. By multiplying the two variables we obtain a series of human capital index 
from which we can obtain annual growth rates. The calculated series are reported 
below in Table B. See Figure A for a comparison of the historical trend of human 
capital index and its components. 
Output: 
The output data employed is GDP in Rials, at constant basic prices of 1997 which 
was obtained from CBI (2011).  
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Table A. Actual and Constructed Gross Capital Formation and Capital Stock, Iran, 1900-2007. 
Year GCF Capital Stock Year GCF Capital Stock 
1900 1041943326 0 1935 2.29198E+11 1.23917E+12 
1901 1215538943 1215538943 1936 2.67384E+11 1.44584E+12 
1902 1418056898 2574034432 1937 3.11933E+11 1.68692E+12 
1903 1654315871 4102222616 1938 3.63903E+11 1.96817E+12 
1904 1929937372 5831151080 1939 4.24532E+11 2.29626E+12 
1905 2251479493 7796904170 1940 4.95262E+11 2.67901E+12 
1906 2626592956 10041448822 1941 5.77777E+11 3.12551E+12 
1907 3064203152 12613620981 1942 6.74039E+11 3.6464E+12 
1908 3574722506 15570276060 1943 7.86339E+11 4.25406E+12 
1909 4170298235 18977630768 1944 9.17349E+11 4.96296E+12 
1910 4865101373 22912828233 1945 1.07019E+12 5.78996E+12 
1911 5675663952 27465763602 1946 1.24849E+12 6.75474E+12 
1912 6621272371 32741213557 1947 1.45649E+12 7.88026E+12 
1913 7724426284 38861320376 1948 1.69916E+12 9.19328E+12 
1914 9011373958 45968489635 1949 1.98225E+12 1.07251E+13 
1915 10512736820 54228770463 1950 2.31251E+12 1.2512E+13 
1916 12264238058 63835798769 1951 2.69779E+12 1.45967E+13 
1917 14307552612 75015397242 1952 3.14726E+12 1.70288E+13 
1918 16691298781 88030941557 1953 3.67162E+12 1.9866E+13 
1919 19472195038 1.0319E+11 1954 4.28334E+12 2.31759E+13 
1920 22716409585 1.2085E+11 1955 4.99697E+12 2.70372E+13 
1921 26501134742 1.41429E+11 1956 5.82951E+12 3.15419E+13 
1922 30916423654 1.65416E+11 1957 6.80075E+12 3.67971E+13 
1923 36067332997 1.93378E+11 1958 7.9338E+12 4.29278E+13 
1924 42076422683 2.25979E+11 1959 9.25563E+12 5.008E+13 
1925 49086672030 2.63992E+11 1960 1.07977E+13 5.84238E+13 
1926 57264881787 3.08322E+11 1961 1.25967E+13 6.81577E+13 
1927 66805642968 3.60019E+11 1962 1.46954E+13 7.95133E+13 
1928 77935966914 4.20314E+11 1963 1.71437E+13 9.27609E+13 
1929 90920686772 4.9064E+11 1964 2E+13 1.08216E+14 
1930 1.06069E+11 5.72667E+11 1965 2.1864E+13 1.24777E+14 
1931 1.23741E+11 6.68347E+11 1966 2.42286E+13 1.42892E+14 
1932 1.44357E+11 7.79955E+11 1967 2.64502E+13 1.6234E+14 
1933 1.68408E+11 9.10145E+11 1968 3.43832E+13 1.88769E+14 
1934 1.96466E+11 1.06201E+12 1969 3.63916E+13 2.15911E+14 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A. (Continued)  
Year GCF Capital Stock Year GCF Capital Stock 
1970 4.04735E+13 2.45805E+14 2005 1.60361E+14 1.79733E+15 
1971 3.94647E+13 2.73225E+14 2006 1.70008E+14 1.87927E+15 
1972 5.30042E+13 3.12841E+14 2007 1.87523E+14 1.97471E+15 
1973 4.6958E+13 3.4447E+14    
1974 8.07589E+13 4.0835E+14    
1975 1.11075E+14 4.99416E+14    
1976 1.33339E+14 6.08284E+14    
1977 1.38388E+14 7.16866E+14    
1978 1.06311E+14 7.8805E+14    
1979 7.75577E+13 8.26994E+14    
1980 8.40881E+13 8.70559E+14    
1981 7.50402E+13 9.02942E+14    
1982 7.30655E+13 9.31763E+14    
1983 9.74951E+13 9.83602E+14    
1984 6.90371E+13 1.00444E+15    
1985 6.07938E+13 1.01602E+15    
1986 6.59714E+13 1.03221E+15    
1987 7.74126E+13 1.05904E+15    
1988 5.79739E+13 1.06512E+15    
1989 6.99678E+13 1.0829E+15    
1990 1.01029E+14 1.13086E+15    
1991 1.27568E+14 1.20302E+15    
1992 1.22146E+14 1.26622E+15    
1993 9.01753E+13 1.29435E+15    
1994 6.10132E+13 1.29194E+15    
1995 8.01713E+13 1.3088E+15    
1996 1.03388E+14 1.34806E+15    
1997 1.04619E+14 1.38663E+15    
1998 1.01392E+14 1.42007E+15    
1999 1.03228E+14 1.45372E+15    
2000 1.11083E+14 1.49357E+15    
2001 1.08525E+14 1.52891E+15    
2002 1.24787E+14 1.57878E+15    
2003 1.46865E+14 1.64828E+15    
2004 1.538E+14 1.72132E+15    
Source: Based on World Bank (2013). 
Notes: The shaded cells are our estimated data.  
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Table B. Employment, Average Schooling and Human Capital Series, 1965-2007.  
Year Employment Schooling Human Capital Year Employment Schooling 
Human 
Capital 
1965 6.313222885 1.42 8.964776497 2000 18.03823661 7.13 128.6126 
1966 6.452240467 1.536 9.910641357 2001 19.12710571 7.316 139.9339 
1967 6.595560074 1.652 10.89586524 2002 20.3331337 7.502 152.5392 
1968 6.74423933 1.768 11.92381514 2003 21.66264343 7.688 166.5424 
1969 6.89978838 1.884 12.99920131 2004 22.94202995 7.874 180.6455 
1970 7.063215256 2 14.12643051 2005 24.09935379 8.06 194.2408 
1971 7.256586075 2.124 15.41298882 2006 24.21943855 8.176 198.0181 
1972 7.446401596 2.248 16.73951079 2007 24.2737484 8.292 201.2779 
1973 7.640528202 2.372 18.1233329     
1974 7.844747066 2.496 19.58048868     
1975 8.067655563 2.62 21.13725758     
1976 8.308641434 2.764 22.96508492     
1977 8.548978806 2.908 24.86043037     
1978 8.803553581 3.052 26.86844553     
1979 9.056785583 3.196 28.94548672     
1980 9.29546833 3.34 31.04686422     
1981 9.632472038 3.466 33.38614808     
1982 9.795509338 3.592 35.18546954     
1983 9.977619171 3.718 37.09678808     
1984 10.34186745 3.844 39.75413847     
1985 10.69631004 3.97 42.46435087     
1986 11.70791149 4.318 46.58581497     
1987 12.22628021 4.492 50.55476182     
1988 12.67041874 4.666 54.92045071     
1989 12.89583588 4.84 59.12017384     
1990 13.02176476 5.1 62.41584564     
1991 13.07407379 5.36 66.41100025     
1992 13.32289982 5.62 70.07703552     
1993 13.70032024 5.88 74.87469698     
1994 14.07029438 6.14 80.55788303     
1995 14.49456501 6.338 86.39160749     
1996 15.23224068 6.536 91.86655303     
1997 16.08504677 6.734 99.55792506     
1998 17.00391769 6.932 108.3167049     
1999 18.03823662 7.13 117.8711575     
Source: Based on Barro and Lee (2013) and Feenstra, et al. (2013). 
Notes: The shaded cells are our estimated data. 
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Figure A. Growth in Total Employment (L), Average Schooling (S) and Human Capital (HK), 
Iran, 1961-2010. 
 
Source: Barro and Lee (2013) and Feenstra, et al. (2013). 
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 TFP Results Using Labour Appendix 5.
The table below reports the results of TFP growth when using labour directly instead 
of the human capital proxy. 
Table A. Iran Output Growth and Its Components, based on labour only (Period’s Annual 
Average). 
Period Real GDP 
Growth 
Capital 
Contribution 
Labour 
Contribution 
TFP 
Contribution 
1966-76 
(pre-revolution) 
11.61% 0.65% 2.42% 8.54% 
1977-88 
(revolution/war) 
-2.13% 0.56% 2.94% -5.64% 
1989-2007 
(post-war) 
5.45% 0.30% 3.34% 1.82% 
1966-2007 
(Total) 
4.90% 0.50% 2.99% 1.45% 
Source: CBI, (2011), Barro and Lee (2013), Feenstra, et al. (2013) (PWT 8.0), World Bank (2013). 
The results are relatively different once we use labour instead of capital. The issue 
here is that this way the effect of schooling and quality of labour is being transferred 
to the TFP component of growth. This can be observed in the smaller growth 
contribution of labour compared to the human capital growth contribution discussed 
in  Chapter 5. This has led to the inflated estimates for the contribution of TFP in total 
growth for this scenario. 
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 Variables and Tables, Korea and Turkey TFP Estimation  Appendix 6.
Here due to maintaining more cohesion between estimates obtained for Korea and 
Turkey we have relied more on a single database, the PWT8. 
Capital: 
Capital stock is not built as for Iran. We employ the capital stock data from the 
PWT8 of Feenstra, et al. (2013). The variable used is called ‘rkna’ in the dataset 
which measures the capital stock at 2005 prices in USD. 
Human Capital: 
Human Capital has been constructed in the same manner as Iran discussed 
in  Appendix 4. 
Output: 
We employ output growth obtained from the output variable of the PWT8 dataset 
called ‘rgdpna’. It measures real GDP at constant 2005 national prices expressed in 
USD. 
We have also kept the assumption of a similar depreciation rate and return to capital 
rate of 4.9% and 7% respectively. Furthermore, the assumptions of perfect 
competition and increasing return to scale have also been maintained through our 
estimations for these two countries. 
Below in Table A we have provided TFP, output and input contributions for Korea 
and Turkey in the same periods for our study on Iran. 
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Table A. Output Growth and Its Components, Period’s Annual Average. 
Period Real GDP 
Growth 
Capital 
Contribution 
Human Capital 
Contribution 
TFP 
Contribution 
Korea     
1966-76 
 
10.21% 0.35% 6.80% 3.05% 
1977-88 
 
9.17% 0.46% 4.41% 4.30% 
1989-2007 
 
6.06% 0.54% 9.14% 2.75% 
1966-2007 
 
8.03% 0.47% 4.29% 3.27% 
 
Turkey 
    
1966-76 6.61% 0.18% 4.79% 1.63% 
1977-88 3.73% 0.12% 5.28% -1.67% 
1989-2007 4.33% 0.20% 5.81% 1.72% 
1966-2007 4.76% 0.17% 3.85% 0.73% 
Source: Barro and Lee (2013), Feenstra, et al. (2013) (PWT 8.0). 
 
 
 
